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The Hispanic population is the largest ethnic minority group in the United States  
and is projected to make up nearly one in three Americans by 2050. While the 
consequences of this demographic shift continue to be a growing area of interest for 
researchers of domestic politics, the potential implications for US foreign policy 
remain relatively overlooked. This paucity of attention is due in part to an assumption 
that Latino elites are almost exclusively focused on domestic concerns at the expense 
of foreign policy, evidenced by a lack of observable attempts by Hispanic elites to 
lobby the US government to influence foreign policy outcomes. 
  
This thesis argues that this assumption is misguided as it fails to appreciate the extent 
to which Hispanic elites engage with US foreign policy where it highlights, advances 
or compliments their domestic agenda. To demonstrate this point, the thesis 
examines case studies of foreign policy engagement by three political generations of 
Hispanic American elites: The Chicano generation in the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Exile generation during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic Latino generation from the 
1990s to the present day. Drawing on extensive interviews with foreign diplomats, 
Latino advocacy organisations and Hispanic Americans working within foreign policy-
related careers in the federal government, the thesis demonstrates that when the 
scope of foreign policy engagement is sufficiently broadened, a history of 
sophisticated discourse and policy engagement is revealed. The thesis findings 
therefore offer an original contribution to knowledge through the novelty of its 
central claim, the inclusion of new empirical evidence, as well as through the 
presentation of a new analytical framework – that of the political generation as a unit 
of analysis – with which to study ethnic minority group engagement with US foreign 
policy. 




“Make America Mexico Again!” was a slogan that materialised as one of the many 
rallying calls for Hispanic campaigners during the 2016 election cycle. Beginning as a 
Twitter hashtag, its usage and popularity grew exponentially after a young activist in 
New York named Jeronimo Saldaña began raising money for the refrain to be printed 
onto red baseball caps in a satire of Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ 
(MAGA) campaign.1  
 
As Saldaña explained in media interviews following high sales of the caps, the idea 
was to highlight what he perceived as the anti-immigrant undercurrent behind the 
MAGA messaging. From early in the campaign, Trump had claimed that the first half 
of the 20th century represented the zenith of US power, prestige and national 
accomplishment and it was to this imagined moment of American greatness that he 
was promising voters a triumphant return.2 Like many Hispanic activists, Saldaña 
suspected that behind this sentiment lurked an emphasis on an un-stated additional 
characteristic of this period: It reflected an era when the US population was 
overwhelmingly white, with Hispanics comprising less than 3.5% of the overall 
population.3 As a result, many activists objected to what they interpreted as the dog-
whistle meaning being signalled with this slogan: an appeal to a less ethnically diverse 
America, a time when the rights of many minority groups were significantly limited. 
 
The sentiment behind “Make America Mexico Again” (MAMA) was therefore an 
attempt to turn the narrative being promoted by the Trump campaign on its head, 
by drawing attention to the historical circumstances that led to many Hispanics 
finding themselves within the territorial boundaries of the United States: 
                                                     
1 Brian Latimer, “'Make America Mexico Again' Hat Maker: Satire Can 'Change Conversation”, NBC 
News, 4th May, 2016. [https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/make-america-mexico-again-hat-
maker-satire-can-change-conversation-n567896] 
2 Ibid. 
3 Pew Research Center, “Facts on U.S. Latinos, 2015: Statistical portrait of Hispanics in the United 
States”, Washington, DC: 18th September, 2017. [http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/09/18/facts-
on-u-s-latinos/#hispanic-rising-share] 
 12 
emphasising that for much of US history, the land that now comprised the southwest 
United States had in fact been part of Mexico. The transferal of sovereignty over 
much of the southwest territory only occurred following the ratification of the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American war in 1848 and saw large 
swathes of land stretching from California to Colorado become incorporated into the 
United States. As a result, the message that activists wanted to convey in 2016 was 
that for many Hispanics, their families had never actively crossed the border to enter 
the United States; their citizenship was instead a consequence of the machination of 
19th century US foreign policy. As a slogan, “Make America Mexico Again” therefore 
served to emphasise an ‘origin story’ that was radically different from the 
conventional depiction.  
 
Saldaña and his fellow Hispanic activists did not mean for the sentiment behind this 
slogan to be taken literally. Instead, they were using this theme to discredit the 
notion of a romanticised Anglo-dominant period in US history, by challenging the 
status of Hispanic immigrants as a subject of political discourse. This slogan was taken 
up by many pro-immigration groups and adorned banners, posters, and t-shirts of 
campaign activists. A viral YouTube video by a pro-Clinton political action committee 
saw young Latino activists criticise Trump’s immigration stances while wearing 
MAMA T-shirts.4 
 
In contrast, conservative political commentators and anti-immigration groups chose 
to view the adoption of the MAMA slogan as a symbol of the threats posed by 
immigration itself. Some suggested the sentiment was to be taken as evidence of a 
threat from Mexican nationals unwilling to assimilate to US political values.5 Others 
interpreted it as a warning of the mobilisation of voting immigrants by a Democratic 
                                                     
4 See: Deport Racism, “Latinos Vs. Trump’s Racist Rednecks”, 21st September, 2016. 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kw9TOPnXFw&frags=pl%2Cwn] 
5 L. Stranahan, “’Make America Mexico Again’: We Warned You About America-Hating Mobs”, 
Breitbart, 30th April, 2016. [https://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidential-race/2016/04/30/warned-
america-hating-mobs/] 
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party that had encouraged a narrative of non-assimilation in the hope of securing 
votes from immigrants.6 
 
The adoption of the MAMA slogan and the conservative reaction to it - a relatively 
small vignette within an electoral cycle overflowing with news-worthy idiosyncrasies 
-  reflects two distinct traditions of engagement with the history of US foreign policy, 
its implications for national security, and the consequences of immigration: The first 
tradition concerns the use by Hispanic activists of a politicised re-evaluation of US 
sovereignty over the territorial southwest as a vehicle for challenging the public 
discourse surrounding Hispanic immigrants. The second tradition; the framing of 
Hispanics as a threat to the United States, can be seen in the conservative reaction 
to the MAMA slogan: The suggestion that its use by Hispanic activists reflected a 
community that refused to politically assimilate, instead choosing to flirt with 
alternative political loyalties to Mexico, reflects a sentiment that has been a 
prominent feature of public discourse since the late 1980s. 
 
The case study of the MAMA slogan’s success offers a glimpse at the kind of complex 
engagement with US foreign policy, diplomatic history and national security that 
Hispanic activists have conducted for decades. Despite this, academic scholars of 
ethnic interest group engagement with US foreign policy have tended to dismiss the 
role of Hispanic Americans, pointing to a lack of any influence on the outcomes of US 
foreign policy as evidence of a lack of engagement on the part of Hispanic elites.  
 
However, as the MAMA case illustrates, there is an obvious space for Hispanic 
engagement with the wider discourse surrounding US foreign policy, including a 
sophisticated inter-contextualisation of the history of US foreign policy with 
contemporary domestic-orientated policies such as immigration. As a result, this 
thesis will explore and analyse the depth of Hispanic engagement with US foreign 
policy, in the hope of drawing attention to an under-studied topic area. 
                                                     
6 See, for example: D. Cadman, “Make America Mexico Again”, Center for Immigration Studies, 16 
May, 2016. [https://cis.org/Cadman/Make-America-Mexico-Again] 
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This thesis is based on the central research question: Under what circumstances, and 
in what ways, do Hispanic American elites engage with US foreign policy? 
 
To answer this question, the research consists of an analysis of engagement with US 
foreign policy by three political generations of Hispanic American elites.7 It draws on 
interviews conducted between 2015 and 2017 with nineteen nationally-focused 
Latino advocacy organisations (LAOs), two environmental policy-focused LAOs, 
sixteen Hispanic American individuals working in foreign policy-related careers 
within the US federal government, and three Mexican-American civil rights leaders 
that participated in the anti-war protests within the Chicano movement during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, further interviews were conducted with ten 
individuals working within the diplomatic and consular networks of three states: The 
United Kingdom, Canada and Mexico, as well as with a diplomat from a fourth state 
that wished to remain anonymous. Further research was conducted from an analysis 
of historical documents from archives held at the University of Southern California; 
the University of California, Los Angeles; California State University, Los Angeles; as 
well as the East Los Angeles Library. 
 
The thesis makes the following original contributions to knowledge, based on the 
following four claims:  
 
Firstly, it demonstrates that Hispanic American elites do engage with US foreign 
policy in a number of ways, but do so where it supports or compliments their 
domestic-focused campaigns and agendas. In addition, since the emergence of the 
pan-ethnic Latino generation elites from the 1990s to the present day, the thesis 
confirms the findings of earlier research studies that argue that Hispanic American 
elites do not routinely a lobby the US government on behalf of Latin American states. 
                                                     
7 In this thesis, the term ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Hispanic American’ are used interchangeably to refer to 
individuals and groups originating from Latin America, or who identify with a Latin American 
heritage. These terms are operationalised so as to encompass both national origin groups such as 
Mexican-Americans or Cuban-Americans, as well as pan-ethnic labels referring to the Latin American 
ethnic demographic in the US as a whole. The term ‘Latino’ is used to refer specifically to individuals 
and groups who fall within the ‘Latino generation’ category outlined in Chapter 2. 
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Secondly, it demonstrates that by broadening the analytical scope of foreign policy 
engagement, it is possible to identify a range of examples of foreign policy 
engagement than that which had been previously considered by the academic 
literature. Whereas the majority of previous research had limited the scope of its 
analysis to the extent to which Hispanic Americans have a direct influence on policy 
outcomes, this study broadens out the perimeters of legitimate ‘foreign policy 
engagement’ so to encompass engagement with US foreign policy discourse, 
resulting in a considerable amount of additional foreign policy engagement being 
revealed.  
 
Thirdly, whilst this provides new empirical evidence to substantiate and support the 
findings of some previous literature that Hispanic American elites are not the ‘threat’ 
to US foreign policy that high-profile critics have suggested they are, it also critically 
challenges a number of literature assumptions, including that the domestic-policy 
and foreign-policy agendas of Hispanic American elites were mutually exclusive. 
 
Finally, it emphasises the necessity of recognising the importance of different 
Hispanic political generations in order to understand Hispanic American foreign 
policy engagement, and presents a generational approach, based on the work of 
Mario T. García, as an alternative analytical framework for understanding foreign 
policy engagement. 
 
This chapter will provide an introduction to the main thesis. It will first demonstrate 
the contemporary relevance and importance of this research question, presenting it 
within the context of the significant demographic changes that have occurred within 
the United States since the 1990s, and the anticipation that Hispanic Americans are 
likely to rise in importance as political actors as they come to represent an 
increasingly large percentage of the overall US population in the 21st century. It will 
then demonstrate the importance and need for new research examining the foreign 
policy engagement by this Hispanic American community, given that the assumption 
of Latino political ascendancy has led a number of important US international 
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partners to significantly increase their outreach efforts to Hispanic elites within the 
US, under the assumption that they will come to play an important role in 
determining the future of US bilateral relations with their respective governments. 
These activities are examined in further detail in four case studies of states which 
have increased their engagement with the Hispanic community since 2012: that of 
Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada and Mexico.   The chapter will then provide an 
outline for the structure of the thesis, summarising the case studies and themes 
within each chapter. 
 
The political ascendancy of Hispanic Americans  
 
Within the last decade, there has been an upsurge in research investigating the racial 
and ethnic demographic makeovers that are set to transform the United States. By 
2050, the United States is predicted to be an ethnic minority-majority population, 
partly from immigration, but also due to exponential growth in domestic-born 
minorities.8 The Hispanic population will continue to be the driving force behind 
much of this change. In 2011, Hispanics became the second largest ethno-racial 
group in the US, and in 2014 became the single largest overall ethnic group in 
California, the state with the largest population, and is set to do the same in Texas 
by 2022.9  
 
The statistical significance of Hispanics, coupled with their heavy concentration in 
key swing states such as Florida, has led to some analysts, such as the demographic 
consultancy firm Ethnifacts, to declare the next hundred years as the ‘Hispanic 
Century’.10 In this analysis, the 21st century will be characterised by the social, 
economic and political ascendancy of Hispanic Americans. Following a logic of 
                                                     
8 R. Janik, “Over 50% of Americans Will Be Nonwhite Within 30 Years”, Time, 3rd March, 2015. 
[http://time.com/3730385/census-projections-diversity/] 
9 A. Ura & N. Ahmed, “Hispanic Texans on pace to become largest population group in state by 
2022”, The Texas Tribune, 21st June, 2018. [https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/21/hispanic-
texans-pace-become-biggest-population-group-state-2022/] 
10 Ethnifacts, “The Hispanic Century Is Here: Results and Implications of the 2010 Census” white 
paper, 24th March, 2011. P. 1. [http://latinodonorcollaborative.org/the-hispanic-century-is-here-
results-and-implications-of-the-2010-census/] 
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strength through size, such predictions anticipate that as Hispanics will continue to 
play an ever-increasing role in the labour market, enrol in education and participate 
in social security programmes, their political power is likely to increase even further. 
 
As a result, the last few years have witnessed the emergence of a public intellectual 
discussion over the extent to which these demographic changes, and the growth in 
the Hispanic American population, is likely to have an impact on the way that US 
foreign policy is conceived, debated and conducted. In a 2014 article for Chatham 
House, the UK-based international relations think tank’s ‘US Policy’ director and the 
former National Security Council staffer Xenia Wickett, suggested that the US’ rapidly 
changing ethnic composition, driven by Hispanic American growth, could lead to a 
more “open” and “accepting” foreign policy.11 Following the same theme, two US 
think tanks, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS) have in recent years establish diversity programs, inviting 
ethnic minority speakers to contribute to discussions on foreign policy issues in the 
anticipation that ethnic perceptions will be of increasing importance in the 21st 
century.12 Looking specifically at Hispanic Americans, the Chicano Council on Global 
Affairs conducted a survey of Latino perspectives on US foreign policy in 2015 to 
determine how far their views were consistent with the rest of the US population13, 
and in the same year a joint paper published by the US-based Center for American 
Progress (CAP) and the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in 
Mexico examined the possible impact of the growth of the Hispanic American 
population on US-Mexico relations.14 
 
                                                     
11 X. Wickett, “America Is in Transition – and So Is Its Foreign Policy”, Chatham House, 24th February, 
2014. [https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/197621#] 
12 The CFR established its ‘Diversity Initiative in Foreign Policy’ in 2012, and the CSIS commenced 
their “Diversity and Leadership in International Affairs Project” in 2017. See: 
[https://www.cfr.org/project/diversity-initiative-foreign-policy] and 
[https://www.csis.org/programs/diversity-and-leadership-international-affairs-project]. 
13 The results of this survey are analysed in further detail in Chapter 5. 
14 Center for American Progress and Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, “Latinos Are 
Shaping the Future of the United States: How the United States and Mexico Are Growing Together” 
research paper, November 2015. [https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/23114334/CAP-CIDE-report2-WEB.pdf] 
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In addition to this recent domestic curiosity in the potential impact of Hispanic 
Americans on US foreign policy, the growing political importance of the demographic 
has led to an increased interest in the community from foreign states looking to 
ensure their long-term bilateral relations with the US. In particular, this has become 
a priority for states that have a significant number of economic and political ties to 
the US and who view the long-term maintenance of positive relations with 
Washington’s elected government as a national priority. As part of this research 
project, the Hispanic outreach efforts of four states with significant political, 
economic, social or historical ties to the US were examined: These were the states of 
Mexico, Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel.15 As will be demonstrated in the 
next section, in the last few years, all four of these states have significantly increased 




Out of the four case studies examined here, Mexico has the longest history of 
developing connections with the Hispanic American community in the US. This is 
hardly a surprise given the size of the Mexican diaspora and the immediate proximity 
of the US-Mexico border as well as the economic importance of financial remittances 
from Mexican migrants to regional economies in Mexico. The importance of these 
realities to Mexico’s national interest has resulted in Mexico maintaining through a 
well-establish consular network, a relationship with Mexican-American organisations 
that have claimed to represent both Mexican nationals working within the United 
States, as well as undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
 
However, the level of outreach to the Hispanic American community has increased 
significantly in recent years.16 The embassy of Mexico began actively tracking the 
                                                     
15 Some scholars have suggested that these states constitute four of the five most prominent ‘special 
relationships’, alongside that of Japan, for the US government. See: P. Williams, British Foreign Policy 
Under New Labour, 1997–2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). P. 37. 
16 In a personal interview on the 19th of May, 2017, Alejandro Celorio Alcántara – the head of 
Hispanic and Migration Affairs at the embassy of Mexico in Washington – explained that while the 
majority of Mexico’s outreach was targeted at Mexican-Americans, the embassy engaged directly 
with pan-ethnic ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ organisations whilst working under an assumption that the 
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number of Mexican-American migrants as well as overall immigration patterns in 
2014, following an assessment that the number of children entering the United 
States from Mexico was going to have a huge impact on the dynamics of the 
demographic composition of the US population, which would, in turn, have an impact 
on the US-Mexico relationship.17 The same year, Mexico substantially increased its 
outreach to Mexican-Americans living within the US that were potential beneficiaries 
of the then newly-announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
initiative, that had been a cornerstone of President Obama’s immigration policy.18 In 
addition to providing legal, educational and consular assistance to DACA 
beneficiaries when the program was first announced, some consulates have since 
agreed to pay the $495 renewal fees for individuals that cannot afford the cost.19 
 
For Mexico, this outreach to the DACA recipients has been driven as much by a 
concern with Mexico’s image amongst Hispanic Americans as it has with fulfilling 
consular obligations to Mexican citizens living illegally in the US. Mexican officials had 
been concerned that for second and third generation Hispanic Americans, the image 
of Mexico presented by their immigrant parents is a negative one, with socio-
economic and political conditions sufficiently bad that it forced them to migrate 
north. The fear for Mexico’s politicians is that as these later-generation Latinos gain 
in political influence, their prejudices towards their ancestral homeland will result in 
a damaging of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship.20 Therefore, the increased level 
of outreach since 2014 reflects an enthusiasm from Mexico to capitalise on 
immigration reform as a way to build bridges with these Mexican-Americans. 
Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, the head of Hispanic and Migration Affairs section at the 
Mexican embassy in Washington, articulated this sentiment in his interview: 
 
                                                     
majority of the membership of - or target audience for - these organisations will be of Mexican 
heritage. 
17 Interview with Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, Natalia Jímenez and Ximena García, 19th May, 2017. 
18 Ibid. 
19 J. Serrato and A. Valle, “Mexican Consulate in Chicago offers to pay DACA renewals”, The Chicago 
Tribue, 8th September, 2017. [www.chicagotribune.com/hoy/ct-hoy-mexican-consulate-in-chicago-
offers-to-pay-daca-renewal-20170908-story.html] 
20 Interview with Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, Natalia Jímenez and Ximena García, 19th May, 2017. 
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People came to this country in the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s with a mindset that 
Mexico is corrupt and the institutions are weak. So we have to do a lot to regain their 
trust and rebuild those bridges. Their children, and DACA, has helped a lot. Because 
those kids that were brought here, when they were three or four, in the 1980s, had heard 
a lot about corruption in Mexico and blackmail opportunities. So when they were served 
by the consulates to obtain their DACA status, they were able to see that the consulates 
do a lot more than issue passports… and we want them to think that “Mexico is not what 
I thought it was”, so we have a lot of consular diplomacy, and we are very aggressive in 
sending the message that Mexico is a lot different, a lot has changed since your parents 
came.21 
 
This sentiment reflected an active concern that the negative image of Mexico 
amongst later-generation Hispanic Americans poses a significant threat to Mexico’s 
standing as the Hispanic American population grows in the 21st century. These 
attempts at displaying the generosity of the Mexico diplomatic apparatus in aiding 
the immigration process for undocumented Mexicans in the hope of casting itself in 
a benevolent light, has been accompanied in recent years by attempts to bring DACA 
recipients, who the Mexican government fears will share the same prejudices about 
Mexico as 2nd and 3rd generation Hispanic Americans, to Mexico for cultural and 
educational exchanges, in the hope that this promotes an affinity with a Mexican 
heritage.22 
 
These overtures to the Mexican-American community reflect the opposite of an 
attempt to leverage the presence of a large diasporic and heritage population in the 
US into a foreign policy lobby promoting Mexico’s interests. Instead, Mexico is 
putting considerable outreach efforts into an attempt to counteract the damage of 
the existence of this population: Rather than mobilising a Hispanic lobby, the 
Mexican government would appear to fear the consequences of one. As Alejandro 
Celorio Alcántara expressed in his interview, this realisation has in part been driven 
by a recognition that Mexico has, in the past, taken its emigrated population in the 
US for granted, assuming that they would cooperate with the Mexican government 
                                                     
21 Interview with Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, 19th May, 2017. 
22 Ibid. 
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to promote its political agenda.23 As he explains, the approach since 2016 has been 
radically different, with a focus on building cooperation on more modest areas of 
agreement:  
 
So we’ve been sending this message, and developing this relationship of respect and 
trust. We might not agree on everything, we know we share heritage, we are both 
perhaps born in Mexico, but your views and your decision to live in the US were already 
made and you want to be Mexican in the United States. And if you disagree with the 
policies of Mexico, that’s fine, let’s work together.24 
 
As this brief examination demonstrates, there is evidence that Mexico’s Hispanic 
outreach in recent years can be characterised by both an increased emphasis on 
proactively establishing relationships with Mexican Americans and Hispanics, as well 
as a decided shift in tone towards a more conciliatory narrative that recognises an 




The Canadian government has also increased its Hispanic outreach efforts in recent 
years, particularly following the 2016 election. When asked in an interview if the 
increased outreach effort to the Hispanic American community in that time was a 
result of the forecast growth in the Hispanic population, James Villeneuve, the Consul 
General of Canada in Los Angeles, confirmed that the consequences of demographic 
changes on the perception of Canada was indeed important: 
 
There’s no question that that’s part of it. When you start having demographics here, and 
elected officials here representing the demographics here, clearly these people will not 
only have local influence but they will also start to develop national influence. And just 
like if you had an elected official from one of the northern states like Michigan, they may 
have a strong understanding of Canada because of the geographic position, but here we 
would need to articulate our position with groups of people that may be a little bit 




different or not have a lot of knowledge of Canada. Most immigrant groups would be 
from Mexico or Central American countries, so they have a pretty good knowledge of 
Mexico or Latin America but not necessarily a strong knowledge of Canada. 25 
 
In this case, the Canadian outreach strategy is principally concerned with the 
prospect of the Hispanic American community challenging the familiar and positive 
image of Canada that it has developed in its bilateral relations with the US over many 
generations. However, much of Canada’s Hispanic outreach since 2016 has also been 
driven by the emergence, since the election of Donald Trump, of policy issues that 
have the potential to have a large impact on both Canada and Hispanic Americans. 
In particular, this has focused on two principle subjects: NAFTA and border security. 
The calling into question of the NAFTA agreement by President Trump has led the 
Canadian government, through local consulates, to establish joint discussions with 
US and Mexican groups on the impact of any reform to the free-trade arrangement, 
which have included Hispanic organisations as part of those discussions.26 
 
In addition, the centrality of border security and immigration reform to the 2016 
election, and the promise of a stricter immigration process by the Trump 
administration, has led to a significant increase in Hispanic outreach by the Canadian 
embassy and consulates within the US.27 These outreach discussions have taken two 
distinct strands: The first has been to react to a concern that Trump’s hard-line stance 
on Latin American immigration has led to an increase in the number of 
undocumented individuals leaving the US and crossing the border into Canada, as 
well as a spike in asylum requests, prompted by Canada’s reputation as a refugee-
friendly host.28 As James Villeneuve explained in his interview: 
 
We’ve also now having to deal with the potential of a large number of people with 
undocumented status thinking OK if we’re going to get deported, Canada might be a 
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destination. We’ve never had a situation like that before where people want to leave the 
United States and come to Canada: Normally, they’ve got here and this is where we want 
to be. And while it’s not like there’s a flood of this going on, we’ve had to establish an 
education program, and we’re using our networks with the Latinos communities to turn 
that on very quickly.29 
 
As a result, Canada sent Pablo Rodriguez, a Spanish-speaking, Argentinian-born 
Member of Parliament to Los Angeles to conduct a series of interviews with Spanish-
language media and meet with Central American consuls as well as refugee groups 
to discourage their crossing the northern border to claim refugee status in Canada.30 
The second strand of immigration-focused outreach has been an attempt to lobby 
Hispanic American elites on the differences between the US’ northern and southern 
borders: Canada has developed a concern that the post 2016 discourse on ‘border 
security’ could result in an argument for a tightening of border checks between the 
US and Canada, driven by Hispanic elites. As a result, the LA consulate has devoted 
attention to lobbying these elites on the difference between the borders, including 
taking a delegation of Hispanic American elites to Canada to see the border 
operations first hand.31 
 
Canada’s outreach efforts have focused on Hispanic American elected officials and 
advocacy organisations. Canadian diplomatic officials began attending NALEO’s 
annual conference from 2014, where they lobbied Latino politicians on areas in 
which they felt Canada’s policies would be seen as exemplary based on Hispanic 
policy preferences, such as on the topic of addressing climate change (as will be seen 
in the example of the UK, this is an area in which Canada wishes to advertise its 
extensive activities to a Latino community that they perceive as sympathetic to 
climate change action).32 Therefore, Canada’s outreach efforts to Hispanic American 
elites has increased considerably since 2012, a reflection of both their anticipation of 
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the growing political importance of the Latino demographic in constructing US-
Canada policy, but also as a result of post-2016 Trump administration policies that 
mutually concern both Canadian and Hispanic American interests in a manner never 
before seen. 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
The British government has also demonstrated considerable outreach efforts 
towards the Hispanic community in recent years. As in the case of the Canadian 
government’s efforts, the UK embassy in Washington DC interpreted the results of 
the 2012 election as a turning point in the political ascendency of the Hispanic 
American vote and forecast that the Latino community would only grow in political 
influence as the demographic increases in size.33 Echoing a sentiment expressed by 
Israeli officials, Matt Reents, the Head of Politics at the British Consulate-General in 
Los Angeles, articulated the importance of developing a relationship with the 
Hispanic American community in terms of maintaining the UK’s long-term interests 
in the US: 
 
We’ve been talking about Hispanic outreach for some time and our typical line is “we 
won’t have a special relationship in thirty years if we don’t do Hispanic engagement”. 
That special relationship is going to look very different in thirty years because America is 
going to look very different in thirty years.34 
 
The importance of continuing the ‘special relationship’ has been the principle lens 
through which Hispanic outreach has been considered by the UK government. Of 
particular concern has been the extent to which the growth of the Hispanic 
population within the US will have an impact on popular perceptions of the UK and 
US-UK relations among the US public.35 Given the importance of shared historical and 
cultural experiences in promoting the UK’s agenda in Washington, a Hispanic 
American demographic with a non-European heritage, with a large percentage of the 
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community having arrived in the US since the 1980s, poses challenges to the way in 
which the British government can deploy those shared experiences effectively.  
 
In a hope of addressing these concerns, the UK embassy commissioned private 
polling on the perception of the UK and of British culture among a sample of the 
Hispanic American population since 2013. This was driven by a fear of a possible 
“affinity gap”, where Hispanics felt less of a connection towards the UK than the 
general US population (which had a higher percentage of individuals with a British 
heritage). However, the survey in fact found that interest in the UK was as relatively 
high among Latinos,36 with Hispanic Americans displaying a high degree of affinity 
with both cultural emblems of the UK such as music and football, as well perceived 
political priorities for the British government such as climate change. In these areas, 
Latinos showed a much stronger interest than the rest of the US population.37  
 
The findings from this research has resulted in the UK constructing a strategy of 
outreach towards Hispanic American elites that have centred on the different Latino 
communities based around the UK’s consulates in LA, Miami and Houston. Efforts in 
Florida have focused on developing ties with Cuban-American business elites38, 
Mexican-Americans in Texas, and Mexican as well as Central American groups in 
California, that were more typically represented under a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label.39 
Much of these energies have been focused on arranging visits for local Hispanic elites 
to visit the UK to experience British culture: In 2015, the consulate-general in LA sent 
a Mexican-American social media personality to visit the UK alongside Jorge Ramos, 
a news anchor for the Spanish-language news channel Univision, who had been sent 
from the Miami consulate.40 Similarly, the UK government is developing an active 
pipeline of emerging political elites, with each consulate nominating two individuals, 
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with a total of twenty, that the UK can establish a working relationship with and invite 
to the UK for political and cultural exchanges, with the embassy in Washington 
anticipating that a significant proportion of these would be expected to be Hispanic 
in the immediate future.41 
 
Since 2012, the UK government has also undertaken significant outreach work with 
Latino advocacy organisations. For example, they have organised workshops with the 
Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU) since 2014 to promote 
Hispanic American students to study in the UK.42 Echoing the initiatives of the 
Canadian consulate, In 2017 the UK consulate-general in LA established a 
relationship with the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials 
(NALEO), attending both their annual conference and ‘boot camp’ in DC for newly-
elected officials, in which they hosted a workshop on the impact of Brexit as well as 
presenting an argument as to why Hispanic American officials should develop an 
interest in foreign policy.43 In 2018, the British embassy secured the right to develop 
a webinar series on foreign policy for internal educational use by NALEO’s 
membership, advertising this as a useful service for new Latino politicians and 
officials provided by the British government.44   
 
Thus, the United Kingdom’s outreach efforts mirror those of Canada’s in the sense 
that they were instigated in a significant way by the 2012 election results, and have 




Over the past decade, there has been considerable Hispanic outreach committed by 
both the Israeli government as well as the Jewish-American pro-Israel lobbies within 
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the United States. As in the cases of British and Canadian outreach, a key driver of 
Israel’s decision to establisher firmer ties with the Hispanic community was the 2012 
election, in which the perception of the growing political importance of Hispanic 
elites in policy discussions resulted in a significant escalation of efforts to reach out 
to the community in order to promote pro-Israel policies and foster a positive image 
of the state. These efforts were catalysed by a concern among pro-Israel groups that 
the future of US support for Israel was reliant on a sufficient degree of solidarity and 
sympathy from the US population, and Hispanics, without the historical or political 
ties to the Jewish state, pose a potential threat to that solidarity. In the weeks 
following the 2012 election, Michael Freund, the American-born Israeli founder of 
Shavei Israel, a conservative pro-government outreach organisation, and the former 
deputy communications director for Prime Minister Netanyahu, published an opinion 
piece in the Jerusalem Post stressing the need for Israel to reach out to a Hispanic 
American demographic growing that was growing in political influence: 
 
In 2012, Latinos constituted 10% of the US electorate for the first time, having added 
four million new registered voters in just the past four years. It is no wonder, then, that 
various Republicans are now racing to figure out how to win a larger share of the Hispanic 
vote in the future. Israel, too, needs to pay more attention to the Hispanic wave that is 
sweeping the American political world. In light of their growing clout, the Jewish state 
must take proactive steps to reach out to Latinos and enhance their familiarity and 
knowledge of Israel. To put it simply: we need to launch a comprehensive and 
coordinated hasbara, or public diplomacy, campaign that makes Israel’s case to 
Hispanics directly and “en Espanol.” In a democracy, demographic dynamism translates 
into political strength, and it won’t be long before we see a slew of Latinos rising through 
the ranks to the heights of decision-making power in Washington.45 
 
This call to action has been met by both the Israeli government and Jewish-American 
organisations within the US. From 2016, the Israeli consulate in New York began a 
series of outreach events with Hispanic churches in the city, including cultural and 
                                                     




artistic exchanges.46 In an interview about one particular event in 2017, Dani Dayan, 
the Israel consul general in New York emphasised that the rationale behind the event 
was a recognition that “Israel will not be able to maintain the level of support it has 
in American society” if it neglected to develop a relationship with Hispanic 
Americans.47 A particular focus of outreach efforts has been attempts to increase the 
profile of the state of Israel itself among the Hispanic population: Organisations such 
as the college student-oriented StandWithUS have focused on providing funding and 
dedicated workshops to Hispanic students, establishing a dedicated ‘Hispanic 
Outreach’ department in 2018 that offers ‘Latin American Fellowships’ to select 
Hispanic Christian students to become ambassadors for Pro-Israel policies on 
campuses and promote a Zionist position.48 In March 2018, the organisation ran a 
series of talks at a Hispanic church youth conference in Houston, providing 
merchandise and information about the group’s pro-Israeli positions.49  Other 
organisations have focused on targeting Hispanic American elites. The American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) held its inaugural ‘Hispanic Outreach’ summit 
in August 2016, an invite-only event that specifically targeted national and local 
elected Hispanic officials and leaders of advocacy organisations, from areas with a 
high concentration of Hispanics, or a district with a Hispanic representative in 
Congress. The summit, with travel and expenses for the Hispanic visitors paid for by 
AIPAC, emerged out of recognition from AIPAC that "as the Hispanic community 
grows both in numbers and political activism, its leadership plays an increasingly 
prominent role in shaping national foreign policy”.50 Following this same sentiment, 
the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in 2016, through their Project Interchange 
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platform that finances and organises visits to Israel for foreign diplomatic and 
political elites, took a delegation of Latino elites, drawn from elected officials as well 
as advocacy organisation leaders, to tour Arab-Israeli incorporation projects within 
Israel, in the hope of stimulating interest in Israeli approaches to immigration and 
assimilation issues among Hispanic Americans.51 In an attempt to consolidate this 
relationship, in January 2017 the AJC launched the Latino Jewish Leadership Council 
(LJLC), with the stated goal of working “to further strengthen Latino-Jewish 
cooperation in advocating for issues of shared concern and values cherished by both 
communities.”52 The LJLC’s membership consists of Hispanic American and Jewish-
American leaders from political, corporate and advocacy backgrounds, and includes 
a number of organisations from the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA).53 
In 2018, the organisation’s first annual conference, convened in Washington, had an 
agenda that included Puerto Rico’s reconstruction, the status of DACA, and US 
support for Israel.54 
 
This approach that attempts to combine a policy platform of support for Israel with 
interest and support for Hispanic American policy concerns such as DACA reflects an 
ongoing strategy by Pro-Israel organisations to win influence with Hispanic elites 
through the presentation as Israel, and Jewish-Americans, as natural allies on topics 
of importance for the Latino community. The AJC’s Belfer Institute for Latino and 
Latin American Affairs (BILLA), established in 2005, began to focus heavily on the 
Hispanic American community after 2012, emphasising what it advertised as the 
similar unique relationships that Latinos and Jewish-Americans have when it comes 
to international concerns. The organisation’s website asserts importance of these 
similarities on its website: “BILLA’s innovative approach recognizes the organic ties 
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between U.S. Latinos and their native or ancestral homelands, which echo the Jewish 
connection to Israel.”55  
 
Such a narrative seeks to stress solidarity between the Jewish and Hispanic 
communities not only in terms of both communities having a mandate to be 
interested in US foreign policy towards their countries of origin, but also based on 
their shared experience as immigrant groups to the United States. For example, in 
justifying organising a group of Hispanic American writers to visit Israel in 2016 
funded in part by the Israeli government, Irwin Katsof, the director of ‘America’s 
Voices in Israel’ - a pro-Israel lobby - emphasised that both groups should see 
themselves as “natural friends” as “they have a similar history: Immigrants to the 
United States, struggling to establish themselves in a foreign land.”56 For many Pro-
Israeli groups, this has resulted in organisations taking an active interest in 
immigration, in the hopes of building a common agenda with Hispanic American 
advocacy groups. As a result, Jewish-American groups since have begun lobbying 
support for immigration reform in Congress, and have helped organise local support 
across the US. Gideon Aronoff, the then-president of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society, outlined the importance of this philosophy in 2010, when he stated that “If 
we want to engage with the Latino community on issues that are of concern for us, 
including Israel, we need to engage on issues that bother their community”.57 Since 
2017, Pro-Israeli organisations such as the Jewish Community Relations Council has 
encouraged its local branches to devote energies to supporting the agendas of local 
Hispanic Americans, such as training local synagogues to provide ‘rapid response’ to 
help undocumented immigrants during deportation raids.58 
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In addition to the momentum generated since the 2012 election, Hispanic American 
outreach efforts by the Israeli government and pro-Israel organisations within the US 
has been driven in the past decade by a concern that the Hispanic population within 
the US has a lower opinion of Israel than the mainstream US population. A poll by 
the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in 2011 found that 42% of foreign-born Latinos, 
and 20% of native-born, were likely to agree with anti-Semitic statements as defined 
by the ADL.59 In addition, a 2012 survey commissioned by the AJC found that 31% of 
Hispanics reported that they had no “familiarity” with Jews on a day to day basis60, 
and a 2011 study commissioned by the New York-based Foundation for Ethnic 
Understanding suggested that 46% of Hispanic Americans felt that the U.S. provided 
too much support for Israel.61 As a result, this backdrop provided a strong incentive 
for the government of Israel and its US-based lobbies to establish ties of solidarity 
and political alliances with Hispanic American leaders beyond simply reacting to 
demographic change, and, as a result, the period between 2012 and 2018 has seen 
significant outreach efforts between the two communities, suggesting that Israel 
views the Hispanic American community as one of future importance for determining 
the nature and scope of US-Israel policy. 
 
Through an examination of the recent Hispanic American outreach efforts by these 
four states with historically-important relationships with the United States, there is 
convincing evidence that the US' international partners are interpreting the 
demographic growth of the Hispanic American community as a sign that the Hispanic 
population is only going to becoming more influential in US politics over the coming 
decades. Not only have all four states significantly increased their outreach efforts in 
various ways since 2012, but they have specifically pointed to the need to develop 
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ties with Hispanic American elites as part of their long-term strategies for the future 




Despite the focus from other states on the demographic growth of the Hispanic 
American community having potential implications on the framing and delivery of US 
foreign policy, existing academic literature has largely neglected the study of 
Hispanic Americans, either as a potential source of US foreign policy influence, or as 
participants in foreign policy discourse. As this thesis will outline, the research that 
does exist, whilst useful, has been somewhat limited by a relatively narrow focus 
when looking at the issue of Hispanic American engagement: 
 
Firstly, the existing literature has concentrated on the existence of home-country ties 
between Hispanic American groups and their country of origin, or between diaspora 
communities and their homelands. In particular, there has been an extensive focus 
on the extent to which Hispanic Americans, either as a single pan-ethnic group or as 
individual national-origin communities, have attempted to operate as ‘ethnic 
lobbies’ seeking to influence the outcomes of US foreign policy towards a particular 
Latin American state with which they feel an ethnic affinity. In this sense, the existing 
literature has sought to identify how far Hispanic Americans operate as a foreign 
policy lobby in the same manner as other ethnic groups such as Jewish-American 
organisations lobbying for Israel. Secondly, whether through an analysis of the 
implications on US bilateral relations with specific states such as Cuba or Mexico, or 
through the scrutiny of the implications of Hispanic American participation in 
international affairs on the larger state of US-Latin America relations, the existing 
literature has limited the analytical framework for considering Hispanic American 
engagement with US foreign policy to an almost exclusive contextual focus of the 
population’s Latin American heritage. 
 
As a result, this literature fails to account for the possibility of Hispanic American 
engagement beyond these narrows analytical confines: That they may participate in 
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foreign policy debates on issues beyond simply in their countries of origin; that they 
may engage with foreign policy discourse without necessarily having a significant 
impact on policy outcomes, and that Hispanic American elites may engage with 
foreign policy without resorting to forming into organised ‘lobbies’. In short, the 
narrow analytical focus taken by the existing literature risks overlooking subtler, but 
no less informative, methods of foreign policy engagement by Hispanic Americans. 
 
The thesis will, therefore, set out to demonstrate how a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of Hispanic American elite engagement with US foreign policy can be 
identified when the analytical frame is sufficiently widened to incorporate a broader 
engagement with foreign policy discourse as well as outcomes. In addition, by 
adopting an analytical approach that considers Hispanic elites as distinct political 
generations, each with unique characteristics, important differences between 
Hispanic generations in terms of foreign policy engagement across different decades 
can be accounted for. Finally, by examining the intermestic nature of many US 
foreign policy issues, the thesis is able to identify ways in which Hispanic American 
elites are able to incorporate an engagement with US foreign policy into their 





Chapter 1 of the thesis consists of the literature review. It outlines the limited 
available literature on Hispanic engagement with foreign policy, and demonstrates 
the different areas of focus within this body of research. These include the 
scholarship examining how far Latinos have attempted to operate as an ‘ethnic 
lobby’ for their countries of origin; studies that looked evidence of transnational 
engagement between Hispanic communities and Latin America, such as through 
home-country associations as well as financial remittances; and research that 
examines the extent to which Hispanic Americans hold different views on foreign 
policy compared to the wider US population. The chapter contextualises this 
literature within the wider discourse of the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s, which focused 
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on the role of immigration and demographic change in altering the political identity 
and socio-economic wellbeing of the United States following the end of the cold war. 
 
Chapter 2 presents an alternative framework for examining Hispanic American 
engagement with US foreign policy that is to be used throughout the thesis. Building 
on the work of Mario T. García, it outlines an adapted generational approach to 
understanding Hispanic American elites: This approach identifies that the Hispanic 
community can be divided into distinct political generations over the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, and that each generation contained within it a unique 
organisational structure and political culture. These differences between each 
political generation resulted in notably different types of foreign policy engagement 
by political elites within each generation, across different decades.  
 
Using this generational approach as a conceptual framework for understanding the 
changing nature of this foreign policy engagement by Hispanic Americans from the 
late 1960s to the contemporary era, it then briefly outlines the three political 
generations that will be examined as case studies in this thesis: The Mexican-
American ‘Chicano’ generation in 1960s, the Cuban and Central-American ‘Exile’ 
generation during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ generation in 1990s.  
 
Chapter 3 examines US foreign policy engagement by political elites within the 
Chicano generation from 1965 to 1974. Specifically, it examines the different ways in 
which US foreign policy was articulated and operationalised by the ‘four horsemen’ 
leaders of the movement, as well as by the leadership of the Chicano Moratorium 
Committee that organised Mexican-American protests against the war in Vietnam. It 
identifies three ways in which Chicano elites engaged with US foreign policy: Firstly, 
by engaging with foreign policy discourse: the chapter demonstrates how a critical 
re-interpretation of the romantic history of US foreign policy and the notion of 
manifest destiny was an integral component in constructing Chicano ethnic 
nationalism, La Alianza’s Land Grant campaign in 1966, and the Brown Beret’s 
occupation of Catalina Island in 1972. Secondly, by engaging with policy: the chapter 
demonstrates how high-profile opposition to Vietnam War was used to bring 
 35 
attention and support for Chicano domestic civil rights campaigns by linking the 
injustices of the war to injustices faced by Mexican-Americans in everyday life. 
Finally, by engaging as private diplomatic actors: The chapter demonstrates how La 
Alianza and the Raza Unida Party, two of the four major Chicano organisations, 
attempted to lobby Mexico to make Chicano civil rights a diplomatic issue in US-
Mexico bilateral ties, and looks at the international outreach efforts by Cesar Chavez’ 
National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) to promote farmworkers’ strike. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the ways in which the Exile generation elites engaged with US 
foreign policy during the 1980s. In particular it looks at how which Cuban exile elites 
made opposition to Castro regime central to their political agenda. This allowed the 
Cuban-American community to enjoy substantial political and financial benefits as a 
result of the elite’s close ties with the Reagan administration. The chapter then looks 
at the ways in which the Central American exile community contributed to protests 
against US foreign policy in Central America as part of the Central American Peace 
and Solidarity Movement (CAPSM). In both cases, the level of foreign policy 
engagement was a reflection of the fact that the exile status of the elites meant that 
they had an intention to return to their countries of origin and therefore their 
attempts to influence the Reagan administration were driven by a very different 
motivator to other Hispanic generations that were committed to US citizenship. In 
this sense, the elites of the Exile generation in the 1980s were operating in a way that 
closest reflected an ethnic lobby. The chapter then contrasts this high-profile 
engagement by Exile elites with the lack of engagement by Mexican-American elites 
during the same period, which saw Mexican-American organisations resisting 
criticising Reagan-era foreign policy in part due to their desire to present a more 
mainstream, politically-incorporated image following the radial nationalism of the 
Chicano generation. 
 
Chapter 5 examines foreign policy engagement amongst the pan-ethnic Latino 
generation elites in the contemporary era, with a particular focus on the post-2012 
period. In doing so, it looks at engagement with US foreign policy among a selection 
of the most high-profile national Latino advocacy organisations (LAOs) in US, drawn 
 36 
from organisations with membership of the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, an 
umbrella of the most politically influential Hispanic American groups. This chapter 
confirms some findings of previous studies from the 1990s, indicating that Latino 
generation LAOs continue to avoid emphasising foreign policy issues on their 
agendas in the manner of ‘ethnic lobbies’, and do not engage with US foreign policy 
to the extent witnessed by either the Chicano or Exile generation elites. This is due 
to the pan-ethnic nature of the Latino generation, in which elites must represent a 
diverse population of different national origin groups, and therefore must construct 
policy agendas based on a limited range of shared domestic, socio-economic 
priorities rather than utilising an ethnic affinity for a particular country of origin. 
However, the chapter finds that on certain intermestic topic areas where US foreign 
policy issues overlap with these socio-economic priorities, there is the possibility of 
an emerging Hispanic foreign policy agenda with which LAOs are willing to engage. 
As the chapter outlines, this is the case in particular with two policy issues: 
Immigration, as well as climate change and the environment. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the arguments used to promote Hispanic participation in US 
foreign policy by Latino foreign policy practitioners (FPPs), drawn from self-identified 
Hispanic Americans working in foreign policy-related careers within the US 
government. The chapter identifies three narratives used to promote the 
recruitment of Hispanics into foreign policy roles in the federal government: Firstly, 
that Latinos are natural diplomats: That the experience of Hispanic Americans having 
to navigate two different cultures (and often two languages) makes them ideally 
suited for diplomatic careers. Under this argument, they are often more capable of 
understanding foreign ‘high-context’ cultures than Anglo-Americans given their 
similarities to Latin American culture. Secondly, that recruiting more Hispanic 
Americans and diversifying the US foreign policy workforce will benefit the US image 
abroad: This is an argument that Hispanic diplomats and foreign policy practitioners 
representing the US will over-turn stereotypes and allow for better relations, 
particularly in the developing world. Finally, it examines the argument that recruiting 
a greater number of Hispanic Americans will result in better foreign policy decisions 
being made by federal agencies. As the chapter outlines, this uses an argument that 
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a more diverse workforce will allow for better decision-making than would happen 
with a homogenous group. The chapter establishes that the deployment of these 
three narratives represents a sophisticated and coordinated effort between 
Hispanics working within foreign policy institutions and the US federal government, 
and represents a willingness to emphasise the ethno-cultural nature of Latino 
engagement with US foreign policy by practitioners. 
 
The case studies that will be examined in this thesis and outlined above were selected 
in part out of a desire to include a relatively comprehensive chronological account of 
the major ‘moments’ of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy from the 
1960s onwards. Principally however, the case studies of the Chicano and exile 
political generations were identified due the focus and attention they receive in 
wider literature on the history Hispanic political elite behaviour during the latter half 
of the 20th century. The relatively high-profile status within the history of the Hispanic 
American population in the United States of both the Chicano movement in the 
1960s and 1970s, in addition to the arrival and political mobilisation of Cuban and 
Central American refugees during the 1980s, meant that it was possible to identify 
from the existing literature available on these topics moments of foreign policy 
engagement by Hispanic elites, or themes and issues that were related to foreign 
policy that was being presented as part of a historical, domestic analysis. As a result, 
these offered a potentially rich vein of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign 
policy that had previously been relatively overlooked by existing scholarship. 
 
As indicated above, the semi-structured elite interview was deployed as the principle 
research method for gathering evidence in this thesis. As Alan Morris identifies in A 
Practical Introduction to In-depth Interviewing, this method has several advantages 
over conducting larger-scale surveys:  
 
It is possible to get an idea of how people see the world through the use of a survey 
questionnaire, observation, blogs and secondary sources, but the strength of the in-
depth interview lies in its ability to create a research space in which the interviewee is 
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able to tell their story and give the researcher a range of insights and thoughts about a 
particular topic.62 
 
To this end, interviews were used in this thesis as this allowed for a qualitative 
analysis that could complement the information that had already been offered by 
previous literature on the topic of Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy that 
had deployed survey data and analysed large-scale trends. By interviewing Chicano 
civil rights leaders in the 1960s, it was possible for them to offer an interpretation of 
how they felt their actions fitted into a sense of foreign policy engagement, and 
which specific actions they felt were important or had been most successful during 
the Chicano movement, given the hindsight of several decades. In the case of semi-
structured interviews with Latino advocacy organisations and Hispanic foreign policy 
practitioners, the interview method overcame the problem of a lack of documentary 
evidence and secondary source material with which to assess the perspective and 
thoughts of contemporary Hispanic elites on US foreign policy matters.  
 
The principle disadvantage of the interview, as identified by Morris, is the possibility 
that the information being provided by the interviewees is inaccurate.63 This is of 
particular concern with the interviewees from the Chicano movement, who were 
being asked to provide information related to specific historical events in which they 
were participants and incorrect information therefore endangered the ‘historical 
accuracy’ of the case studies. As a result, archival research was undertaken, 
principally related to the chapter 3 case study of the Chicano anti-war movement, in 
order to attempt to triangulate the information being provided by interviewees and 
minimise the risk of inaccurate information being presented in interviewee 
testimony. 
 
Much of the analysis in Chapter 4 of foreign policy engagement by exile generation 
elites was drawn from secondary sources, as was elements of the analysis of 
                                                     
62 A. Morris, A Practical Introduction to In-depth Interviewing (London: SAGE Publications ltd, 2015), 
P. 5. 
63 Ibid., P. 7 
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speeches, poetry and activities by Chicano elites in Chapter 3. Where these 
secondary sources were used extensively, it was because the available material 
provided excellent examples of empirical evidence to support the central thesis 
claims, and had not been previously examined or considered by the primary 
literature on Hispanic elites in US foreign policy. Therefore, by introducing these 
secondary sources into the analysis, it highlights important additional empirical 
material to the wider debate, from research that had previously been absent from 
the academic discussion on Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy. 
 
When deploying the term ‘elite’ in this thesis, it draws on Ursula Hoffmann-Lange’s 
operational definition, with elites as “groups or individuals with regular and 
substantial influence on important decisions within an organization or a society” that 
“command important resources enabling them to influence important decisions”. 64 
In this case, this relates to the ability of Hispanic individuals and organisations to 
command ‘resources’ and ‘influence’ related to the topic of US foreign policy. 
Individual Hispanic Chicano leaders from the 1960s and 1970s, in addition to 
national-origin and pan-ethnic advocacy organisations during the 1980s and present-
day respectively, were all able to command the resources of their relevant Hispanic 
networks and were recognised as legitimate ambassadors for either a constituency 
of the Hispanic population, or the Hispanic population as a whole. As a result, in the 
case of contemporary Latino generation advocacy organisations and Hispanic foreign 
policy practitioners, they were considered ‘elite’ for the purposes of this thesis as 
they would likely be considered legitimate representatives of the Hispanic 
community when speaking on US foreign policy issues by the US government, media 
and foreign policy establishment: Latino advocacy organisations due to their status 
as ambassadors on domestic politics, and Hispanic foreign policy practitioners due 
their existent foreign policy expertise. 
 
                                                     
64 U. Hoffmann-Lange, “Methods of Elite Identification”, In H. Best and J. Higley (eds.), The Palgrave 
Handbook of Political Elites (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018). PP. 79-80 
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When using the term ‘Hispanic’, this thesis defines this as individuals and 
communities of Spanish-speaking origin in Latin America & the Caribbean, who self-
identify either with a pan-ethnic Hispanic label or with a Latin American or Spanish 
Caribbean national-origin label. This definition does not assume a pan-ethnic identity 
amongst the Hispanic population and indeed, the changing nature of this identity, 
and its instructive role in the evolution of Hispanic elite composition and behaviour, 
is explored in Chapter 2. ‘Latino’ is used to describe elites that belong to the pan-
ethnic Latino political generation, or to the membership of those organisations since 
1990 where the actions of the membership would appear to be publicly invoking a 
sense of political or cultural pan-ethnicity.  
 
Whilst the scope of this thesis is contained to an analysis of the extent to which 
Hispanic elites engage with US foreign policy, it nevertheless raises important 
questions concerning the nature and role of power within the United States and how 
it operates within the American state. In particular, both the conceptual framework 
of political generation and the empirical accounts of differing types of foreign policy 
engagement, present potential challenges to the pluralistic model of the state. 
Specifically, the evolution in political engagement between Hispanic generations, 
from a platform of opposition towards the US government to one of active 
incorporation, indicate that Hispanic elites believe they can best achieve political 
success where they configure an image of their community to best fit within a 
pluralistic model, and in turn work ‘within the system’.  
 
However, rather than providing evidence that the pluralistic model therefore best 
explains the operation of power in the US state, it in fact suggests the opposite: By 
conforming to an image of successful ethnic assimilation, this leaves any established 
ethnic hierarchy within the US power structure unchallenged. In the case of foreign 
policy engagement, the shift from a position of resistance to deference over 
government planning and execution of foreign policy further hints at the continuing 




Whilst these conceptual areas are not the focus of this thesis, their potential 
implications for the wider debate over the role and nature of power within the US 




Chapter 1: “Latinos are more concerned with domestic 
issues”: A review of the existing literature concerning 





This chapter will outline the relevant literature that researches Hispanic American 
engagement with US foreign policy. It will begin with an examination of the literature 
that considers whether Latinos operate as a traditional ethnic lobby akin to Jewish-
Americans. It will then identify some of the problems with this literature, in particular 
the lack of focus on the priorities and level of engagement of Latino elite actors, 
before highlighting the useful insight offered by the small number of studies that 
have so far been conducted on Latino elites. It will then examine scholarship that 
looks at individual aspects of possible Latino foreign policy engagement, including 
various features of a hypothesised ‘transnational’ identity that incorporates both 
Latin American and US political engagement.  
 
Finally, it will outline the ways in which this existing literature, whilst useful, is limited 
by the context in which a significant proportion of the research was published: Much 
of the literature was written against a backdrop of the high-profile anti-immigrant 
narratives of the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s. The chapter will therefore observe the 
tendency for much of the existing literature to be influenced by a desire to respond 
to the claim by prominent public intellectuals that any Latino engagement with US 
foreign policy is going to represent a ‘threat’ to the security and prosperity of the US, 
and will highlight the claim by several authors that Latinos are expected to have a 
detrimental impact of US foreign policy by virtue of their growing size as a 
demographic as well as their reluctance to assimilate towards the traditional 
American political values that inform foreign policy decision-making. 
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Overall, the literature on Latino engagement with US foreign policy is notable mostly 
due to an overall scarcity. Since 1970, there has only been one dedicated monograph, 
in addition to a handful of chapters and articles devoted specifically to the topic. Of 
the relevant literature that does exist, it can be found into two distinct research 
areas. One area concentrates on measuring the extent to which Latinos operate as a 
traditional foreign policy lobby, building on the body of scholarship that has looked 
at the circumstances in which ethnic minority groups interact with US foreign policy 
more generally. The other area of literature looks at the extent to which Latinos 
engage in transnational interaction with their countries of origin through home-town 
associations and financial remittances. Whilst these analyses offer useful insight on 
particular perspectives of foreign policy engagement, they nevertheless leave certain 
aspects unexamined: These studies look mostly at the relationship between Latinos 
and Latin America, or between individual communities and their countries of origin. 
In addition, these have tended to ignore examinations of elite Latino actors in favour 
of focusing on the demographic as a whole. The main study that does choose to look 
at elites, a 1997 study by Harry P. Pachon, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, and Adrian D. 
Pantoja offers a useful insight into the foreign policy preferences of a sample of 454 
Latino political and business leaders.65 This provides a useful starting point for further 
examination, but offers a static picture of foreign policy leaders and therefore 
warrants re-visiting.  
 
Latinos as an ethnic lobby 
 
The first major area of research that explores Latino engagement with US foreign 
policy attempts to ascertain the extent to which Latinos can be considered an ‘ethnic 
lobby’ that would seek to advance the interests of their ethnic ‘kin’ in Latin America. 
Ambrosio defines such lobbies as representing organised interest groups that ‘seek 
to influence U.S. abroad in line with a specific agenda’ and that they represent 
“political organizations established along cultural, ethnic, religious, or racial lines that 
                                                     
65 H. P. Pachon, R. O. de la Garza, and A. D. Pantoja, “Foreign Policy Perspectives of Hispanic Elites,” 
in R. O. de la Garza and H. P. Pachon (eds.), Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the 
“homeland”? (Walnut Creek, CA, United States: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2000). 
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seek to directly or indirectly influence U.S. foreign policy in support of their homeland 
and/or ethnic kin abroad.” 66 
 
Since the end of the Cold war, a flurry of research has focused on investigating the 
presence of such lobbies, their factors in success or failure at swaying policy and their 
relative overall influence relative to other non-ethnic lobbies. Melvin Small makes 
the case that foreign policy lobbies are well-placed to play an influential role in the 
foreign policy-making process, due to the sizeable role Congress plays in foreign 
policy, a consequence of the separation of powers.67 Tony Smith suggests that 
following the end of the Cold war, ethnic interest groups took advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by these institutional set-ups, and coupled with a lack of any 
foreign policy consensus following the Cold war, they have since begun to play an 
increased role in the foreign policy-making process. 68 His analysis is negative in tone: 
he follows Huntington and Schlesinger in suggesting this reflects a worrying move 
away from a foreign policy guided by the US national interest. 
 
Drawing the opposite normative conclusion, Shain argues that the processes of the 
US politico-cultural system, where a citizen is automatically enfranchised to engage 
with the public sphere and the political process so long as they adhere to the liberal-
democratic principles at the core of US political culture has meant that ethnic 
diasporas have been tolerated and sometimes even celebrated as evidence of the 
plurality and diversity of US society. 69 His conclusion agrees with Smith’s analysis 
that lobbies exist and play a role in US foreign policy, but where Smith forecasts 
negative consequences, Shain celebrates this new phenomenon as a welcome and 
proportionate one.   
 
                                                     
66 T. Ambrosio, “Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in T. Ambrosio, Ethnic Identity 
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Ambrosio attempts to reconcile these two positions by claiming that with the re-
convergence on combatting terrorism that dominated US foreign policy after 9/11, 
successful ethnic lobbies need to convince the wider public and decision-making 
actors that their specific agendas are in line with wider national interests. 70 
  
Others have looked at the circumstances under which an ethnic lobby could be 
successful: Saideman, for example, attempts to determine how the structure of an 
ethnic lobby affects its ability to influence policy. 71 He puts forward the case that 
smaller lobbies are at an advantage due to lobby over specific policies of influence to 
a homogenous, specific community. He provides the example of Armenian 
Americans successfully lobbying against an extension of aid to Azerbaijan, making 
use of their small size and cohesive, clear agenda. Rubenzer goes further and 
develops a qualitative analysis of multiple case studies of lobbies in an attempt to 
isolate which factors determine their influence, and finds that despite numerous 
hypothesis put forward by different academics, only the organisational strength and 
the level of political activity are important determinants of successful minority 
influence, with energetic, well-organised lobbies having the most success. 72 
  
Building on this larger literature that attempts to map out the influence at ethnic 
lobbies generally, there has been a limited number of studies that have either 
focused on the extent to which Latinos constitute their own ethnic interest group for 
the purposes of foreign policy, or have examined the possibility of Latinos forming 
one in the near future. Generally, there are very few texts that examine Latinos as a 
foreign policy interest group and of those that do exist, there is little consensus over 
methodology or definition over what constitutes an ethnic interest group, or what 
can be considered foreign policy behaviour. In addition, of the literature that exists, 
it can be divided into two categories: studies that examine Latinos specifically, and 
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those that use Latinos as comparative case study alongside other ethnic groups as 
part of an analysis of a model of ethnic interest group behaviour. 
 
Generally, the studies reflect a consensus view that Latinos, as a cohesive group, are 
a poor fit under an ethnic lobby model. They also largely agree that Latinos, when 
examined as an ethnic interest group, do not exert the level of influence of successful 
groups such as the Jewish-American pro-Israel lobby. Within the literature, there are 
several hypothesised explanations put forward to account for this: that Latinos 
within the United States are divided in terms of political interests for a variety of 
reasons; that Latinos are more likely to prioritise domestic, socio-economic concerns 
over foreign policy issues; and that where they do look at foreign policy of Latin 
America, there is little consensus over what should go into proper and effective US 
foreign relations towards the region. 
 
The principal argument, put forward by Michael Jones-Correa, is that Hispanic 
Americans have failed to organise themselves into a cohesive and successful foreign 
policy interest group due to the division within the Hispanic community between first 
and second generations.73 The former group will exert a considerable degree of 
energy on establishing ties with their countries of origin and will participate in 
transnational activities such as sending remittances back to their country of origin, 
participating in home-country elections if they retain citizenship of have dual-
nationality, as well as showing a generally higher level of interest and concern for the 
politics and events in their country of origin. However, US-born Latinos, who are able 
to participate in the US political system and are more likely to have the socio-
economic resources or educational background to more effectively participate in 
influencing US foreign policy towards Latin America, do not do so as their political 
agendas are dominated by domestic concerns. According to Jones-Correa, it is only 
on the “intermestic” issue of immigration that the interest of these two distinct 
Latino groups overlap and result in coordinated and effective lobbying efforts.74  
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Domestic focus of Latino elites 
 
Tied to Jones-Correa’s argument is the claim that Latinos have not demonstrated 
consistent interest in influence US foreign policy towards Latin America because they 
have little active interest in doing so due to the more immediate need to improve 
the socio-economic situation for the Latino community that is disproportionately 
likely to experience poverty; low rates of school completion; be the victims of crime 
as well as receive insufficient access to affordable healthcare. As a result, the policy 
agenda of organised Latino groups is dominated by domestic concerns. Foreign policy 
towards Latin America is therefore not pursued with the same level of energy and 
enthusiasm as it may be by other ethnic groups.75  
 
Additionally, other authors have forwarded the explanation that Hispanics have 
resisted attempts to influence US foreign policy with regards to Latin America 
because there is no consensus over what that policy should look like, or what should 
constitute the policy agenda that Latinos should lobby on. Beyond individual cases of 
home-country relations with their specific Latino communities such as Cubans and 
Mexicans, a broad political consensus regarding Latin America policy does not exist 
within the Latino community as a whole.76  
Confounding this lack of policy consensus is the desire by Latinos, particularly first 
generation immigrants, to not want to appear disloyal to the United States. 
Appearing to lobby for the interest of foreign governments or on behalf of Latin 
American interests would risk calling into question the intentions of Latino interest 
groups in a manner that Huntington warned of. 
 
As a result of both  the lack of consensus and the incentive not to appear disloyal, no  
established organisation has effectively organised to lobby the US government on 
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behalf of all Latinos regarding foreign policy, in the way that Cuban Americans have 
done so with Cuba policy. 
 
Thus, much of the literature that focuses on the role of ethnic minorities such as 
Latinos and their engagement with US foreign policy has focused on the extent to 
which groups have organised themselves to influence the US government’s position 
regarding the country of ancestry or of particular interest for the ethnic group. Whilst 
there has been debate over the extent to which such ethnic ‘lobbying’ has an overall 
influence on US foreign policy, there is a consensus that some individual groups have 
had success in organising along such lines.  
Literature that has examined how far Latinos can be seen as a successful ethnic 
interest group on this basis has been relatively scarce. That which does exist has 
generally emphasised the obstacles that prevent Latinos from effectively ‘lobbying’ 
on behalf of Latin America, including a lack of consensus over policy, community 
divisions between immigrants and US-born Latinos, and the emphasis placed on the 
socio-economic agenda of Latino political activists. From the perspective of an ethnic 
interest group, Latinos can be considered a modest success at best. 
 
Problems with this literature 
 
Whilst this literature provides useful analyses that offer insight into particular 
aspects of foreign policy and international engagement, the focus on the ‘ethnic 
lobby’ analytical framework as the principle lens through which foreign policy 
engagement is viewed is problematic in several ways. 
 
Firstly, these studies focus on the Latino demographic as a complete unit of analysis. 
As a result, they, in general, do not attempt to make a claim about which elements 
with the Latino community are most likely to represent the community in foreign 
policy matters, or is likely to take a disproportionate interest in foreign policy. In 
particular, none of this literature considers the role of Latino elite actors in the 
foreign policy process, which may offer useful insights into the way in which political 
representatives of the Hispanic community forward a foreign policy agenda, or the 
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extent to which they take an interest in foreign policy issues and how their 
preferences may be different from non-Hispanics.  
 
Secondly, whilst the recent literature examining the domestic impact of Latinos has 
recognised the unique position that the demographic is in in terms of their 
unprecedented displacement of Anglo-Saxons in a growing number of states, the 
literature examining foreign policy engagement has largely failed to accommodate 
this fact. 
With studies that attempt to examine Latinos’ fitness as an ethnic lobby, they rely on 
organisational models that were developed to explain previous patterns of 
immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, treating Latinos as simply 
another manifestation of an incoming immigrant community to the ‘melting pot’, 
ignores the unique demographic change that will occur over the next several 
decades. With the US set to become a minority-majority, it is doubtful that these old 
organisational models, which rely on there always being a statistically dominant 
ethnic majority, may not be useful. Making direct comparisons with the Jewish or 
Armenian lobbies, with ethnic groups that continue to represent relatively small 
proportions of the overall population, is therefore problematic.  
 
Thirdly, what little empirical evidence that is offered by the literature is often based 
on analysis of aggregate statistics. Conclusions are drawn from large-scale surveys of 
Latino voters or random samples of the community, or trends are analysed from 
overall census data. Whilst undoubtedly useful in providing the kind of analysis that 
would be less easily available to an individual researcher, it can only offer limited 
understanding of the relationship between Latinos, ethnic identity and political 
preferences. It leaves unexplored any explanations from Latinos themselves as to 
why foreign policy preferences may be different from the mainstream, or 
explanations as to why they choose to engage or not engage with US foreign policy. 
 
Finally, the existing literature focuses overly on the level of direct influence Latinos 
have had on specific examples of US foreign policy. Whilst attempting to gauge their 
influence on US foreign policy is indeed important, an equally relevant question is 
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whether Hispanics show an interest in US foreign policy even if it does not have an 
impact at present, as a potential consequence of demographic growth could  greater 
impact in the future. 
 
These points mean that the existing literature, whilst useful, only offers partial insight 
into Latino engagement with foreign policy and their capacity to act as international 
actors. A greater focus on elites, qualitative methodology and a wider examination 
of engagement with foreign policy beyond simply looking at Latin America and 
government influence is necessary. 
 
The importance of ‘elites’ 
 
Given the limitations of a literature that focuses primarily on the Latino demographic 
as a whole, there are potential benefits to an approach that focuses on the role of 
elites and uses Hispanic American elites as the principal unit of analysis and for 
research. There are two principal motives why this is a prudent choice of focus and, 
by extension, why it is necessary to incorporate two different definitions of ‘elite’ as 
a source from which to draw the research sample. 
 
The first reason reflects the nature of the subject matter: The reality of US foreign 
policy is that it is dominated disproportionately by elite actors. This occurs at multiple 
levels of US foreign policy: It is elite-driven when relating to formal decision-making 
as this is an area that remains heavily concentrated among government institutions 
such as the Department of State, Department of Defense and centrally within the 
National Security Council. Beyond this, formal oversight of foreign policy is elite-
driven insofar as it constitutes a power that is invested in Congress, through the 
functions of foreign affairs-focused committees and the ability of the Senate to 
scrutinise Presidential appointments for foreign policy-related jobs. Coverage of 
foreign policy by the media remains the vestige of a network of professional foreign 
and diplomatic correspondents. Beyond that, wider scrutiny of US foreign policy is 
provided by academics working within related university departments, as well as 
think tanks, NGOs and the political party not currently running the administration. 
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The actual conduct of US foreign policy conduct is carried out by a workforce of 
diplomats, military and intelligence officers, US trade representatives and a select 
few other groups that represent the US government in some formal diplomatic 
capacity on a full-time basis.  
 
The individual specialists involved in the day-to-day execution of these various 
foreign policy activities would be considered to possess foreign policy expertise and 
can broadly be considered to represent the foreign policy elite. Given the uniquely 
privileged position of such elite actors, it would be prudent and logical to include 
Latinos that operate within this foreign policy elite as a source of insight. 
 
The second reason relates to the nature of Hispanic politics. The political organisation 
and representation of Latinos is dominated by elected officials as well as around 
ethnic interest groups. John A. Garcia identifies several variations of such groups, 
including mass-membership ones such as advocacy groups like the League of United 
Latin American Citizens, or professional-based organisations, such as those 
representing business interests or Hispanics within a particular trade or industry. In 
addition to this, organisations can be class-based or gender based.77 They can also 
be tied to elected representatives such as the Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
Institute.  
 
This has two implications for researching US foreign policy: Firstly, Latinos claiming 
to represent the community in such a way are likely to be the first to be reached out 
to provide a Latino perspective on foreign policy issues by the federal government. 
Secondly, with any perceived growth in the importance of the Latino electorate, the 
power of such elites will grow as a consequence as long as they are seen by the 
community and US population generally as legitimate. Therefore, it is logical to 
examine the perspectives and engagement with foreign policy of such organisations. 
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In addition to this, public diplomacy and international engagement efforts by Latinos, 
which can be seen as both peripheral to and of consequence to US foreign policy, will 
also be dominated by elites. Such activities typically involve institutional engagement 
as well as establishing relations between different foreign political actors and 
organisations. Any such un-official diplomacy of this nature is likely to be conducted 
by elites representing Latino interest organisations. This presents an additional 
reason to examine the international engagement efforts of such groups. 
 
Given the relevance of both conceptions of ‘elite’ that concern both Latinos and US 
foreign policy, it is necessary to examine examples of both in studies attempting to 
gain a more complete picture of Latino engagement with US foreign policy. 
 
Towards an expanded focus on foreign policy 
 
Given the limitations of the existing literature, it would be advantageous to consider 
ways in which the areas of scope for academic investigation could be widened, to 
offer a more complete picture of Latino engagement with US foreign policy. Much of 
the literature that (negatively) forecasts an increased impact for Latinos in US foreign 
policy assumes that the interests of Latinos will be different from those of current 
foreign-policy decision-makers, and that this will, in turn, be detrimental. Whilst 
much of the response literature that looks at empirical examples of Latino influence 
on US foreign policy paints a much more modest picture of historical and recent 
impact, they have largely avoided the question of whether the actual policy agenda 
of Latinos differs from their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.  
 
Therefore, whilst the question of how much have Latinos attempted to influence 
foreign policy has been partially answered, the more inherent question of 
‘influencing towards what end?’, remains disappointingly ignored. A plurality of 
views towards Latin America has been alluded to as a feature of the Latino 
community, but this does not address whether there is a similar plethora of views 
towards other foreign policy issues. Therefore, it is essential to look at whether there 
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is a coherent foreign policy agenda among Latino elites, and how far this does or does 
not differ from non-Latinos. 
 
In addition, to gain a more complete picture of foreign policy engagement, it is 
necessary to look beyond attempts to influence the government over specific policy. 
Whilst this is undoubtedly a useful starting point, it leaves out other possible avenues 
of foreign policy engagement. For example, it leaves un-explored the extent to which 
foreign policy is a dimension in the domestic agendas of Latino elites: To what extent 
do Latinos choose to incorporate US foreign policy into arguments to support 
domestic agendas, or as part of their process of binding Latinos into a common 
political community? And, was such a use of foreign policy the case, in what forms 
does it take, and why? Investigating such aspects of engagement could potentially 
offer useful insight into whether or not Latinos articulated an alternative foreign 
policy agenda, or an alternative interpretation of the national interests behind US 
foreign policy. 
 
As well as this, by limiting foreign policy engagement to simply government 
influence, it excludes other avenues of attempts at influencing US foreign policy. One 
example would be whether there had been any attempts by Latinos to lobby foreign 
governments to influence US policy from the ‘other side’ of diplomatic relations. A 
most likely avenue would be lobbying Latin American states, to which Latinos would 
have specific ties and interests, to influence the bilateral relations between those 
states and the US.  
 
Furthermore, outreach to foreign political actors, perhaps an indicator of an appetite 
for international engagement, is also un-explored. If Latinos were to demonstrate 
evidence of outreach to political bodies outside of the United States, this would 
perhaps offer an indicator of foreign policy preferences were their domestic 
influence to grow. In addition, the question of why and how such outreach were to 
occur would also provide a useful insight. 
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Beyond these points, the literature was, in places, also limited in its treatment of 
foreign policy issues and preferences as being distinctly separate from domestic 
concerns. Foreign Policy is taken largely to be the extent that they concern 
themselves with traditional security dimensions of US-Latin American relations, as 
well as the application of soft power in the region. Lindsey offers a typical example 
of this rationale: 
 
Groups such as the National Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund have concentrated their focus on the economy, civil rights, and 
immigration because those are the issues that matter to their members. Given the economic 
challenges facing the Hispanic community today and the relative security that most Latin 
American countries enjoy, foreign policy is not likely to galvanize Latinos any time soon.78 
 
However, maintaining this kind of clear distinction between foreign and domestic 
politics is problematic. By limiting the definition of foreign policy concerns to 
traditional security and geopolitical interests, it leaves the possibility that an 
engagement with US foreign policy can nevertheless be taking place in a political 
agenda focused on “the economy, civil rights, and immigration”.79 From the 
perspective of the researcher, looking for foreign policy in the domestic agendas of 
Latinos is prudent for three main reasons: 
 
1. Domestic concerns are increasingly becoming inextricably interlinked with 
foreign policy. Rather than being mutually exclusive, a comprehensive foreign 
and economic security policy requires as much attention to the interior 
dimensions and implications as they do to the exterior. Issues such as 
immigration (and indeed, immigration reform), economic growth, and the 
impact of environmental degradation are increasingly intermestic in nature – 
meaning they have overlapping and inseparable domestic and international 
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dimensions. Therefore, omitting them as issues from an analysis of foreign 
policy engagement leaves an incomplete picture of Latino influence. 
 
2. Latino elites may draw on aspects of US foreign policy as part of a traditionally 
‘domestic’ agenda. A reluctance to formally advocate for specific foreign 
policy positions does not automatically mean engagement with US foreign 
policy is excluded from the substance, agenda-items or narrative of domestic 
campaigns.  
 
3. By examining how Latinos engage with domestic issues that have the 
potential to become foreign policy concerns, it provides potential insight into 
how they may choose to engage with US foreign policy and what agendas 
they may adopt. For example, support or opposition for the domestic 
implications of a free-trade agreement, environmental legislation or civil 
rights reform could all offer indications how similar and related issues would 
likely be supported or opposed when replicated at the level of international 
diplomacy. 
 
Of the ‘domestic’ political issues that could be considered intermestic, immigration 
is likely to offer the most insight into potential Latino foreign policy preferences. It is 
also, as Jones-Correa points out, the issue on which Latinos are most likely to 
successfully influence government policy.80 Therefore, omitting it is an issue from an 
analysis of foreign policy engagement leaves an incomplete picture of Latino 
influence. As Domínguez points out, immigration policy has historically been very 
much considered an instrument of foreign policy by the US government – who used 
the immigration status of Cubans both as a tool for furthering Cold war policies, as 
well as seeing the control of the border as a wider national security concern. 
 
Therefore, an expanded focus on the wider Latino engagement with foreign policy 
that looks beyond simply their ability to influence the government and looks at the 
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extent to which interaction with US foreign policy can be found in their domestic 
agendas, as well as attempts to connect with foreign political actors and 
governments, offer fertile new avenues for insight. 
 
Literature on elite engagement 
 
Given these considerations, it is clear that there is new avenue for Latino 
engagement with US foreign policy that examines elite actors as a unit of analysis 
and specifically looks at examples of their engagement and their foreign policy 
preferences. A good starting point, therefore, is to consider existing literature that 
has explored the foreign policy positions of Latino elites. 
 
The most notable feature of the literature concerning Latino elites and foreign policy 
behaviour is the striking lack of it. What there is all analyses the same data set, drawn 
from a study by the Tomas Rivera Institute in 1996, with the results being published 
as part of de la Garza and Pachon’s 2000 book Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy.81 It 
surveyed 454 Latino elites to gauge their interest in foreign policy compared to 
domestic issues, as well as asking them to rank their foreign policy interests. The 
results then compared this the rankings by non-Latino US elites. The findings can be 
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Issue % of US leaders 
saying issue is 
“very 
important” 
% of Latino 
leaders saying 














90 62 1 1 
Defending 
allies’ security 
60 8 2 8 
Stopping illegal 
drugs 




54 20 4 9 
Protecting US 
jobs 




49 60 6 2 
Combating 
world hunger 
41 41 7 4 
Reducing trade 
deficit 
49 21 8 6 
Reducing illegal 
immigration 
28 14 9 7 
 
Table 1. H. P. Pachon, R. O. de la Garza, and A. D. Pantoja (2000) 
 
In their analysis of the data, the authors emphasise that Latino leaders prioritise a 
domestic agenda. Foreign policy concerns were ranked 6th, behind various social and 
economic issues. They emphasised that when foreign policy issues were discussed, 
these broadly reflected the goals of mainstream elites, for example stopping nuclear 




In a 2004 chapter, The Tomas Rivera Institute then reflected on the data themselves 
but reach a different conclusion.82 They instead choose to highlight the differences 
present in the data, such as the fact that 60% of Latino leaders rate environmental 
concerns as very high compared with 49% of non-Latino elites, and their ranking of 
it as the 2nd most important issue overall, as opposed to 6th by non-Latino elites. 
Similarly, they point to the fact that whilst the same percentage of Latino and non-
Latino elites rate combating world hunger as ‘very important’ those Latinos that do 
so rate it of higher overall priority than non-Latino elites. The institute thus points 
out that this could suggest Latino elites may favour a more liberal foreign policy 
agenda. 
 
Valeriano also analyses this data set, but from a slightly different perspective.83 He 
argues that after 9/11, Huntington’s thesis of Hispanic threat to identity had created 
a belief that Latinos may undermine the existing national security goals concerning 
the Middle East. He reaches a similar conclusion to De la Garza et al, arguing that the 
broad similarities between Latino and Anglo elites meant that Latinos supported 
mainstream national security goals. 
 
In a 2015 analysis for Latino polling firm Latino Decisions, Pantoja comments on the 
contemporary foreign policy situation and once again revisits this data set, even 
though it is now almost two decades old. In this instance however, he differs from 
his conclusion, suggesting that whilst they did not rank it as highly as domestic issues, 
the fact that Latino leaders were able to convey a slightly different set of foreign 
policy preferences suggested that they have a potential role to play in foreign policy 
in the future.84 
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The second major strand of research looking at Latino engagement with foreign 
policy looks specifically at the extent of transnational ties that exist between Latino 
immigrants and their descendents, and the Latin American states from which they 
immigrated, in part as a way of determining potential foreign policy influence. To 
that end, the research has tended to look at a range of transnational activities that 
could be considered indicative of Latino-Latin American political engagement, in 
particular examining the nature of economic as well as political ties between Latinos 
in the US and the Latin American states from which they originated. A significant 
proportion of the research therefore focuses on the following individual areas: 
 
Literature on remittances, hometown associations and political affiliation 
 
A principal focus of the research looking at the economic impact of immigration 
concerns the financial transferals of income from Latino immigrants within the 
United States to the family members that remain in their countries of origin. DeSipio 
and de la Garza note that a recent World Bank estimate suggested around $123 
billion was sent in financial remittances from the United States in 2012,85 almost a 
quarter of the entire global total for that year. Cortina et al. estimated that in 2004, 
60% of Latin American immigrants in the US sent money home as remittances.86 
Cortina and de la Garza emphasise the critical importance of this transferal of money 
by immigrants to their families back home to the rural economies of Mexico and 
Central America. Given the significance of such remittances to the economic health 
of Latin American economies, it makes logical sense for the continued wellbeing of 
immigrant communities to being a high priority for the foreign policy agendas of Latin 
American governments. 
 
Strongly associated with the impact of financial remittances is the literature that 
specifically examines the organisations that develop to facilitate the effective 
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transferal and use of the money. In particular, there has been a focus on the 
existence and activities of hometown associations (HTAs), or organised efforts by 
immigrant and ethnic communities from a particular region or town to support 
immigrants living in the US as well as facilitating cultural and developmental projects 
in these locations of origin. Given the positive implications of such organisations, 
some Latin American governments have taken active steps to encourage such 
initiatives – Mexico has established the ‘3x1’ initiative in which they guarantee a 
contribution of 3 dollars for every dollar for development projects provided by a HTA 
87. The obvious links with the socio-economic development of Latin America has 
made the extent of HTA activity by Latinos an area of interest to researchers. Leiken 
examined the scope of efforts by the Mexican government to strengthen political 
and cultural ties with HTA’s during the 1990s, concluding that Mexico saw HTAs as a 
potential vehicle for the establishment of a political lobby as the growth of the 
Mexican-American community was outpacing the national average.88 De la Garza and 
Hazan examined the consequences for incorporation of HTA political activity and 
concluded that whilst there was significant relationships between HTAs and Mexico, 
HTAs could also serve as a catalyst for political incorporation into the US as they 
provided a mechanism for immigrants to familiarise themselves with US political 
values.89 
 
Another area of obvious interest to researchers concerns the extent to which Latinos 
continue to follow and participate in the politics of their home-countries or counties 
of ancestry. As Gershon and Pantoja demonstrate, according to the 2006 Latino 
National Survey, around 60% of Latino immigrants profess to follow home-country 
politics, and this interest remains largely as strong among US-born respondents.90 
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Researchers also focus on the role of dual-nationality in hindering integration into 
the United States by Latinos. As DeSipio and de la Garza point out, in the last 20 years 
twelve Latin American states have legalised dual-nationality for US-based citizens, 
including Mexico and Nicaragua.91  This has facilitated the ability for US Latinos to 
formally participate in the domestic politics of Latin Americans states, and in the case 
of Mexico has seen the active pursuit of Mexican immigrant voters by candidates in 
the Presidential election. In addition, as dual-national citizens they often have the 
right to make use of public services of their country of origin, including the right to 
seek office themselves, as well as petition for aid and representation from the 
diplomatic apparatus of their home-country in the United States. For researchers, 
this not only has implications for questions concerning how this impacts the ability 
of Latinos to politically incorporate into the United States, but also for how it impacts 
the bilateral relations between the United States and the various Latin American 
states with dual-nationality citizens living with the US. 
 
Despite the relative abundance of studies looking at transnational ties, no consensus 
has yet emerged on how far the data supports or refutes Huntington et al.’s assertion 
that Latino residual political interest in Latin America will hinder or affect their 
political incorporation in the US. Indeed, a number of scholars perceive these various 
forms of transnational interaction between Latinos and their countries of origin as 
having negative consequences for their ability for Latinos to involve themselves fully 
into the political life of the United States. Renshon follows the work of Huntington 
and Buchanan that sees the continuation of political ties to their countries of origin 
raises the spectre of divided loyalty for Latinos.92 He further suggests that not only 
does dual-nationality increase rates in which second generation Latinos choose to 
identify using non-American labels, but that dual-nationality in the 1990s was 
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principally encouraged by Latin American governments such as Mexico and the 
Dominican Republic as an avenue to further the political lobbying opportunities 
within the Latino community.93  
 
Others emphasise that the consequence of participating in the political and social life 
of both the United States and the country of origin results in a decreased level of 
participation in the US compared to those with exclusively US citizenship: Straton et 
al. looked specifically at the impact of dual citizenship among first generation Latin 
American immigrant communities and found that dual citizens were less likely to 
consider themselves American, feel a civic responsibility towards the United States 
or speak English than Latin American immigrants possessing US nationality only.94 
Cain and Doherty suggested that dual citizenship specifically depressed voting 
registration, participation on the electoral system and rates of naturalisation among 
immigrant communities.95 
 
Other scholars have offered an optimistic appraisal of the data and suggest that 
transnational engagement does not hinder involvement in US political life by Latinos. 
These suggest generally that Latinos that come from Latin American states that 
encourage greater transnational ties can feel safe in the knowledge that their formal 
association with their countries of origin will not be threatened by an active 
participation in US politics and working towards naturalisation. Jones-Correa96 in an 
influential 2001 article, contested the claim that dual-nationality hindered political 
incorporation: Analysing data from 1965 to 1997, he concludes that immigrants with 
dual-nationality are more likely to naturalise as US citizens than those who are not. 
Pantoja took the argument a step further and claimed that transnational ties could 
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in fact foster political incorporation, in a study that looked at civic engagement 
among Dominican immigrants.97  
 
Whilst this body of research looking at transnational ties offers a useful perspective 
on a certain aspects of Latino engagement with foreign policy, the focus is limited 
largely to whether an increased engagement with Latin American politics will limit 
their engagement with US politics and an incorporation in US political life, or help to 
facilitate it. However, as Gershon and Pantoja observe, the level of transnational 
engagement is as much determined by socio-economic status of Latinos than by 
years of residence in the United States:98 Latinos with a higher income and higher 
level of education are significantly more likely to visit their country of origin and 
participate in Hometown associations. In addition to this, they are more likely to 
participate in political life in the US. This suggests that whilst transnational ties 
generally increase with time spent in the US, a relative economic and social elite of 
Latinos increase their transnational activities once they become established 
politically in the US.  
 
Ultimately, this research focusing on the trans-national economic and political 
participation of Latinos provide some useful information in framing research looking 
at Latino engagement with foreign policy. Firstly, it indicates that to varying degrees 
of complexity, Latinos, when taken as a population that is not distinguished between 
US-born and non-US born, remain significantly tied to Latin America; principally 
through significant economic remittances, but also through political connections 
such as voting. As an ethnic minority demographic in the United States, Latinos are 
unique actors in this regard. 
 
Secondly, this research tells us that there is a significant chance that Latinos are only 
likely to increase this engagement with Latin America as the population continues to 
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grow, mean that the Latino population in the US remains a hugely significant part of 
bilateral relations between the US and the Latin American states that are the 
beneficiaries of the economic remittances and maintain political ties with their 
diasporas. Thirdly, it indicates that Latinos are likely to become more politically and 
economically involved with Latin America as they become more socio-economically 
advantaged in the US, something that is likely to continue as the population grows 
and the size of the Latino middle classes rises. 
 
The Latino threat narrative 
 
There remain some overall issues that leave the existing literature problematic. 
Firstly, and of greatest concern, relates to the objectivity of the research. Political, 
ethical and ideological motivations of the individual authors appear to have 
influenced their analysis in many cases. In particular, much of the literature on how 
far Latinos will influence US identity falls under the shadow of earlier literature 
published during the “Culture Wars” of the 1990s that framed Latino participation in 
foreign policy, and Hispanic immigration generally, as having negative consequences 
for the political, economic and social wellbeing of the United States. To understand 
the academic literature therefore requires an understanding of the political context 
in which it functions: 
 
Much of the works discussed in this chapter have been either overt or tacit responses 
to earlier literature that suggests that the changing demographics within the United 
States, and in particular the relative growth of the Latino demographic, will likely 
have a significant impact on United States foreign policy. For the most part, such 
analyses have been negative in tone: It follows a line of argument that the national 
interests to which the US government calibrates its foreign policy objectives is 
informed by a clear consensus over what constitutes American national identity. A 
dangerous by-product of changing ethnic demographics is a lack of assimilation by 
minority groups such as Latinos towards this identity, which threaten to cloud the 
vision of US foreign policy interests. 
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Many of the most high-profile authors that forward such interpretations of the 
effects on national identity of the growth of the Latino population emerged in the 
1990s following the end of the cold war.  Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warns that core 
American values such as respect for democracy will be put at risk as the enthusiasm 
within educational establishments of promoting a diverse range of minority cultural 
traditions places the fundamental core US national identity at risk. 99 He sees the core 
US identity as a heritage-free descriptor: to be ‘American’, an individual must shed 
their previous ethnic allegiances; by adopting the US identity: “The point of America 
was not to preserve old cultures, but to forge a new American culture”. 100 
 
In his 2004 book, Who are we?, Samuel Huntington puts forward the case that 
Latinos as a demographic group, populated primarily by Mexican immigrants, pose a 
threat to the traditional ‘American Creed’ which constitutes the essential value-set 
that informs US identity and interests.101 In doing so, he built on a 1997 article in 
which he echoed Schlesinger’s sentiments concerning the negative consequences of 
value pluralism.102 He argues that whilst traditionally immigrant groups have 
assimilated into US society over time, Mexicans have instead formed their own 
cultural enclaves with distinct values. Traditionally, US identity has been based on 
culture and creed, which is in turn built upon what he says are identifiable and 
distinct ‘American’ values drawn from the US’ Anglo-Saxon heritage:  
 
The English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of 
law, including the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting 
Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the 
ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, a ‘city on a hill’. 103 
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Huntington contends that Mexicans, who represent the ever-increasing majority of 
Latinos, are unwilling to learn the English language; that their Catholic heritage 
prevents them from adopting the traits associated with Protestantism, and their 
fertility rates mean they will overtake Anglos within the century. This, in effect, 
represents an existential crisis for the United States mainstream population. 
 
These texts were published at a time in which the consequences of shifting public 
attitudes on a range of political issues were a prominent topic of national discussion 
in the public sphere. Both Schlesinger Jr and Huntington served as the academic 
contributors to a wider set of conservative voices that identified the end of a 
consensus on political values that had supposedly previously existed in US civil 
society. In a part of a wider debate that sociologist James Davison Hunter labeled in 
1991 as the new “culture wars”, the arrival of the 1990s marked a vociferous 
discussion on both the accuracy, causes and consequences of claims that the US 
public was becoming increasingly polarized on a range of political issues including 
abortion, gay rights and the role of the state.104 Huntington and Schlesinger’s 
accounting of the dangers for US foreign policy of a society that does not subscribe 
to a single set of values fit into this wider narrative, and amplified what might have 
otherwise been relatively obscure intellectually-orientated arguments into positions 
of national prominence. Indeed, the role of un-assimilated Latino immigrants in 
aggravating the cultural divide was similarly highlighted by one of the most 
prominent voices in the conservative side of the “Culture Wars”, Patrick Buchanan. 
Buchanan’s Death of the West 105 and Suicide of a Superpower 106 follow a similar line 
of argument to Huntington. The former White House Communications Director 
under Reagan suggests that as the demographic shifts indicate the white population 
of the United States is set to continue experiencing declining birth rates over the next 
century, non-white minorities such as Latinos will erode the WASP identity of 
America.  
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Huntington and Buchanan’s books became bestsellers and were echoed in sentiment 
by other by conservative public intellectuals such as Peter Brimelow, who published 
the strongly anti-immigration work Alien Nation in 1995.107  These authors shared 
the powerful sub-narrative that claimed that Hispanics were both unwilling to 
assimilate and were exacerbating the cultural polarisation across the US. But it 
remained Huntington’s thesis that had the most profound claim for the 
consequences for US foreign policy: That Hispanics possessed an essentially different 
set of cultural values from those found within the traditional American Creed that 
had dominated the US from its colonial origins. Unlike previous new arrivals of ethnic 
immigrant groups, Latinos were unwilling to shed these different cultural values in 
favour of assimilating to the Creed. Not only did this threaten to undermine or erode 
the national values that go into formulating the US’ national interest in the world, 
but were immigration into the South West to be left un-checked, Hispanics could 
seek to claim the region as an autonomous Spanish-speaking province and advocate 
for cessation from the United States. This reflects a wider concern with concept of 
the ‘Reconquista’: That Latinos not only harbor alternative ideological views to 
mainstream Americans, but in fact hold political allegiance to foreign states. At best, 
this culminates in sympathy for Latin American governments, and at worst an active 
desire to secede from the USA. This fear forms a central part of what Leo R. Chavez 
considers calls ‘the Latino threat narrative’.108 
This can take on a passive form, such as the suggestion that, through a lack of proper 
assimilation, Latinos, particularly immigrants, continue to show political loyalty to 
the nations of their heritage over the United States. A more active and overt form of 
this narrative is the suspicion that Latinos, Mexican-Americans in particular, have a 
desire – and in some cases actively planning – to gain autonomy over the South West 
territory of the United States and return it to Mexican sovereignty, as it was before 
it became part of the United States. Within the narrative, this takes two strands: One 
which suggests this would happen de facto as a result of overwhelming Latino 
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population dominance of the region, giving it a culture that demography that is 
effectively identical to a Latin American state. The other is that this would happen 
deliberately, via a campaign political violence on the part of disgruntled Latinos.  
 
Proponents of this idea have held this up as a worst-case consequence of Latino 
involvement in foreign policy ever since. In a 2001 article for Foreign Policy magazine 
that served as a precursor to Who Are We?, Huntington warned that this process of 
re-conquest has already begun:  
 
Demographically, socially, and culturally, the reconquista (re-conquest) of the Southwest 
United States by Mexican immigrants is well underway. A meaningful move to reunite these 
territories with Mexico seems unlikely, but Prof. Charles Truxillo of the University of New 
Mexico predicts that by 2080 the southwestern states of the United States and the northern 
states of Mexico will form La República del Norte (The Republic of the North).109 
 
As a result, the prominent legacy of these narratives has had an impact on the 
development, framing and conclusions of the literature on Latinos and US foreign 
policy. The most notable example of this is the analysis of the Tomas Rivera survey 
of Latino elite opinion of foreign policy. Pachon, de la Garza and Pantoja, in response 
to Huntington, use the data on elite preferences as evidence that Latinos are unlikely 
to transform the consensus opinion on foreign policy priorities as the current Latino 
views are sufficiently similar to the Anglo mainstream. This is an interpretation of the 
data that is continued by Valeriano in his 2007 paper. However, when writing more 
recently in the context of giving greater political respect to Latinos as a political block, 
both of these authors reach the opposite conclusion, using the same data. Thus the 
political context into which the individual publications are embedded has obvious 
implications for the academic neutrality of their research conclusion, and therefore 
must be treated with caution when used as a possible platform for future research. 
 
                                                     
109 S. P. Huntington, ‘The Hispanic Challenge’, Foreign Policy, October 28th, 1999. 
[http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/the-hispanic-challenge/]. 
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Further to this, there is an additional problem that is characteristic of the literature 
that looks at Latino elites. Since the majority of the pieces on Latino elite preferences 
have been based around the single Tomas Rivera study, much of the conclusions that 
they draw are hard to generalise into the future. In particular the primary argument 
that Latino elites are unconcerned with foreign policy because of the more pressing 
socio-economic concerns of the wider Latino population leaves open the possibility 
that this could change if the associated domestic circumstances begin to improve. 
However, the conclusions have tended to instead treat Latino interests as static, 
leaving unconsidered the possibility that as more Latinos enter the middle class, they 
may take a greater interest in foreign policy. Therefore, the conclusion that they are 
less interested is temporally situated; it can only capture a picture of ‘now’. 
 
Existing literature within the context of the ‘culture wars’ 
 
The collective literature that looks at Latino engagement with foreign policy is 
comprised of several different research areas, united by an attempt to uncover 
Latino transnational behaviour, or attempts by Latinos to form a foreign policy lobby. 
In doing so, they comprise both those authors that take a pessimistic interpretation 
of potential Latino involvement in international affairs, fearing divided loyalty could 
lead to Latinos promoting the agendas of to Latin American governments, as well as 
those that reject that the premise that such divided loyalty is a genuine possibility 
among Latinos. Very little research has focused on foreign policy engagement of 
Latino elite actors, but where initial studies have been conducted, they show areas 
of possible differences in policy preference between Latinos and non-Latino elites, 
indicating that further qualitative research on Latino elites could provide new 
insights. 
 
Overall, much of this existing literature must be considered in the context of the 
‘culture wars’ of the 1990s, and the post-cold war focus by the likes of Huntington, 
Buchanan and Brimelow on the way in which the discourse surrounding Hispanic 
American engagement with US foreign policy has been produced and reproduced. As 
has been demonstrated, and will be revisited in Chapter 5 of this thesis, this context 
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has cast a long shadow on the way in which Hispanic American foreign policy has 
been conceived and researched, by both academics and Hispanic elites themselves.  
 
The ferocity of the ‘culture wars’ had a notable influence on the academic literature: 
The accusation that Hispanic Americans posed a possible ‘threat’ to the United States 
due to an un-shakeable interest in (or preference toward) their countries of origin, 
led to a brief but fruitful period of scholarly attention on the importance of Hispanic 
foreign policy engagement. In particular, scholars made great efforts to undermine 
Huntington’s claim that an increase in the Hispanic population would have negative 
consequences for US foreign policy. The most productive outcome of this period was 
the wealth of information generated concerning Hispanic American relations with 
their countries of origin, in terms of political, economic and social ties. It also 
provided dedicated scholarship on the extent to which Hispanic Americans were 
willing to operate as foreign policy lobbyists following the cold war. 
 
Whilst this literature is helpful where those topic areas are concerned, it is 
nevertheless limited: The strength of influence of Huntington, Buchanan and the 
‘culture wars’ discourse has constrained the existing scholarship to a limited focus on 
Hispanic American interest in their countries of origin. As a result, much of the 
literature assumes that the ‘ethnic lobby’ is the appropriate conceptual frame for 
analysing engagement with US foreign policy. Thus, studies within the literature 
continuously reached the conclusion that Hispanic Americans were acting as not 
ethnic lobby seeking to influence any particular administration, because they were 
neither organised as such, nor did they show any interest in doing so.  
The main advantage of this focus was therefore providing sympathetic activists in the 
‘culture wars’ with the ammunition necessary to disprove the ‘Latino threat’ 
narrative and the claims of Huntington and co. 
 
However, the dominance of the ethnic lobby conceptual framework leaves the 
literature suffering from several significant disadvantages: Firstly, it misrepresents 
the nature of the Hispanic American elites following the end of the cold war through 
to the contemporary period: It considers them as a diaspora community that will 
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fundamentally politically identify with their ‘home country’ outside the United 
States, rather than as an ethnic minority group within the US population whose 
membership is overwhelmingly likely to consider the US government as the one to 
which they owe their political allegiance, as would be the case with any other 
domestic minority group. Beyond undermining the claims of Huntington, Buchanan 
and co., the finding that such a minority group within the US does not lobby for a 
foreign government is relatively unremarkable. Instead, by limiting the analysis to a 
narrow focus on lobbying for a country of origin, it leaves little room for other 
possible forms of foreign policy engagement. 
 
The incentive to focus so predominantly on the ethnic-lobbying model has not been 
helped by the tendency for the US federal government, various Latin American 
governments, the media and think tanks to, at various times, treat Hispanic American 
population as a source of potential foreign policy lobbies, as has been demonstrated 
in this chapter. As a result, this has made Hispanic American elected officials, as well 
as various organisations and community leaders, potential research subjects to be 
measured to assess their level of influence on US foreign policy. 
 
Therefore, taking the advantages and limitations of this existing literature into 
account, Chapter 2 will present a new analytical framework that has the potential to 
overcome some of the restrictions imposed by the limited ethnic-lobby and home-
country focus of previous scholarship. Taking into account in particular the 
problematic nature of an existing literature that has paid relatively little attention to 
the nature of Hispanic elites, Hispanic sub-group differences, and the possibility that 
the Hispanic demographic has the capacity to structurally change over time, the 
chapter outlines an approach to examining Hispanic elite engagement with US 
foreign policy that places the political generation of Hispanic elites as a central focus 
of enquiry. As will be outlined, this draws on the work of Chicano and Hispanic studies 
scholarship that emphasises the importance of interpreting the political history of 
Hispanic American elites through the prism of distinct political generations. In this 
instance, the thesis will examine the case studies of the Chicano generation during 
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the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘Exile’ generation of Cuban and Central American refugees 
during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic Latino generation in the contemporary period. 
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Chapter 2: A generational approach to analysing 




This chapter will set out how the limitations identified with the existing literature in 
Chapter 1 can be addressed through the adoption of an alternative framework for 
analysing Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy. It adapts an approach to 
considering Hispanic political behaviour advocated by several scholars of Hispanic 
American history, most notably Mario T. García: That political engagement amongst 
the Hispanic American community across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
should be considered through the lens of distinct political generations. To García, the 
history of the Hispanic American population in the United States has been 
characterized by a succession of separate political generations, each with their own 
demographic, socio-economic and political features. By placing political generation 
at the heart of the analytical framework, the changing nature of foreign policy 
engagement over time can be better understood in the context of the different 
ideological projects, group identities and political structures that have characterised 
these changing generations. 
 
The chapter then sets out an argument for placing political elites as the central focus 
of analysis of the thesis over a focus of the Hispanic population as a whole. In doing 
so, it considers the alternative manifestations of Hispanic elites, and identifies those 
which have not previously been considered by the existing literature.  
 
Following this, the chapter then briefly outlines three generations of Hispanic 
political elites that will be analysed throughout this thesis: The Mexican-American 
‘Chicano Generation’ in the 1960s and 1970s, the Cuban and Central American ‘Exile 
Generation’ during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic ‘Latino Generation’ that reached 




Limitations of existing literature 
 
Beyond the drawbacks of the existing literature on Hispanic American engagement 
with foreign policy discussed in Chapter 1, there remains several additional issues 
concerning the chosen unit of analysis within much of the literature that need to be 
addressed. In particular, the relatively narrow focus on both large-scale trends within 
the overall Hispanic population, as well as the search for a Latino ethnic lobby model, 
have limited the scope for intellectual discovery. In addition, the lack of breadth 
afforded within the definition of key terms such as ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ have had 
direct consequences for the kind of interpretations that can be drawn from Hispanic 
political behaviour. 
 
Firstly, as was demonstrated through the presentation of existing literature focus in 
Chapter 1, much of the existing literature has heavily focused on examinations of 
trends and policy preferences amongst the Hispanic population as a whole. Whilst 
this has a potential use in determining how far the demographic share common 
perspectives on foreign policy issues, it nevertheless fails to account for the 
disproportionate role that elites play in the formulation and delivery of US foreign 
policy.  
 
Secondly, whilst some literature will strive to identify differences between national 
origin groups within a Hispanic or Latino sample, much of the existing literature 
leaves the dynamics of the Hispanic American community as a ‘black box’. A heavy 
emphasis on the analysis of survey data has resulted in only limited discussion of the 
way that Hispanics are negotiating their political identity and the extent to which 
Latinos identify with the labels to which they been attributed. Furthermore, by 
declining to problematise and interrogate beneath the ‘Hispanic’ label, there is no 
mechanism to account for any substantive changes or disruption within the 
community in terms of size, age distribution, identity traits, economic disparity, 
political affiliation or the percentage of immigrants compared to native-born 
Hispanic Americans within the composition of the overall population. 
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Thirdly, much of the existing literature fails to inquire as to how far pan-ethnic labels 
such as ‘Latino’ or ‘Hispanic’ have had differing levels of legitimacy at different 
historical periods. Given the significant changes to the composition of the Hispanic 
population in terms of national origin group since the 1960s, it is highly likely that 
these terms have had varying levels of political purchase at different times. By failing 
to acknowledge this, it leaves open the possibility that a pan-ethnic label that was 
appropriate during one decade may be inappropriate in another. 
 
Fourthly, the existing literature largely fails to take into account the importance of 
the changing structural composition of Hispanic political organisations over time. 
Instead, the central focus of much of the research has focused on identifying how far 
Hispanic organisations have structured themselves as a traditional foreign policy 
lobby. Whilst this is useful in so far as determining whether Hispanic organisations 
affect foreign policy outcomes towards specific states, it leaves unexplored the 
possibility of wider engagement with foreign policy discourse by my more general 
Latino organisations. 
 
These last three problems are particularly acute, given the significant demographic 
changes that have occurred within the overall Hispanic population over the past fifty 
years: At the beginning of the 1960s, the flow of immigration from Latin America was 
at its lowest since the first major wave of Mexican immigration around the turn of 
the 20th century110, with less than a million foreign born immigrants residing in the 
US, with the overwhelming majority of this population being of Mexican 
extraction.111 At this time, the Bracero guest worker program was the largest 
influencer of Mexican immigration, with settlement patterns dominated by the 
availability of jobs in manual labour on farms. This complemented the existing 
Hispanic population’s relatively homogenous Mexican-American heritage, 
                                                     
110 Pew Research Center, “Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population 
Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Society Mixed.” 
Washington, D.C.: September, 2015. P. 23. 
111 M. Tienda & S. M. Sanchez, “Latin American Immigration to the United States.”, Daedalus, Vol. 
142, No. 3, 2013. See Figure 1. 
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geographically situated in the Southwest. The other notable source of Latin American 
immigration during the 1960s were Cuban political refugees leaving the island in the 
wake of the communist revolution in 1959. This relatively stable pattern was 
overturned in the late 1970s and 1980s, which saw an explosion of new Spanish-
speaking communities arriving into the US in a new wave of Latin American 
immigration. Whilst the majority of this new population was from Mexico, pushed in 
part by political and economic turmoil, this immigration wave was also characterised 
by a significant increase in new arrivals from Central America and the Caribbean, and 
Cuba in particular. This saw in increase in the total foreign-born Latin American 
population in the US to 3.8 million in 1980 to 7.4 million in 1990.112 In addition, this 
period saw a marked increase in the percentage of these immigrants arriving as 
young, low-skilled males: Between 1970 and 1990, the number of Latin American 
men aged between 18 and 33 entering the US with a high school degree or less rose 
from 11.6 to 34% of Mexican immigrants, and from 13.2 to 23.7% from the rest of 
Latin American and the Caribbean.113 This period also saw significant changes in the 
distribution of Hispanics across the US: Whereas 1960 saw Mexicans predominantly 
located in the southwest with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean communities 
located in urban centres in the Northeast, by the 1980s new Hispanic population 
centres began to emerge, such as Miami and southern Florida.  
 
Therefore, given these significant changes to the composition of the Hispanic 
population over a relatively short space of time, it is essential that any examination 
of Hispanic political behaviour, including engagement with the discourse of US 
foreign policy, take into account that the nature and legitimacy of pan-ethnic terms 
such as Hispanic or Latino may well vary considerably between decades over the last 
50 years and have evolved in meaning over this period to accommodate the 
significant demographic changes. 
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Towards a generational approach to interpreting Hispanic behaviour 
 
Given the problems identified with the existing literature, this chapter will outline a 
generational approach to analysing Hispanic engagement that recognises the 
importance of examining the distinct, historically-situated political cohorts of 
Hispanic elites that have made claims to represent Hispanic populations (either as 
specific national origin communities, or pan-ethnic ‘Hispanics’ more generally) at 
various points since the second half of the 20th century. These cohorts, as will be 
outlined, represent three distinct political generations of Hispanic elites. By adopting 
this generational approach, it is possible to identify similarities and differences in the 
nature of foreign policy engagement between different generations, as well as 
reconciling the fluctuating ethnic labels with which Hispanics have identified, 
contested and discursively negotiated, into the analysis. 
 
The importance of biological generation as a mechanism for understanding 
differences in statistical patterns and behaviour within the Hispanic immigrant 
population has long been recognised by numerous academic disciplines. For 
example, the notable differences between first, second and third generation 
Hispanics has been given extensive focus in topics ranging from assimilation 
patterns114, education115, healthcare116, birth outcomes117, childhood health118, and 
crime119, among others. Whilst this research highlights an obvious importance of 
biological generations in understanding the socio-economic outcomes of Hispanics, 
                                                     
114 See, for example: A. Portes and M. Zhao, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation 
and Its Variants” in C. Suarez-Orozco, M. Suarez-Orozco and D. Baolian Qin-Hilliard (eds.), The New 
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115 See, for example: U. Özek and D. N. Figlio, “Cross-Generational Differences in Educational 
Outcomes in the Second Great Wave of Immigration”, NBER Working Paper No. 22262, May 2016 
116 See, for example: D. Acevedo-Garcia, L. M. Bates, T. L. Osypuk and N. McArdle, “The effect of 
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and Medicine, Vol. 71, No. 6, September 2010. 
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in Childhood Adolescence”, Childhood Development Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2014. 
119 See, for example: R. Morin, “Crime rises among second-generation immigrants as the assimilate”, 
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understanding how Hispanic communities came to terms with the rapidly changing 
composition of their own demographic and how these changes were discursively 
negotiated both within the Hispanic population and within the wider United States, 
requires a broader definition that recognises the importance of shared historical 
experience to the manifestation of a Hispanic generation’s identity: 
 
Rodolfo Alvarez suggested in a 1973 paper that the history of the Mexican-American 
experience in the United States, for example, could be considered up to that point 
through the lens of the ethnic experiences of four biological generations: the 
‘creation’ generation, the ‘migration’ generation, the ‘Mexican-American’ 
generation and the ‘Chicano’ generation.120 Alvarez defined generation as “a critical 
number of persons, in a broad but delimited age group, [that] had more or less the 
same socializa-tion experiences because they lived at a particular time under more or 
less the same constraints imposed by a dominant United States society.”121 Under 
this framework, different generations of Mexican-Americans could interpret and 
engage with the political, economic and social system within the US in different ways 
and with different narratives, depending on the specific historical events that 
informed their collective experience as an ethnic community. 
Given these observations, the potential importance of generation as an operating 
dynamic of the Hispanic American demographic is highlighted. This is significant not 
just for determining issues such as levels of assimilation and socio-economic 
integration, but also to help answer questions as to the manner in which the 
demographic itself is participating in the domestic and foreign policy discourse across 
different immigrant generations. To help address this question, this thesis will adapt 
and operationalise the analytical use of ‘generation’ deployed by the Chicano 
historian Mario T. García. Where Alvarez ties the analysis of Mexican-American 
generations to their biological origin, García follows an alternative definition of 
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generation building on the work of German sociologist Karl Mannheim, in which the 
shared social and political historical experiences of a group can determine their 
collective consciousness and thus affect how the group will perceive of and react to 
the outside world.122 Crucially, García’s approach stresses an importance on the 
definition of generation beyond the biological relation to the foreign-born parent or 
grandparent of a Hispanic American. Instead, the definition that he deploys focuses 
instead on the importance of the political generation: incorporating the distinct and 
complex political, racial, ethnic and ideological dialogues that were a defining 
characteristic of each generation. In doing so, García identifies how each generation 
is a product of its time, its geography and its political and economic place within the 
‘melting pot’ of the USA. 
 
García argues that there are three distinct political generations which have played 
prominent roles within Hispanic American history across the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. Firstly, In Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology and Identity, 1930-
1960, he presents a group that consisted of the first US-born Hispanics of the first 
large wave of Mexican immigrants that had emigrated around the turn of the 
twentieth century.123 This generation were characterized by childhood experiences 
of the Great Depression and early twentieth century racial discrimination in schools 
and public spaces.124 This generation participated in World War II and set up some of 
the first Hispanic American civil rights organisations. In The Chicano Generation: 
Testimonios of the Movement, García presents the ‘Chicano Generation’ – referring 
to the group that identified and participated in the Mexican-American Chicano 
political movement of the 1960s and 1970s.125 Finally, in The Latino Generation: 
Voices of the New America, he offers the ‘Latino Generation’, which consists of the 
children of immigrants from Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America who came 
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to the United States during the 1970s and 80s, who have grown up experiencing the 
consequences of globalisation, technological innovation, and the ‘culture wars’ of the 
1990s (which were discussed in Chapter 1).126  
 
In the Latino Generation, García outlines how the distinct identity and characteristics 
of the current, Latino political generation is a product of three experiences: the 
‘immigrant story’, referring to the historical patterns of immigration from Mexico and 
then Latin America, that delivered individuals and communities into this category; 
the racial and ethnic identity of Latinos; and ‘historical agency’, referring to how far 
Latinos choose to identify with, interpret, and continue the political and civil rights 
agendas of the previous generations.127 
 
García himself stresses that this approach to generation in his three case studies does 
not constitute a comprehensive social scientific study, but rather represents his 
interpretations as a historian on the differences between Hispanic American elite 
engagement across different decades.128  And in contrast to the accepted use of 
generation within literature on immigration and ethnic history, the literature of 
International Relations (IR) has historically almost entirely overlooked it.129 Perhaps 
recognising the potential importance of generation as a determinant of political 
behaviour, IR scholarship has only just begun to take it seriously as a unit of critical 
analysis, with a small but emergent body of literature.130  
 
Despite not being designed principally for use as a tool for foreign policy analysis, this 
framework nevertheless offers a potentially more useful template to make sense of 
Hispanic engagement with foreign policy: The internal discourse, socio-economic 
dynamics and the manner in which US politics, governance, ideas and policies are 
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perceived and reacted to can in fact differ significantly across different generations 
of political elites. For García, this approach was deployed to illuminate both the 
change and continuities between civil rights agendas across different generations, 
and how each generation made sense of their identities in the context of the 
economic, social and political discrimination that they experienced. However, the 
importance and relevance of these dynamics are just as important when trying to 
make sense of differences in foreign policy engagement by Hispanics groups across 
time, something that current research has generally declined to study.131  
 
This approach therefore offers an excellent analytical framework with which to 
resolve the main problems identified with the existing literature: Through allowing 
for the variances between different Hispanic American subgroups to be accounted 
for both between subgroups and across historical periods, a generational approach 
enables an analysis of US foreign policy engagement that incorporates the various 
ways in which Hispanic Americans have perceived, discussed and reacted to US 
foreign policy between different generations. 
 
The importance of elites 
 
In addition to utilising a generational approach, it is necessary to incorporate elites 
into the analytical framework. As outlined in in Chapter 1, the majority of the existing 
literature has largely neglected any specific focus on the role of Hispanic American 
elites in US foreign policy, which, as the chapter argues, represent disproportionately 
important source of foreign policy influence. Instead, the literature has traditionally 
focused either on analyses of large-scale survey data organised lobbying efforts, 
large-scale trends such as remittances, or evidence of local home-country 
engagement such as through home-town associations, or through diaspora voting 
behaviour.132 
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As a result, where the literature does incorporate political elites in their analysis, it 
generally results in a focus on one of three categories of foreign policy elite: 
 
Firstly, it looks at Hispanic elected officials. This concerns either those elected to 
national office in DC, or at the local level such as state legislatures, city council, or 
local executives.133 In particular, there has been a focus on the extent to which 
Hispanic officials have been the recipients of successful lobbying efforts for large-
scale initiatives such as NAFTA.134 This allows for a focus on how far Hispanic 
politicians promote the interests of either the US government, or that of Latin 
American governments such as Mexico. Whilst useful to determine how far Hispanic 
elected officials vote with regards to legislative foreign policy issues, a narrow focus 
on elected officials as Hispanic elites misses the possibility of foreign policy 
engagement by political advocacy organisations. 
 
Secondly, where the literature has taken Hispanic advocacy organisations as a unit of 
analysis to determine elite behaviour, it has done so with a focus on how far these 
organisations operate as an ethnic foreign policy lobby, attempting to compare their 
efforts against the examples of supposed ‘successful’ lobbies.135 Whilst this literature 
is useful in concluding that, with the exception of the Cuban-American lobby, there 
are no significant example of Hispanic American organisations adopting this model, 
the narrow focus on organised lobbying efforts with regards to a specific state avoid 
the possibility of a foreign policy engagement at a broader, more discursive level by 
these same Hispanic organisations. 
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Finally, the existing literature will identify governmental actors themselves as the 
principle elites that should be studied when looking at the influence of Hispanic 
foreign policy engagement. In this regard, this typically involves a focus on the policy 
outcomes of a particular US administration, to assess how far these have been in any 
way influenced by the efforts of Hispanic American lobbying. The other 
governmental actor that the literature engages with is that of foreign governments 
themselves, specifically those within Latin America.136 This is part of an attempt to 
analyse how far foreign governments will attempt to establish diaspora lobbies 
within their emigrant communities within the US, and how successful such efforts 
have been. Again, whilst such a focus on governmental elites is useful in examining 
the extent of home-country lobbying and influence on the policy outcomes of the US 
government, it limits the scope of the analysis by declining to examine the influence 
of Hispanic American actors within governmental foreign policy institutions, to 
determine what if any unique perspectives they bring to the policy formulation and 
delivery process. 
 
By limiting the focus on these specific definitions of political elite, the existing 
literature has largely overlooked two important varieties of foreign policy elite: That 
of non-elected political elites outside of ethnic lobbies, as well as Hispanic Americans 
working as foreign policy practitioners (FPPs) within the foreign affairs agencies of 
the US government.  
 
Focusing on elected officials, ethnic lobbies and governmental actors discounts the 
voice of Hispanic American actors who are likely to be able to exert significant impact 
on the way in which the Hispanic demographic as a whole engage with US foreign 
policy. In particular, it fails to include non-elected political elites that do not organise 
as an ethnic lobby but nevertheless have the capacity to shape Hispanic engagement 
with foreign policy discourse. This includes individuals and organisations that have 
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the power and influence to make representative claims on behalf of the Hispanic 
community. This could include cultural leaders, community organisers and civil rights 
activists. In addition, this could include Hispanic advocacy organisations that typically 
advanced domestic issues or that attempt to represent the population at the national 
level. These elites could have influence either for a brief period and over a particular 
set of issues, or for a longer period of time and represent an established authority 
over a particular Hispanic community or specific issue. 
 
In addition, a second important manifestation of Hispanic foreign policy elite that is 
frequently overlooked by the existing literature is that of Hispanic American foreign 
policy practitioners working within the federal government. This could include 
Hispanic Americans serving as career diplomats or analysts working with foreign 
policy institutions such as the Department of State or the US Agency for International 
Development, those working as researchers within foreign policy think tanks, or 
foreign affairs specialists within academia.  
 
In both of these instances, these elites have the potential to be seen as legitimate 
voices for their communities on foreign policy subject matters, given either their 
existing foreign policy expertise, or a legitimate status as recognised ambassadors for 
the community on domestic political matters. 
 
Within wider literature on foreign policy analysis, the perspective of domestic elites 
is recognised as a legitimate and useful source of insight to determine foreign policy 
engagement.137 Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that there has not been a great 
deal of research looking at the level of engagement by non-elected political elites 
within the Hispanic community outside of looking for evidence of home-country 
lobbying.  
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Towards a Generational analytical framework 
 
Therefore, this thesis will utilise an alternative framework for understanding Hispanic 
engagement with US foreign policy. This is based on an incorporation within this 
thesis of an adapted version of García’s generational approach, as well as a 
broadened definition of the term elites that will incorporate both non-elected 
Hispanic political elites and Hispanic Americans working within the foreign policy 
establishment of the federal government. 
 
It will adapt García’s model by focusing on the foreign policy engagement within the 
Chicano generation in the 1960s and 1970s as well as examining engagement by the 
Latino generation from the 1990s through to the contemporary period. However, it 
will also suggest a new generation with which to focus the analysis: That of the ‘Exile’ 
generation in the 1980s. This was a period characterised by the political organisation 
of both Cuban and Central American political exiles within the United States, set 
against the backdrop of high profile involvement in the politics and violence of 
Central America by the Reagan administration. This case study was chosen for 
inclusion in this thesis for two principle reasons. Firstly, both the intervention by the 
US government in Latin America, as well as attempts by Cuban exile elites to 
influence the US government’s policies towards the island, represent prominent 
activities in this history of the later cold war, as well as being relatively well-known 
events within US public discourse. As a result, their relevance to this thesis topic and 
their relative importance in the history of post-war US foreign policy, means that 
their exclusion as a case study from the thesis would leave both a notable gap in the 
chronological timeline of this analysis, as well as leave one of the most high-profile 
moments of Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy un-examined. Secondly, as 
will be outlined in Chapter 4, the examples of both the Cuban and Central American 
exiles represent the closest that any Hispanic elites have become to operating within 
the ‘ethnic lobby’ model discussed in the existing literature. As a result, it is important 
to understand the important distinctions between these Exile elites and the later 
Latino generation, in order to better understand why Hispanic elites from the 1990s 
onwards became reluctant to engage with US foreign policy. 
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The analysis will therefore use these three Generations as case studies to determine 
not only the extent to which these generations engage with US foreign policy, but to 
also identify the manner in which the nature of this engagement changes between 
the periods in which these generations operate. 
 
Furthermore, the analytical framework will take as its central unit of analysis the 
political elites within these three generations. This will allow a new level of insight 
previously missed by the existing literature that failed to sufficiently broaden the 
definition of foreign policy elite. 
 
To contextualise the case studies within the framework of these generations, the 
chapter will outline a brief overview of the changing nature of political elites across 
these different generations from the 1960s through to the 2010s. This will illustrate 
the extent to which Hispanic elites have changed over time from representating a 
predominantly Mexican-American community to incorporating the entirety of a pan-




The Chicano Generation reflects the group of Mexican-Americans that identified with 
and participated in the Chicano movement during the 1960s and 1970s. At its core, 
this was a political and cultural movement that reached its peak with the California 
farmworkers strike in 1965, through to the to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. 
138 It incorporated a Mexican-American civil rights agenda that demanded 
improvements in the social, economic and political conditions of Mexican-Americans, 
and featured a number of separate campaigns by different elites, across different 
parts of the geographic Southwest. Whilst the movement was characterised by 
decentralized campaigns, the ideology and ideational engagement within the 
                                                     
138 M. T. García, “Introduction: The Chicano Movement and Chicano Historiography,” in M. T. García 
(ed.), The Chicano movement: Perspectives from the twenty-first century (London: Routledge, 2014), 
PP. 1–2. 
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movement included consistent features. These included a deliberate invocation and 
conscious espousal of Mexican heritage as a positive quality that should be 
embraced, rejecting the notion that the cultural legacy of Mexico should be 
discarded in favour of assimilation. In particular, the movement’s ideology rejected 
the legitimacy of the conventional ideas of immigrant assimilation and of the US 
political system. In its place, it presented a counter-narrative in which the US political 
and economic system operated as a tool of oppression against the Mexican-
American population. 
 
The Chicano generation elites were characterised by a focus on a number of high-
profile and charismatic individual leaders of various different movements and 
protests, though within a number of areas of the movement such as the Crusade for 
Justice and the Chicano war moratorium, the participants of the movements were 
disproportionately students and young Mexican-Americans.  
 
The major themes and historical events associated with Chicano generation elites are 




The Exile Generation refers to the collection of Hispanic immigrant groups that 
arrived in the United States as political refugees, during the mid to latter half of the 
twentieth century. In particular, these groups were driven by refugees from Cuba, 
following the 1959 socialist revolution, as well as from Central American states such 
as Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, who began arriving in large numbers 
following the escalation of civil wars within the region from the 1970s onwards. 
During the heights of the cold war, exiles from these groups organised themselves so 
as to influence US foreign policy towards their home countries, in the hope of 
resolving the political situations that led to their exit.  
 
The presentation of the Cuban population that began arriving in the US in 1959 as 
exiles, is a common (though not exclusively-used) practice within both academic and 
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public discourse, and is a term that has been consistently deployed by US presidents 
when publically discussing the community, especially when referencing the first wave 
of arrivals.139 Central Americans who arrived in the US fleeing political violence are 
less regularly afforded the exile label, instead being typically referred to as refugees 
by media and political commentators.140 However, despite the widespread use of the 
exile label to refer to Cubans living in the US, the specific concept of an ‘Exile 
generation’ as its own political generation is original to this thesis: By affording the 
elites from these communities a common ‘exile’ label, it emphasises the shared 
characteristics, interests and behaviour, and recognises that these unique features 
affected their engagement with US foreign policy in a sufficiently distinctive way that 
it becomes necessary to think of them as a distinct political generation in their own 
right. 
   
García himself does not include this generation as part of his analysis, due to his focus 
on the evolution of the Mexican-American community and his attention on the 
broader changes in domestic circumstances and political behaviour of Mexican-
American elites. However, as will be outlined in Chapter 4, the Cuban and Central 
American exile communities undertook considerable engagement with US foreign 
policy during the 1980s. As both Cuban and Central American foreign policy 
engagement was driven by similar principles and reflected a significant engagement 
by Hispanic population with US foreign policy, they have therefore been included 
together as a cohesive generation in this analysis to complement the political 
generations already identified by García. This reflects not only a unique epoch in the 
history of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy due to the high-profile 
                                                     
139 For example, in a speech in Old Havana during his historic visit to the island in March of 2016, 
Barack Obama referred to the US’ “Cuban exiles” that “love Cuba” and for whom many “still 
considers [the island] their true home”, (See: R. T. Beckwith, “Read President Obama's Speech to the 
Cuban People”, Time, 22nd March, 2016. [http://time.com/4267933/barack-obama-cuba-speech-
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140 For example, Barack Obama specifically used the term ‘Central American refugees’ in a speech 
thanking the Mexican government for their efforts to ‘absorb’ individuals that cross their southern 
border seeking asylum. (See: D. Nakamura, “Obama thanks Mexico for ‘absorbing’ Central American 





nature of the home-country lobbying efforts, but it also marks a significant moment 
in the evolution of the Hispanic American community from a collection of ethnic 




The Latino Generation refers to both the state of the Hispanic population in the 
decades following 1990, as well as the state of the political elite that represents it. 
García defines the broad population of the Latino Generation as compromising the 
children of the new immigrants that arrived in the United States from Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean from the late 1970s through to the 1990s.141 As a result, 
this is the first Hispanic generation to represent a genuinely heterogeneous mix of 
Latin American backgrounds. This generation is also characterised as “coming of age” 
at a time when the United States economy experienced unprecedented levels of 
globalisation, which had effects on both the US and Latin American socio-economic 
landscapes. In addition, the Latino Generation grew up alongside a recognition of the 
growing political clout of the expanding Latino demographic, alongside a revolution 
in communication technology that has allowed Latinos to communicate both 
externally with their countries of origin and with strangers more globally, as well as 
with other Latinos across the US.142 The final characteristic of Latino identity that 
García emphasises has been informative in developing the generational mindset has 
been the emergence of neo-nativism following the culture wars of the 1990s. As 
García emphasises: 
 
Neo-nativism represents a surge of anti-immigrant sentiment in this country in response 
to increase undocumented immigration, especially from Mexico. This has led to such 
anti-immigrant actions as the passage of Proposition 187 in California in 1994 that 
denied most state services to the undocumented, including hospital care and education 
for their undocumented children… Those children… who crossed the border as babies or 
as very young children became Dream Act Latinos who have had to live, if not in the 
                                                     
141 M. T. García, The Latino Generation, P. 23. 
142 Ibid., PP. 23-25 
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shadows, at least with the burden of their personal limitations, such as in education, due 
to their status.143 
 
As a result, the wider population that makes up the Latino generation represents a 
number of novel positions within the history of the Hispanic population: They are at 
once a recognised growing political entity and, at the same time, the subject of open 
criticism of their status and place in the United States. Most importantly, they are 
the first true Hispanic community to represent diverse international origins. 
 
The Latino Generation elites, which will exist as the focus of analysis in this study, 
reflect a different set of novel characteristics. As will be outlined in Chapter 5, Latino 
elites claiming to represent the community are concentrated within large-scale, 
national advocacy organisations that operate within the framework of the US 
political system. They emphasise the legitimacy of the pan-ethnic component of the 
Latino demographic in the hope of leveraging this for greater political capital.  
 
However, the transition from the country of origin labels that characterised the 
Chicano and Exile generations, to pan-ethnic Latino and Hispanic labels, did not occur 
overnight, nor was it a process that developed organically from within the population 
itself. As will be outlined below, this process reflected a co-constitutive effort from 
both the Hispanic elites themselves, in conjunction with the federal government and 
the media, to legitimize the pan-ethnic Latino label. As will be further explored in 
Chapters 5 and 6, this process and its outcome has directly impacted the ways in 
which Latino Generation elites can engage with US foreign policy discourse in the 
twenty first century. 
 
Transitioning to a pan-ethnic label 
 
By the 1990s, the banner under which Hispanic American political engagement had 
been conducted at the national level had transitioned from being along national-
                                                     
143 Ibid., P. 25 
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origin lines, to the now-commonplace ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ labels. This represented 
more than just a change of terminology; organisations and advocacy groups, in 
framing their constituents in such a way, were making the active choice to assume a 
pan-ethnic identity and make a claim to be representing a united ethnicity over a 
collection of individual groups that had happened to share similar characteristics. 
 
Scholars had initially identified the concept of a Latino pan-ethnicity in the previous 
decades. Padilla had observed the interaction between Puerto Rican and Mexican-
Americans in Chicago during the 1950s and 60s and noted that, as a consequence of 
sharing a finite physical and political space with growing populations, a collective 
consciousness emerged that took the form of a new identity that existed ‘above’ 
national origin labels and transcended cultural differences, formed out of the 
commonalities between the two Spanish speaking, predominantly Catholic groups, 
both of whom were minorities in a predominantly Anglo city.144 Thus pan-ethnicity, 
from a theoretical perspective, is a fundamentally new identity, mutually conceived 
by different Spanish speaking groups once sufficient social and geographic conditions 
are met, that surpasses the traditional boundaries between the groups. 
 
The topic of Latino pan-ethnicity represents a continuing area of scholarly enquiry. 
Researchers have questioned both the existence of such a phenomenon and 
speculated on the necessary conditions for its development. As with many questions 
of social identity, it represents a site of interest to a number of social science 
disciplines. For the purposes of this study, however, it is the possible political 
consequences that are relevant, and the examination of to what extent the 
development of pan-ethnicity amongst the Latino population brings with it 
consequences for Latino political behavior and the nature of elite engagement. 
 
In trying to make sense of how this rapid rise in pan-ethnicity came about, it is 
necessary to look at the development of the term within the United States census, 
                                                     
144 F. M. Padilla, Latino ethnic consciousness: the case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in 
Chicago. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985) 
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as it was through this process that the categories of ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ were first 
offered as legitimate identities to individuals from Spanish-speaking backgrounds.  
The first attempt at measuring the size of the ‘Latino’ population was the 1970 
census. A long-form version of the questionnaire that was distributed to a sample of 
the population included the question “Is this person’s origin or descent—“ with the 
choices of responses being “Mexican”,  “Puerto Rican”, “Cuban”, “Central or South 
American”, “Other Spanish” or “No, none of these”145 
 
By the 1980 census, this question was included in the short form questionnaire that 
was distributed to the entire population. This time the question was worded: “Is this 
person of Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent?” ‘Hispanic’ was now the explicit over-
arching category under which the entirety of responses based on national origin 
group were subsumed. 
The decision to use the term “Hispanic” had come about following recommendation 
of a specially convened Hispanic Task Force, part of a larger initiative within the 
federal government to find more appropriate labels for ethnic minorities that could 
be used for official purposes. The term ‘Latino’ was offered on the 2000 census as an 
alternative label, though the two were treated as interchangeable for statistical 
purposes.146 
Attempts to measure the size of the Latino population through the census had 
proven problematic. The 1970 long-form question gathered 9.1 million respondents, 
which was half a million below other estimates of the size of the Hispanic 
demographic. Furthermore, in an indication of the confusion around the question, 
over 1 million individuals who answered the question were not of Spanish-speaking 
origin, and had likely mistaken the “central or south American” option to refer to a 
geographic region of the United States. The official data from the census did not 
attempt to update or correct these figures, making the designated Hispanic 
population size from the period hard to gauge. The ‘Central or South American’ 
category was removed in time for the 1980 census, but a different problem emerged 
                                                     




when several hundreds of thousands of non-Hispanics mistakenly answered the 
question by circling the “amer” part of the “yes, Mexican, Mexican-Amer., Chicano” 
response. There were yet others whose stated language and origin suggested they 
were Latino but had failed to identify explicitly as such. This all resulted in a significant 
degree of confusion, and raised a question mark over the legitimacy of the ‘Hispanic’ 
category.  At the very least, the first two official attempts to categorise Spanish-
speaking national origin groups under a common label produced questionable 
statistical data, and ultimately resulted in a somewhat flawed picture of the extent 
of pan-ethnic identification in the 1970s and 1980s147. 
 
Given these problems, the legitimacy of the ‘Latino’ label is open to challenge. For 
the purposes of this project, it is necessary to look at how far has the label been 
successfully ingratiated amongst the target Latino audience themselves. Public 
affinity with pan-ethnic labels can suggest whether it has been embraced by Latinos, 
which can in turn indicate how far it can be used as an avenue for political 
mobilisation. In the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), around 1 in 3 
respondents chose to identify with a pan-ethnic label such as ‘Hispanic’ or ‘Latino’. 
This suggests that at the start of the new decade, pan-ethic labels held a degree of 
acceptance but they remained secondary to national origin group as the primary 
method of identification. By 2006, this had changed considerably, where 87% of 
respondents in the Latino National Survey claimed identification with such a label148. 
This suggests that within 15 years, support for the concept of a common Latino 
identity had more than doubled within the general Hispanic population; a dramatic 
increase that suggests that a belief in the concept of pan-ethnicity does indeed exist 
and is shared among the vast majority of Latinos. 
 
                                                     
147 Ibid. 
148 J. L. Monforti, “Identity Revisisted: Latinos(as) and Panethnicity”, PP. 51-73, in T. Affigne, E. Hu-
Dehart and M. Orr (eds.), Latino Politics en Ciencia Politica: The Search for Latino Identity and Racial 
Consciousness, New York University Press (New York & London: 2014), P. 52. 
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This raises a subsequent question of relevance to this project: if a pan-ethnic identity 
is recognized amongst the target population, does this have implications for how 
Latinos engage with the political process?  
 
Kaufmann investigated the potential impact that a pan-ethnic identity would have 
on the ability for Latinos to engage with other minority groups and work together for 
shared political goals.149 Given that being able to advocate whilst representing a 
larger ‘block’ of potential voters increases that chances of success, it could 
potentially prove a highly useful tool for a Latino organisations. To examine the 
possibility of such inter-minority cooperation, she examined a sample of Latino 
survey respondents from 1999 and found that respondents that expressed a high 
level of pan-Latino identity were more likely to feel a greater degree of affinity 
towards African Americans, believing that they have shared goals and challenges as 
a fellow discriminated group150. This has significant implications for the potential for 
Latinos to build mass coalitions with African American advocacy groups. 
Building on this research, others looked at the how far Latinos expressed a sense of 
linked fate with each other. It is well documented that African American political 
engagement as a block is enabled by the fact the most African Americans see their 
personal fortunes dependent on the necessary success of the race as a whole151. 
Were Latinos to be able to operate as a similarly cohesive block, a similar sentiment 
of linked fate should also be present. Sanchez examined the 2006 Latino National 
Survey results and found that 77% of respondents believe that the fate of their 
national origin group is intrinsically tied to the fate of Latinos as a whole, and 68% 
indicated they believed their individual success was also dependent on Latinos doing 
well.152 
 
                                                     
149 K. M. Kaufmann, “Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-
American Political Coalitions”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2003), PP. 199-210. 
150 Ibid. 
151 See for example M. C. Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American politics 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
152 G. R. Sanchez and N. Masuoka, “Brown-Utility Heuristic? The Presence and Contributing Factors 
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In addition to this, recent survey data from the Pew Hispanic Center suggests that 
Latinos overwhelmingly express a desire to be presented by a ‘national’ political 
leadership figure. 74% say it is either ‘extremely’ important or ‘very’ important for 
the success of the Latino political agenda to have an individual that can represent 
them in the public sphere.153 It is not clear how far Latinos would be willing to accept 
a Latino individual from a national-origin group other than their own, but what is 
clear is that three-quarters of Latinos are comfortable with an individual representing 
a pan-ethnic identity to the rest of the US population. 
 
Therefore, despite the controversy over its origin and the limits and scope of its 
potential impact, statistical evidence would suggest that Latinos display an affinity 
with a pan-ethnic label and that this is likely to inform the manner in which they 
engage with the US political system. 
 
Hispanic Generational elites in context 
 
This overview demonstrates how Hispanic generational elites followed a pattern of 
evolution from national origin groups based around charismatic individuals, to 
established national advocacy organisations that make claim to represent the 
entirety of the Latino population. Thus, it is clear that elites changed significantly as 
they evolved from Chicano and Exile generations into a pan-ethnic, Latino 
generation, both in terms of outreach strategy and organisational structure. In 
addition, the generations themselves were substantially different in terms of the 
population compositions that the elites were representing: Chicanos were grounded 
in a premise of resistance to the perceived oppression of an illegitimate US political 
infrastructure, and worked to construct an ethnic national identity around that 
premise, with elites representing a relatively uniform Mexican-American 
constituency. By contrast, ‘Latino’ as a category is inherently more contested; as a 
result, its elites cannot draw on the same level of homogeneity as the Chicano or 
                                                     
153 Pew Hispanic Center, “Three-Fourths of Hispanics say Their Community Needs a Leader”, 
(Washington DC: 2013). [http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/10/22/three-fourths-of-hispanics-say-
their-community-needs-a-leader/] 
 96 
Exile elites, who were speaking to populations drawn principally from similar 
backgrounds and countries of origin. 
 
Thus, this poses an important question from a foreign policy perspective: Given the 
significance of change in structure and composition between different Hispanic 
generations, did engagement with US foreign policy change as a consequence? 
Through the utilisation of a generational approach within this thesis, using the case 
studies outlined above, it is possible to attempt to answer this question in a manner 
that provides an account for both differences and continuities between these 
generations. Deploying this approach also offers a more nuanced understanding of 
individual case studies of Hispanic American foreign policy engagement during the 
latter half of the 20th century, by placing them within their generational context. 
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Chapter 3: “This very place is our Vietnam”: Chicano 




This chapter will analyse the nature of foreign policy engagement by Chicano 
generation elites within the Chicano movement, during its main period of activity 
from 1965 to 1975. It will establish that the Chicano elites engaged with foreign 
policy discourse in three principle ways: Firstly, a critical re-appraisal of the history 
of US foreign policy towards Mexico, the nature of westward expansion, and the 
concept of an American ‘manifest destiny’ were all crucial components of the critical 
narratives underpinning Chicano ideology. Secondly, Chicano elites established a 
high-profile, organised anti-war platform in response to the disproportionately high 
number of Mexican-Americans killed in the conflict, tying opposition to the war to 
their wider civil rights campaigns. Finally, a number of Chicano elites conducted 
significant international outreach efforts, establishing direct relationships with the 
government of Mexico, as well as organised labour movements in Europe, in the 
hope of securing international support for their efforts.  
 
As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the case study of Chicano elite engagement 
with US foreign policy ultimately supports the main claims in this thesis: 
 
Firstly, these findings support the claim that Hispanic elites engage with foreign 
policy where it supports and complements their domestic agendas. The three 
methods of foreign policy engagement outlined above were utilised by Chicano elites 
as part of an attempt to bring greater support to their civil rights campaigns, whether 
by solidifying the Chicano identity around a narrative of resistance, bringing attention 
and public support to their local operations, or lobbying foreign actors to provide 
international and diplomatic interest in their crusade to liberate the barrios. 
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Secondly, it supports the claim that widening the scope of foreign policy engagement 
beyond an analysis of evidence of home-country lobbying, it is possible to find 
meaningful and substantial engagement with foreign policy and foreign policy 
discourse: For Chicano elites, the injustices brought about by the legacy of US foreign 
policy was a principle lens through which Mexican-American history and socio-
economic problems were considered. This in turn meant Chicano elite approaches to 
campaigning and relationship-building were left inextricably contextualised to the 
wrongs of US foreign policy. Despite this engagement, relatively little academic 
attention has been afforded to this period in Hispanic American history by the 
existing literature of US foreign policy, despite it representing a moment of 
considerable public engagement with foreign policy and cold war doctrine, against 
the backdrop of US military intervention in Southeast Asia. 
 
Thirdly, the chapter supports the claim that, by utilising a generational approach to 
understanding Hispanic elite leadership, the nuances of Chicano US foreign policy 
engagement is revealed: Both the oppositional nature of Chicano ideology, coupled 
with the relatively homogenous, Mexican-American community that it represented, 
meant that elites were able to build the movement’s identity around a revisionist 
history that placed Mexican-Americans as the historical and continuing victims of an 
oppressive US foreign policy. Furthermore, an organisational structure where social 
protests were led and centred around a relatively small number of high-profile, 
charismatic leaders, resulted in the possible avenues of foreign policy engagement 
being different for Chicano elites than for the Exile Generation and for the Latino 
Generation elites examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
The structure of this chapter consists of a brief outline of the Chicano movement, its 
principle leaders, campaigns and Ideas. It then presents the ways in which Chicano 
elites critically engaged with the history of US foreign policy, demonstrating how 
elements of the movement constructed an alternative ‘manifest destiny’ based on 
ethnic nationalism, solidifying the essentially resistive nature of Chicano identity. It 
then outlines how opposition to the war in Vietnam became a central component of 
the movement, seen in both the literature and art that emerged at the time, as well 
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as in the organised marches against the war that were conducted between 1969 and 
1971. This section incorporates interviews with two Chicano civil rights leaders that 
served as co-presidents of the Chicano Moratorium Committee, which organised the 
largest ever march against the war, in Los Angeles in 1970. The chapter will then 
outline how various campaigns of the movement conducted international outreach 
efforts, attempting to build relationships with foreign policy actors in the hope of 
securing international and diplomatic support for their local campaigns.  
 
Outlining the movement 
 
The Chicano movement, or El Movimiento was a political and cultural movement that 
took place principally from around 1965, with the commencement of the farmworker 
strikes in California, to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. 154 It was, at its core, a 
demand for improvements in the political, social and economic status of Mexican-
Americans, and included specific campaigns for land reform, labour rights and 
educational opportunities, among others. These were often separate campaigns that 
were un-coordinated and steered by separate elites, across different parts of the 
geographic Southwest. However, whilst the movement was inherently decentralized, 
it was nevertheless characterized by several unique features, which applied across 
the movement. These included a conscious espousal of Mexican heritage as a 
positive quality that should be embraced, rejecting the notion that their language, 
values, religion and customs should be discarded in favour of the Anglo-Saxon 
cultural establishment. As Garcia summarises: “One of the objectives of the 
Movimiento was to liberate Mexican-origin people from a sense of cultural 
inferiority”. 155  
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The Chicano movement can broadly be considered as a youth movement: a central 
feature of its membership was a new generation of US-born citizens of Mexican 
heritage that openly rejected the general commitment to assimilation of the previous 
generation of Mexican-Americans. This included a marked generational difference 
concerning perspectives on military services, with younger Chicanos rejecting service 
in the military as a path to societal integration. In many individual cases, this was at 
odds with their the ‘Mexican-American’ generation parents, who had often viewed 
military service as a display of patriotism and as way to demonstrate their 
deservingness for a recognised place within the US, and bring a wider public 
acceptance towards their community.156 In place of such sentiments, the younger 
generation at the heart of the Chicano movement rejected the idea that a 
contribution to the state in this manner was a necessary requirement of participation 
in US society, encouraging instead a more critical interpretation of the place of the 
Mexican-American community within the existing socio-economic and political 
structure.157 A 1969 manifesto published in La Raza, a Chicano magazine published 
in LA, typified this sentiment:  
Why this sudden awakening? Actually, it is not as sudden as it looks. Its first 
manifestations begin in the period following the Second World War. Mexican-Americans 
emerged from that conflict with a new determination to make their sacrifice count. No 
ethnic group had received a larger proportion of decorations, and few had sustained as 
large a share of casualties. These veterans challenged in and out of court the blatant 
legacy of discrimination still prevailing in the Southwest, often displayed by the glaring 
signs of the brutal words “No Mexicans allowed”.158 
 
The movement did not include a rigid ideology. There was never a consensus over 
what did and did not constitute Chicano thought and as Jorge Mariscal points out, 
the movement’s philosophical basis was contained ideas of both nationalism and 
internationalism.159 The popularity of different ideas changed over time, as well as 
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varying from geographic location and between different organisations. However, 
Ignacio García nevertheless identifies four ‘phases’ where certain ideas were 
incorporated into the movement’s ideological development and made it unique from 
previous Mexican-American generations. Firstly, it involved a critical re-evaluation of 
the place of the Mexican-Americans within the US socio-economic and political 
structure that rejected the existing model of immigrant-incorporation as a failure.  
Secondly, it inspired Mexican-Americans to re-discover their history and encouraged 
a positive appraisal of their heritage. It advocated a celebration of Mexican history 
and culture, removing it from its perceived lower rung on an ethnic hierarchy that 
privileged Anglo-Saxons as an ideal to be assimilated towards. In the third and fourth 
phases, this heritage became a central focus of the movement’s identity and was 
incorporated into a new wave of political activity that opposed the Anglo-Saxon 
model of assimilation. 160 
 
The structure of the elite within the movement was much more based around the 
disproportionate dominance and influence of individual leaders than had been the 
case previously (or is the case today). A class of charismatic personalities dominated 
Chicano leadership, and this has been reflected in academic study of the period, 
which has focused disproportionately on high-quality biographical accounts and the 
testimonios of movement leaders. The main organisations were often headed by a 
charismatic individual (invariably a man) with a national profile, but the day to day of 
organisational activity was often anchored around the initiative of local chapters and 
communities. As a result, they were often cash poor but membership rich, which led 
to campaigns centred on public marches and demonstrations. Whilst Chicano history 
included a relatively wide range of individual elites and groups, the most high-profile 
and the most influential for the longest period were the organisations based around 
the so-called “four horsemen” 161: Reies Tijera and La Alianza Federal de Mercedes, 
who were based in New Mexico and campaigned for land-grand reform; Rodolfo 
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“Corky” Gonzales, and the Crusade for Justice, based in Colorado; Cesar Chavez who, 
along with Delores Huerta and others led the United Farm Workers and campaigned 
for labour and farmworkers rights in California; and José Angel Gutiérrez, who served 
as President of La Raza Unida Party, a Southwest-wide political party that formally 
participated in the US electoral process on a Chicano policy platform and had a 
number of electoral victories in Texas. 
 
Despite the influence of Chicano elites in the 1960s and 70s, as well as the often-
revered status of a number of Chicano leaders today among the Latino community, 
the period of the Chicano movement remains relatively ignored by scholars of ethnic 
minority engagement with US foreign policy. The foreign policy perspectives of 
Chicano elites themselves have been left virtually unexamined. This is perhaps a 
consequence of the dominance of the domestic agenda that was characterised by 
the movement elites’ high-profile local and national campaigns. However, that 
domestic concerns took pre-eminence does not mean that foreign policy and 
international perspectives were not of significant importance to the movement: 
these dimensions are present in the politics, activities and ideologies of the 
movement, in varying forms, throughout its existence. 
 
To correct this omission, this chapter will outline and demonstrate how and when 
Chicano elites engaged with US foreign policy and international issues. It will begin 
with an examination of the way in which one of the central ideas that underpinned 
the Chicano identity, that of the mythical Mexican homeland of Aztlán, included a 
sophisticated re-examination of the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Southwest, 
the use of manifest destiny as a justification for territorial expansion, and contests 
the legitimacy of US sovereignty. The second section will focus on Chicano elite 
opposition to the Vietnam War, including organizing the largest anti-war 
demonstration in US history in Los Angeles in 1970. The final section will look at the 
international outreach efforts of Chicano elites, attempting to leverage relationships 
with foreign political actors either to strengthen their domestic agenda, or to build 
solidarity with foreign movements to which they sympathized. 
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The Chicano challenge to manifest destiny 
 
‘Chicanismo’ – or the political ideas and ideology that underpinned the Chicano 
movement, were contested throughout the 1960s and 70s, and still continue to be 
the subject of debate today. It contained within it a number of different strands and 
positions reflecting its geographically de-centralised structure. However, the most 
prominent issue that dominated Chicano thought revolved around the relationship 
between Mexican-Americans and the space in which they found themselves in the 
United States, both physically and culturally, and how this interaction contributed in 
the conscious production of new, Chicano, identity. 162 It included a critical re-
evaluation of the manner in which the United States annexed the territory in the 
Southwestern states, and the historically-situated narratives used to justify its right 
to govern.  
 
A prominent counter-narrative within the Chicano movement was a rejection of the 
legitimacy of the US sovereignty in the Southwest. This was centred on the concept 
of ‘Aztlán’: a name for the legendary homeland of the Aztec civilisation that had 
stretched from Mexico as far north as California and Colorado. 163 Chicano leaders 
encouraged Mexican-Americans to think of themselves as direct descendants of 
indigenous Mexican populations: they were the spiritual inheritors to the territorial 
Southwest, and by extension their claim to the land was of higher precedence than 
that of the more recently-arrived Anglo-Saxon population.  With this came a renewed 
focus on historical US foreign policy in the Southwest and its expansion into Mexican 
territory as well as a refutation of the claims of Manifest destiny that had been used 
to justify it. Instead of the result of the natural march of Anglo progress, Chicano 
elites put forward an alternative picture of a brutal occupation by an imperialistic 
aggressor.   
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Tijerina and the Land Grants  
 
A challenge to the physical territory had begun earlier with Reies Tijerina and the 
political organisation that would go on to become La Alianza Federal de Mercedes 
(translated in English as Federal Land Grant Alliance). A charismatic evangelical 
preacher, he moved to New Mexico in the 1950s and became interested in the Land 
Grant struggle. This concerned the territory that was ceded to the United States by 
Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 that ended the Mexican-American 
war. The treaty had guaranteed Mexican citizens that were living in territory that was 
to become part of the United States would have their rights to the land honoured 
under US law. In the end however, US authorities recognized only a small percentage 
of claims by Mexican farmers. 164 As a result, Tijerina and La Alianza sought to argue 
that the US had violated international law and that the ‘Hispanos’ living in New 
Mexico had the legitimate right to the land. They argued that the current 
occupiers of the land, in large instances by the federal government itself, were there 
illegally and that their sovereignty based on the hundred-year-old international 
treaty was invalid.  
 
Tijerina and La Alianza initially sought to rectify the situation through the existing 
legal and political apparatus and built up their organisation to a size that allowed 
them to petition both the courts and meet with local elected officials for redress. By 
1965, La Alianza had 14,000 members and its national conference the following 
years was attended by over 20,000 delegates, and Tijerina’s outreach efforts 
included both a television and radio program.165 However, these efforts were largely 
unsuccessful, and La Alianza began to turn to symbolic acts of militancy. In 1966 the 
organisation staged an occupation of the Carson national forest in northern New 
Mexico, in which they proclaimed that the territory, according to international law, 
was the rightful property of its legal Mexican owners that had been previously 
recognized by Mexico in the 19th century. Rejecting the sovereignty of the United 
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States government over the land, they declared the territory the “Republic of Joaquín 
del Río de Chama”. 166 On the first day, two officials from the U.S. Forest Service were 
subjected to a symbolic trial for trespassing on independent Mexican land. 167 
Tijerina admitted after the occupation had ended that the move was meant to draw 
national publicity to the land grant movement and not an earnest attempt to declare 
the park independent from the U.S. 168 
 
In a limited sense, the actions of La Alianza in Carson national forest denoted an 
attempt by a local group of activists to draw wider attention to the contested legality 
of U.S. ownership of former Mexican landholders’ property in New Mexico. But the 
manner and tactics used to do so reflect the importance of re-examining the received 
history of US foreign policy in the Southwest to their strategy for achieving their 
political objectives. In its theatrical appearance, the symbolic takeover of the park 
based on theoretical violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo represented a clear 
and direct challenge by La Alianza to the legitimacy of US’ sovereignty over the land, 
drawing on the stipulations of an international treaty signed after a 19th century US-
Mexican war. However, despite the symbolism of the 
takeover, Tejerina’s organisation was not advocating the outright political secession 
for Mexican-American landowners. Instead, they were attempting to leverage 
the spectre of a claim for political independence in order to deliver legal 
entitlements within the existing US system. This was a challenge to the basis of 
assumed Anglo pre-dominance in the region. The origin of the border was a 
consequence of US foreign policy, and the legality of its subsequent governance lay 
in a bilateral treaty. As a result, the very foundations of the legitimacy of US control 
were contested, with the intention of putting the status quo political structure on 
the defensive.  
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Corky Gonzales and the Crusade for Justice  
 
In Colorado, a movement for social right was being built around another charismatic 
speaker, Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales, a former boxer turned political activist. The 
Crusade for Justice emerged out of a series of campaigns by a proportion of the 
State’s Mexican-American population on issues of civil rights, education reform and 
police brutality. Like La Alianza, they also campaigned over the issue of land grants, 
but were primarily concerned with achieving socio-economic justice.  Gonzales had 
previously been an active participant in local politics, working with the Democratic 
Party and rising to the position of a local ‘captain’. However, he quickly became 
disillusioned with this role after experiencing corruption within the party first hand 
and dismissing it as an avenue to improve the conditions for minorities.169 He felt 
that Mexican-Americans were unable to fully integrate into American society due 
to an un-willingness on the part of Anglos to offer the socio-economic and political 
parity that supposedly lay at the end of the assimilation process into the wider Anglo-
Saxon society. At the same time, he recognized that many Mexican-Americans were 
actively participated in US foreign policy via military service in the hope of achieving 
such parity. He instead encouraged his compatriots to embrace their rich Mexican 
heritage as a source of pride in the face of Anglo pressures to conform. He articulated 
his sense of frustration, betrayal and a colonized people in the poem “I am Joaquin”: 
 
“My blood runs pure on the ice caked  
hills of the Alaska Isles,  
on the corpse strewn beach of Normandy,  
the foreign land of Korea,  
                                    and now  
                                    Vietnam.  
…   
I have made the Anglo rich  
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               Yet  
Equality is but a word,  
 the Treaty of Hidalgo has been broken  
and is but another treacherous promise. 
… 
Part of the blood that runs deep in me  
could not be vanquished by the Moors.  
I defeated them after five hundred years,  
                and I have endured.  
Part of the blood that is mine  
has labored endlessly four hundred  
years under the heel of lustful  
Europeans.  
I am still here!”170 
  
 
The poem attempted to capture a sentiment of a generation of young Mexican-
Americans, who felt similarly disillusioned with the promise of equal treatment 
through assimilation by ‘Anglo society’ and felt that they remained socially and 
politically marginalized and demanded a civil rights campaign to address their 
situation. 171 Gonzales’ response was to work with the Crusade for Justice to promote 
a Chicano political identity. Rejecting assimilation outright, it advocated instead that 
Mexican-Americans embrace their multiple indigenous and Spanish ancestries. It 
turned to a romanticized Mexican history and shared culture, and asserted that these 
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The image of ‘Aztlán’  
 
At the heart of this ethnic culture building lay the mythologised concept of ‘Aztlán’. 
To Chicanos, this represented the legendary homeland of the Aztec people – an 
indigenous civilisation that dominated Mexico immediately before the arrival of the 
Spanish. The location of Aztlán was theorised to exist north of Mexico and within the 
boundaries of the United States. 172 To Chicanos, the physical space of Aztlán became 
synonymous with those Southwestern states that had been within the borders of 
Mexico before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. As Chicanos considered themselves 
to be the direct descendants of the indigenous Aztecs, they therefore were the 
spiritual ‘owners’ of the South West territory. 173 Aztlán was their nation and 
territorial homeland, to which the Anglo-Saxon newcomers were simply political 
occupiers. This mythology became the anchoring concept for much of Chicano 
ideology and infused their political activity. 174 At its heart was a celebration of the 
fact that Chicanos were inheritors of a culture and ethnic legacy that pre-dated 
United States. It presented an alternative Manifest destiny based on Mexican 
heritage in a narrative that placed Mexican-Americans as the central political actor 
in the history of the Southwest United States. U.S. annexation of Mexican territory 
was no longer the inevitable result of progress, but rather an act of brutal occupation 
following a war of conquest, using oppression as principal tool of social control. 
‘Aztlán’ as a concept allowed the promotion of cultural hegemony within the 
territory with which Chicanos were dominant, and provided moral legitimacy for 
demands for self-determination.  
 
This emerging nationalism still needed a written articulation to clarify its message 
and present a cohesive ‘mission statement’ to Chicanos, the Mexican-American 
community at large, as well as the wider US population. In March 1969, Gonzales 
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convened a gathering of Chicano activist groups hosted by the Crusade for Justice in 
Colorado. This became known as the first National Chicano Liberation Youth 
Conference and was attended by around 1500 activists from various 
Chicano organisations across the Southwest. 175 There, the attendees agreed upon 
and ratified a document known as ‘El Plan Espiritual De Aztlán’, which set out the 
founding ideals of Chicano nationalism and the political objectives of the movement. 
The idea of the document was to serve as the “common denominator for mass 
mobilization and organization”176 and enshrine the sentiments of Chicanismo. El Plan 
listed 13 goals that would lead to self-determination for Mexican-Americans, and 
finished by emphasizing the agenda’s eventual goal of achieving national self-
determination for the people of Aztlán:  
 
A nation autonomous and free - culturally, socially, economically, and politically- will make 
its own decisions on the usage of our lands, the taxation of our goods, the utilization of 
our bodies for war, the determination of justice (reward and punishment), and the profit 
of our sweat.177 
  
The tone of the Plan reflected the strength of feeling among delegates 
that Aztlán represented a spiritual home for Mexican-Americans and afforded them 
the moral authority to seek a political revolution to reclaim their rightful sovereignty 
over the land. Whilst this attitude was in reality largely symbolic – none of the major 
Chicano elites advocated that Aztlán should attempt to become an actual 
independent state – in flirting with the notion of a legitimate claim to separation, it 
did none-the-less reinforce the challenge to the traditional narrative of an Anglo-
Saxon Manifest destiny leading to a progressive expansion into the South West. The 
prominent Chicano poet Alurista, who attended the conference and wrote a pre-
amble to the Plan, emphasised in his writing this contested narrative of sovereign 
legitimacy:  
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In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but 
also of the brutal "gringo" invasion of our territories, we, the Chicano inhabitants and 
civilizers of the northern land of Aztlán from whence came our forefathers, reclaiming the 
land of their birth and consecrating the determination of our people of the sun, declare that 
the call of our blood is our power, our responsibility, and our inevitable destiny. We are free 
and sovereign to determine those tasks which are justly called for by our house, our land, 
the sweat of our brows, and by our hearts. Aztlán belongs to those who plant the seeds, 
water the fields, and gather the crops and not to the foreign Europeans. We do not recognize 
capricious frontiers on the bronze continent. 178 
  
The fact that the conference attendees had chosen to issue a Plan was itself 
symbolic. Political documents such as this has a long association with the 
commencement of a number of violent political revolutions in Mexican history. This 
demonstrated two things: It reiterated to Chicanos that the heritage of European 
Mexican culture was to be celebrated and seen as a primary identity alongside 
older, indigenous cultures. To wider America, it hinted at the possibility that a similar 
revolution was about to occur were the political demands of the Mexican-American 
people not addressed. As if to signify both of these attitudes, conference attendees 
organized a march to the Colorado state Capitol building, where they lowered and 
replaced the State flag with the flag of Mexico and announced that the territory was 
now the “territorio liberado de Aztlán” (Liberated territory of Aztlán). 179 
 
Gutiérrez and the Raza Unida Party  
 
In addition to these protest activities, a number of Chicano elites were determined 
to build an organized infrastructure through which Aztlán could become a political 
project. Whilst Gonzales and other leaders had become disillusioned with 
the Democratic Party, they had not so readily abandoned a willingness to work within 
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the existing institutional framework for democratic politics. Gutiérrez outlined this 
position in at a rally in May of 1970: 
 
We have had other problems which we have known about for a long time. For instance, 
the fact that the Mexicano can’t cope with the culture of the monolingual creatures that 
abound in South Texas. You see, we’re literate in Spanish, so we can’t recognise the 
name of John Waltberger on the ballot, but we sure as hell recognise Juan Garcia… 
Supposedly in this kind of democratic society the citizenry is encouraged to participate 
in the political process – but not so in South Texas. Someone asked me recently whether 
I thought any type of system other than the American political system could work in 
South Texas. I thought about It for a minute and suggested that the question be 
reworded because we ought to try the American system first (Applause).180 
 
The solution became the creation of a formal Chicano organisation for getting 
Chicano elites into elected office: The Raza Unida Party (RUP). Emerging as a political 
force from 1970 onwards, it expanded to multiple party chapters across the states of 
the South West. However, it was José Angel Gutiérrez’s Texas operation that proved 
to be the most successful: they built on local campaigns for socio-economic issues 
that were already in place, particularly in the Winter Garden region near the border, 
which had a heavy Mexican and Mexican-American population. 181 From 1969 
the RUP under Gutiérrez campaigned for office in three local cities and won 15 out 
of the 16 seats they contested, and took control of the city council of Crystal City. 182 
The RUP’s message and policy platform was built around the same sentiments of self-
determination and Chicano ethno-cultural nationalism found in the Plan. This 
sentiment can be seen for example in the preamble of the Oakland chapter of the 
RUP: 
 
We see that our lands were stolen from us. We see that the only payment was in poverty, 
starvation, disease, racist mockeries made of our language and culture and race… Given 
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that these factors of oppression form the common denominator that unites us, 
THEREFORE WE THE PEOPLE OF LA RAZA, have decided to reject the existing political 
parties of our oppressors and take it upon ourselves to form LA RAZA UNIDA PARTY, which 
will serve as a unifying force in our struggle for self-determination.183 
  
While emphasizing the revolutionary nature of the Chicano struggle and the right of 
Mexican-Americans to the land, the RUP showed a clear commitment to the principle 
that government-organised democratic elections were the appropriate avenue for 
achieving Chicano political aims. The revolutionary message of the movement and 
challenge to US sovereignty was taken in a more literal sense by other 
Chicano organisations. On August 30th 1972, a youth militant organisation known as 
the Brown Berets – named after the headwear worn by members – undertook a 
‘takeover’ of Catalina Island off the coast of California.184 The group had adopted a 
similar organisational model to the Black Panthers; they had chapters across the 
Southwest and were involved in a number of high profile protests and 
demonstrations in California. Activists wore uniforms reminiscent of Latin American 
paramilitary soldiers. During the ‘takeover’, 26 members ‘invaded’ the island, which 
was then a popular high-end resort, and unveiled a Mexican flag overlooking the 
main harbor. In the confusion, the city manager’s office initially mistook the group 
for soldiers from the Mexican army.185 The invaders claimed the islands had not been 
ceded by Mexico to the US in the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, and that 
therefore the US was illegally occupying the island. They claimed they were therefore 
re-taking the territory on behalf of Mexico. David Sanchez, the ‘Prime Minister’ of 
the Brown Berets who led the takeover of the island, outlined the motive of the 
action in his interview: 
 
It actually emerged out of the anti-war marches: After it died down in 1971, I said ok we 
can't let the movement die here let's continue it.  So the last part of the campaign was 
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Catalina Island. Because we had 35 soldiers that were trained in peaceful conditions, it 
was something that we knew we could accomplish. And one of our protest was that we 
wanted better conditions for the Mexican American community. The other statement 
was about the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo that had came about at the end the 
Mexican- American war. In that treaty, there are certain rights granted to Mexican 
Americans, including the right to traditions and the right to speak Spanish, as well as the 
right to go up and down the streets without facing roadblocks. So we wanted to bring 
focus to the treaty and show people we had rights.186 
 
Therefore, as with Tijerina’s occupation of Carson National Forest six years earlier, 
the actual purpose of the ‘invasion’ was to raise awareness of the social problems 
faced by Mexican-Americans and specifically to generate sufficient publicity to 
communicate their concerns to politicians. 187 As with Tijerina’s symbolic 
‘reclamation’, the imagery reflected the importance of the presentation of the Anglo 
population as illegal occupiers to the movement and the continuing use of historical 
US foreign policy as a strategic tool for furthering their domestic agenda. 
 
In fact, the centrality of narrative of occupation and the stressing of the right of 
Mexican-Americans to the sovereignty of Aztlán was in fact so pronounced that some 
within the movement feared it moving from symbolism to physical separatism 
become an actual goal of activists, and the political ramifications that such a move 
would bring. In 1970 in a story entitled Mutations, Chicano activist and author 
Ricardo Sanchez wrote a fictionalized Plan in a 1970 response to the Plan 
de Aztlán that called for a revolution on the part of Mexican-Americans to reclaim 
their rightful sovereign territory:  
 
We pledge ourselves to the reclamation of our lands at whatever the cost… be it irrefutably 
known throughout the world that Aztlán is free, that revolution is here, and that if our 
blood must flow in order to secure our nation, we are fully prepared to fight in the barrios, 
cities, fields and valleys that our people might live in harmony, love, and economic 
rectitude… If war is the only avenue open to us, we here and now declare before all the 
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peoples on the Americas, before all nations everywhere, that we have exhausted all other 
avenues in our struggle to regain our freedom from oppression, exploitation, racism, and 
de-humanization foisted upon us by the new-oligarchical despotism of the gringoistic u. s. 
of a.;  
we thus proclaim our freedom and separation from the United States of Amerika, and 
hereby give notice that we are Aztlán, a mestizo nation predicated on the principles of 
dignity, worth, freedom, human-ness, and love. Viva el mestizage, VIVA LA RAZA DE 
BRONCE! 188 
  
The fictional plan was titled “Libertad o muerte” Aztlán es nuestro…” (“Liberty or 
Death: Aztlán Is Ours”) and in the story, the author goes on to document how the 
message incited Chicanos to take part in a violent and bloody uprising against Anglos, 
resulting in a great number of deaths and the damage to the South West.  
This highlighted the strength of concern that political militancy could turn to violence 
and indicated the dominance of the idea of Aztlán representing an alternative 
manifest destiny for Chicanos by the height of the movement’s activities in 1970.189 
 
That the idea of actual separation was even contemplated reflects the success of the 
Chicano movement elite’s invocation of an alternative history of US foreign policy as 
a core aspect of the movement’s identity. Without the challenge to Anglo-Saxon 
notions of manifest destiny that were an anchoring feature of Aztlán, they would 
have been without a rallying central idea that supported the narrative of a unified 
Chicano nationalism.  
 
Given the consistency with which Tijerina used the narrative as part of the campaign 
for Land reform and Gonzales and Gutiérrez deployed it to describe the shadow of 
racial oppression in their analyses of Mexican-American socio-economic conditions, 
it is clear that the spectre of US foreign policy was thus a present feature at the heart 
of Chicano movement discourse. 
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Chicano opposition to the Vietnam War 
 
Among the Mexican-American generation during the 1940s and 50s, there had been 
a relative consensus that making attempts to demonstrate loyalty and a patriotic 
disposition towards the United States was necessary to hasten their successful 
acceptance among the mainstream population. To this end, they were keen to 
distance themselves from their immediate Mexican immigrant status. Whereas in the 
early decades of the twentieth century immigrants had been keen to maintain their 
immigrant status due to the benefits it provided – Mexican diplomatic consuls took 
an interventionist stance in protecting their expatriate community from 
exploitation190 – the Mexican-Americans elites made efforts to encourage an image 
that the community was making active steps towards assimilation to the American 
way of life. At its core was an assumption that mere residence in the United States 
and economic participation were insufficient criteria for true citizenship. Instead, the 
onus lay upon Mexican-Americans to demonstrate worthiness. With the onset of 
World War 2, US foreign policy provided this opportunity: by serving in the military 
in Europe and the Pacific, Mexican-American men “proved their deservingness” of 
fully-fledged US nationality.191 In an interview, Félix Gutiérrez - a prominent Chicano 
anti-Vietnam activist and now Professor of Journalism at the University of Southern 
California, explained the importance of this phenomenon: 
 
US forces had been greatly strengthened by Mexican Americans in World War 2 and the 
Korean War, and Latinos and Mexican Americans had highest percentage of Medal of 
Honor winners in World War 2. The military was seen as a way of moving up and getting 
out, on an equal basis and footing with others, where you couldn't do it otherwise. So 
for a lot of people, the significant departure of their life in terms of changing their 
circumstances had been military service.192 
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At the same time, US entry into the war brought with it a new scrutiny of the political 
beliefs of Mexican immigrants and in particular, ‘zoot suit’ wearing adolescents were 
feared to be influenced by fascist ideology out of Mexico.193 Mexican-American 
elites, wary of being perceived as a national security threat, sought to highlight 
Mexican-American participation in furthering foreign policy goals of the US through 
their high rates of military service. In 1948 a World War 2 veteran named Hector B. 
Garcia established the American G.I. Forum that promoted improving the domestic 
socio-economic situation for returning Mexican-American servicemen. The central 
focus of their narrative was that the sacrifices made on the battlefield and in service 
to the state afforded them not only acceptance as citizens but also equal civil rights 
to the Anglo-Saxon mainstream population. Thus the strategy of the G.I. forum was 
to leverage their role in furthering US foreign policy overseas to improve the 
domestic conditions at home. 
 
However, the end of World War 2 did also herald the emergence of an alternative 
perspectives on US foreign policy among the Mexican-American community, albeit 
on a much more limited scale. Sections of the more radically minded Mexican-
American communities began to establish platforms for promoting their political 
agendas, and the years immediately following the war saw the emergence of 
organized networks that represented this new, radical position. The Asociación 
Nacional México-Americana (ANMA) was one such organisation. Founded in 1949, it 
emerged as the political wing of the Mexicans within the Union of Mine, Mill 
and Smelter workers in Colorado. It was influenced by the recent establishment of a 
range of political movement on the Left, and was inspired by the organisational 
tactics of the Popular Front. Existing from 1949 to 1954, it quickly became one of the 
dominant elite Mexican-American groups that claimed to be a representative voice 
for the community, with a number of chapters operating in cities and towns across 
the Southwest. 194 
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Operating at a time when the Cold war was quickly raising popular anti-communism 
to the forefront of American life and McCarthyism was at its political zenith, the 
organisation actively encouraged Mexican-Americans to embrace their Mexican 
heritage and resist calls for assimilation to Anglo-Saxon culture. In a move that 
Chicano elites would go on replicate a decade later, ANMA embraced a cultural 
nationalism that emphasised the importance of Mexican history and the Spanish 
language, and encouraged Chicanos to unite behind their ethnic commonalities. 195 
 
A core platform of ANMA’s political agenda was their critique of US foreign policy 
during the Cold war. ANMA had organized a meeting in Los Angeles in 1950 of groups 
that opposed to the escalation of the Cold war, after which an ANMA leader 
triumphantly announced that 20,000 Mexican Americans had signed the Stockholm 
Appeal calling for a ban on nuclear weapons. Local ANMA chapters sponsored talks, 
rallies and fundraisers in support of various peace movement and disarmament 
initiatives. Following the US’ decision to commit troops to Korea in 1950, opposition 
to the war became a central focus of ANMA’s activities. At their second national 
convention, ANMA passed a resolution encouraging the US Government and the UN 
to urgently find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, 196 and in 1951 
they encouraged Mexican-Americans who were opposed to the war to actively write 
to President Truman and petition him to bring a peaceful, early end to the conflict. 
197 
The focus of ANMA’s leaders campaigning revolved around the argument that the 
domestic, socio-economic problems that Mexicans faced were being continuously 
worsened by the US’ involvement in Korea. Firstly, Mexican-Americans were being 
disproportionately drafted into the military and formed a much higher percentages 
of the war casualties. In 1951, the Denver chapter of ANMA convened a ‘Peace 
Committee’, which noted that whilst Mexican-Americans made up only 10% of 
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Colorado’s population, they represented 28% of soldiers from the state killed in 
Korea. They identified that this was a trend across the Southwest, with 
disproportionate ratios of population percentage per state to death per state in 
Arizona (20% to 44%), Texas (17% to 30%) and New Mexico (49% to 56%). 198 
Secondly, ANMA leaders highlighted a negative link between the war in Korea and 
an increasingly hostile social, economic and political climate for Mexican-Americans 
domestically. Anti-communist laws like the McCarren Act, which targeted Mexican 
political associations, and anti-union laws like the Taft-Hartley Act, which targeted 
organized labour, were restricting the avenues with which Mexican-Americans could 
have their interests represented. 199 
 
Additionally, Mexican-Americans were disproportionately on low-incomes salaries, 
had to contend with an increase in taxes and a cut in social welfare programs to pay 
for increasing cost of the war in Korea. Thus, by demonstrating that the domestic 
wellbeing of Mexican-Americans was directly tied into the foreign policy of the US 
government, ANMA leaders were keen to emphasise the need for Mexican-
Americans to take a keen interest in the international conduct of their government 
in the Cold war. This again challenged the received convention that military 
service was an appropriate avenue for Mexican immigrants to demonstrate a 
commitment to the United States and earn the same rights and privileges as Anglo-
Saxons. As Garcia references, this sentiment is typified in the comments of a teenage 
Mexican-American girl at the time, when she said: “we’re good enough to fight and 
die in Korea for nothing, but not good enough to get jobs at home without 
discrimination and to be treated with equal with respect and dignity.” 200 
 This argument – that US foreign policy not only negatively impacted Mexican-
Americans but also did so in an unfair, disproportionate matter – would be used 
again by Chicano elites opposing the Vietnam War 15 years later.  
  
ANMA’s open critiques of US foreign policy and its refusal to respond to the pressures 
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of McCarthyism were, ultimately, the cause of its downfall. Its leadership was 
accused throughout its existence of being dominated by communists and having ties 
with the US Communist Party. As a result, it was the subject of considerable 
government and media scrutiny. The FBI, having infiltrated and studied the 
organisation, formally registered ANMA as a security threat to the US in 1952, 
and while ANMA’s leadership tried in vain to appeal the decision, this was followed 
two years later with them being declared a subversive organisation by the Attorney 
General’s office. ANMA’s stance on the Korean War made them a target for media 
criticism. As Garcia notes, in an interview during the ANMA’s national convention in 
El Paso in 1952 the President of ANMA, Alfredo Montoya, was accused by a local 
newspaper of refusing to “give a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to whether or not he or his 
organisation favors action against Red aggression in Korea” and described him as a 
“Red Front Leader”. Ultimately, the organisation succumbed to the pressure and 
ANMA activity at local chapters had ceased by the end of 1954. Despite their short 
tenure, the position of ANMA elites on US foreign policy and foreign interventions 
laid a framework that would be taken up a decade later by the Chicano movement. 
201 
 
The alternative approaches of elite Mexican-American organisations like the GI 
Forum and ANMA foreshadowed the difficulties that some Chicano elite groups 
would later encounter when trying to draw activists from both the youthful student 
movement sympathetic to the radical anti-war politics of ANMA, as well as more 
traditional rural farmworkers of the Mexican-American generation that were deeply 
reluctant to countenance expressing criticism of US foreign policy. Cesar Chavez and 
the UFW, which relied on the support of both groups found this a challenging position 
to have to negotiate. Wary that during the heights of anti-communist rhetoric 
conservative commentators were openly suggested that Chavez and the boycott 
organisers had communist sympathies202 (and likely hoping to avoid the fate of 
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ANMA a decade earlier), he initially placed the boycott organisers very much on the 
side of the government concerning foreign policy action in Southeast Asia during the 
early years of the campaign, including holding a rally in 1965 in celebration of Latino 
military servicemen in Vietnam.203 However, by 1970 Chavez committed to an anti-
war position, having moved from the open support to neutral silence during the mid-
to-late 60s. As this chapter will demonstrate, this shift reflected not only the strength 
of anti-US foreign policy sentiment among the Chicano movement by 1969, but also 
the acknowledgement that the war was having a direct impact on the socio-economic 
reality for Mexican Americans and that making Vietnam a focus of the campaign 
would directly advantage their goals. 
 
Context and outline of anti-war activities 
 
In the mid-to-late 1960s, the critical re-examinations that had led to the Chicano 
movement rejecting the received history of the Southwest region – that of American 
foreign policy as Manifest destiny - in favour of a portrayal of aggressive imperial 
expansionism by an Anglo-Saxon ethnic majority, also informed the manner in which 
Chicano elites responded to contemporary US foreign policy. The Vietnam War, 
which was the dominant international news story throughout the height of the 
movement’s main decade of activity, similarly dominated the focus of Chicano 
political protest. Critique of US foreign policy in Southeast Asia thus became an 
important aspect of campaigning, and for some specific groups, opposition to the 
war became a defining aspect of their political identity. 
 
 On the 16th of September 1969, a young Chicano activist named Rosalio Muñoz, who 
had recently received his letter informing him of his conscription into the military, led 
a procession of over a hundred supporters to the Armed Forces induction centre in 
Los Angeles. There, he read a statement before the military and the media in which 
he publically refused his draft orders, accusing the conscription system of 
systematically discriminating against Mexicans to allow an easy supply of military age 
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men to be expended in pursuit of US foreign policy objectives. Muñoz characterized 
such a system as representing a genocide against the Mexican-American population:  
 
I accuse the draft, the entire social, political, and economic system of the United States of 
America, or creating a funnel which shoots Mexican youth into Vietnam to be killed and to 
kill innocent men, women and children. I accuse the law enforcement agencies of the 
United States of instilling greater fear and insecurity in the Mexican youth than the Viet 
Cong ever could, which is genocide. 204 
 
Muñoz, a former UCLA student body president, quickly decided that 
this sentiment reflected strong opposition to the war itself rather than just the draft, 
and he quickly realized the opportunity for Chicanos to have their own voice in the 
growing anti-Vietnam movement at the time. He began coordinating with 
Corky Gonzales and the CFJ in Denver, and planned a series of Chicano-run 
demonstrations and public rallies against the war for the following year. A Chicano 
Moratorium Committee (CMC) was formed to organize the protests and act as a 
central authority for the various Chicano groups that wished to participate, with 
Muñoz elected co-chair with David Sanchez, the leader of the Brown Berets.205  
 
An initial rally was held in Los Angeles in December 1969 to gauge the level interest 
among Chicanos and build momentum, attracting over 2,000 participants. A 
subsequent demonstration held in February 1970 attracted crowds of 5,000 people, 
bringing Chicano activists and local groups from across the Southwest region. Over 
20 smaller-scale local protests were held throughout that summer, concluding in a 
march on August 29th named by the CMC as the National Chicano Moratorium and 
held in Laguna Park in east Los Angeles. Attracting at estimated crowd attendance 
of 20,000 to 30,000 people, it was the largest such demonstration against US foreign 
policy in Southeast Asia of any minority group during the Vietnam War.206 Tragically, 
the protest ended violently after police clashed with protesters and a riot broke out, 
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ending with the death of two Chicano activists and Ruben Salazar, a journalist for the 
LA Times that had covered the Chicano movement.207 
  
This chronology of organised Chicano anti-war activity demonstrates at the very least 
a significant engagement with US foreign policy discourse. However, to make sense 
of the nature of this engagement, why it played such a prominent role and how it 
fitted into the larger strategy of promoting the agendas of the movement elites, it is 
necessary to examine the principle arguments used by the Chicano movement that 
informed their anti-war stance. Muñoz, Gonzales and the Chicano elites who 
endorsed the anti-war campaign focused their message around three main themes: 
That first is that the war was disproportionately negatively effecting Mexican-
Americans; Secondly, that the socio-economic and political situation of the 
Vietnamese people meant that Chicanos had more in common with their supposed 
enemies than with Anglo-Saxons in the US; and thirdly that US foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia was merely an extension of their imperialist ambitions to dominate 
third world populations and should not be endorsed by already-oppressed Chicanos. 
 
The domestic consequences of Vietnam 
 
Muñoz, Gonzales and the Chicano elites who endorsed the anti-war campaign 
focused their message around three main arguments. The first, most common and 
most successful message was an emphasis on the unequal manner in which Mexican-
Americans were impacted by the war compared to the Anglo-Saxon majority. In the 
same way that ANMA had taken exception to the disproportionate number of 
Mexican Americans killed in Korea, Chicano activists tapped into a similar indignation 
over Vietnam.  
In 1969 Ralph Guzman, a Political Science professor at the University of California 
Santa Cruz, released a report entitled ‘Mexican-American casualties in Vietnam’ that 
highlighted a similar disproportionality: 
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Mexican American military personnel have a higher death rate in Vietnam that all other 
servicemen. Analysis of casualty reports for two periods of time: one between January, 
1967 and March, 1969, reveals that a disproportionate number of young men with 
distinctive Spanish names do not return from the Southeast Asia theatre of war. 
Investigations also reveal that a substantial number of them are involved in high-risk 
branches of the service such as the U.S. Marine Corps. 208 
       
Overall, he concluded that whilst Mexican-Americans were just 11% of the 
Southwest population, they represented almost 20% of all soldiers killed in Southeast 
Asia. In his report, he went on to suggest possible reasons for this.  For a minority 
group that had long had its loyalty to the US questioned, military service offered an 
opportunity for demonstrating patriotism. The American G.I. Forum routinely 
highlights the high number of Mexican-Americans that are decorated for gallantry 
and distinction in the Armed Forces, suggesting this encouraged young Mexican-
American youths to enlist. Other reasons included the wish to provide a steady 
source of income for impoverished families, as well as the relatively low level of 
Mexican-Americans in higher education at the time, which left very few Mexican-
Americans eligible for an educational deferment.209 
 
Emphasising this last point, he concludes: “Whatever the real explanation, we do 
know with a high degree of certainty that Mexican Americans are over-represented 
in the casualty reports from Vietnam and under-represented in the graduating 
classes of our institutions of higher learning.” 210 These findings were widely spread 
among young Chicano activists, and led to a common sentiment that not only was 
the military draft system inherently unfair to the socio-economically marginalized 
Mexican-Americans. In his interview, Muñoz emphasised how the Moratorium 
Committee used these statistics to present what they perceived as an inherently 
discriminatory military that preyed upon Mexican-Americans: 
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I think one of the things that had a big impact was operation one hundred thousand. 
That in '66, McNamara came up with the manpower plan and they lowered the standards 
for entering the army. Part of that was things like English proficiency, and things like 
physical size - Mexicans and Puerto Ricans tend to be shorter - and it was presented that 
the service was a good place to gain training and experience, and, as they are cutting 
poverty programs, the government said that the armed service will provide that, but if 
you look at the actual statistics, we were just going straight to the front lines.211 
 
As Félix Gutiérrez suggested in his interview, this message was particularly successful 
given the relatively youthful audience for – and membership of – the Chicano 
movement, as the prominence of specific injustices caused by the war were likely to 
be immediately recognizable to a population of draft-eligible young Mexican-
American men: 
 
So you see your young people, or at least they young boys, are being taken by the draft 
and going into the military, and ultimately many of them are not coming back. So if we 
are going to invest in our future, we needed to see where we are at risk and one place 
we were at risk was in Vietnam. These things were controlled by local draft boards in 
terms of who got drafted. I got a student deferment which meant I had no risk as long 
as I was a college student, but a kid who got out of high school and went to work to 
support his family and help out his mom and dad, he'd get drafted. With the 
farmworkers, Cesar Chavez was saying that the kids who were the sons of the growers 
were getting agricultural deferments, but the ones who were actually the migrant 
workers - who were the ones who were actually picking the crops - they had a hard time 
getting it because the local draft boards were not very racially diverse. ... So we saw the 
draft and the war as a furtherance of the discrimination that we were facing at the hands 
of society that did not treat us with respect or even equal.212 
 
In addition to this, many Chicano elites used the war to emphasise that even for 
those Chicanos who returned alive, they faced discrimination and inequality at 
home. Muñoz himself recalled the impact that this new approach had had on 
galvanizing support at a rally in the December of 1969: 
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People spoke about the war and how it was damaging to the Chicano community. They 
integrated their political issues, such as the farmworkers’ struggle, the schools, police 
abuse, welfare rights, conditions in the barrios, and other issues, to the protest against the 
war. What was impressive to me was that these different movement groups were 
comfortable fitting these issues in with the antiwar issue. This held the key to future 
organizing of the Chicano antiwar movement. 213 
 
At the same time that this message was being articulated by political organisers, it 
also became a feature within artistic expressions supporting the Chicano movement. 
Such an example can be seen in the poem “Indict Amerika!” by Ricardo Sanchez, in 
which he makes the call for activists to transfer their commitment to fighting in 
Vietnam towards more immediate war at home: 
 
now     here     this very place   
   is our viet-nam,  
   from tierra amarilla  
                        to court house steps,  
…  
if our blood must flow,  
   let it become an engulfing ocean  
   drowning our oppressors;  
   if we must fight,  
   the enemy is here,  
   not in Asian jungles ... 214 
 
The success of this new narrative was obvious and Chicano elites recognized its 
potential benefits: Firstly, it drew a prospective new base of support from those who 
opposed the war but had remained indifferent to Chicano activities. This potential 
support came from two principle groups: Conservative Mexican-Americans that had 
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become disillusioned with the war but had previously avoided getting involved in the 
domestic Chicano protest movements, as well as anti-war activists from the wider US 
population. In both instances, the attempt was to leverage high profile opposition to 
the war to build attention and support for Chicano civil rights campaigns. In his 
interview, Muñoz confirmed that the level of opposition to the war not just across 
the Mexican American community, but across the US public generally, meant that it 
was relatively easy to build support for the moratorium:  
 
Yes I think there was a genuine awareness of the problems of the war that came through. 
I think early on there was at least, though after a while they also had the whole 
psychology of "we have to be for our boys over there" as well as a more general anti-
Communist sentiment at the time, but I think in general yes it was a very strong mind-
set… The feeling was people were coming back so damaged, with the Agent Orange and 
the drug addictions and heroin. As a result, it was fairly simple and fairly easy when I 
began organising to be able to convince people on the grassroots level and this 
sentiment was there. And these other people [non-Chicanos], they saw that and they 
felt that.215 
 
This emphasised the importance of the war, in the mind of Chicano elites, as a vehicle 
for developing wider interest in the movement and sympathy for its agenda. The 
second major benefit concerned its use as a catalyst for consolidating the Chicano 
movement itself. By directly tying the war to their domestic situation, it not only 
highlighted the injustice with which US foreign policy was adversely affecting the 
Mexican-American community, but it also encouraged fresh Mexican-American 
participation in the movement by suggesting that those Chicano youth fighting 
bravely in Southeast Asia should transfer that energy to fighting at home, against 
the ‘real’ political battle which was the one for domestic equality. As Muñoz recalled, 
this became the takeaway message: 
 
I wasn’t aware at that moment that at this first moratorium we were developing what 
would become the key theme of the Chicano antiwar movement: “¡La lucha está aquí!” 
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(the struggle is here!) This theme was inherent in my “J’Accuse” proclamation. It began to 
be a slogan at the December 20 demonstration. 216 
 
David Sanchez expressed a similar sentiment in his interview. He outlined how the 
main victory of the anti-war protest was the catalytic way in which it spurred a 
greater focus on the socio-economic and justice campaigns that Chicanos were 
fighting in the Barrios:  
 
The effect of the Moratorium was that it really helped bloom the Mexican-American civil 
rights movement. Because it brought so many people out of their houses to protest. 
Traditionally people stay home and watch TV and they see the war on TV. But in so far 
as actually coming out and doing something about it, this was the first effort. The other 
thing was that there was a very strong Chicano identity at the time. ... that’s why we 
fought, why we formed the Chicano Moratorium committee, because of our people, our 
people were being killed and abused. 217 
 
Therefore, Chicano elites were able to communicate the perceived injustices 
experienced by the Mexican-American community in the 1960s and 70s through the 
prism of US foreign policy. Both Muñoz and Sanchez reported a belief that this 
approach benefitted the Moratorium’s efforts to emphasise the wider socio-
economic inequalities, and unfair treatment on the part of the government. By 
highlighting the high death rates of Mexican-Americans in the war as a basis for an 
organised, high-profile anti-war campaign, the Chicano elites were able to deploy an 
emotive foreign policy issue to benefit their local civil rights campaign. 
 
Empathy with the Vietnamese   
 
The second major approach that the Chicano elites utilized to emphasise that 
Chicanos should be united in their opposition to the war, was to 
encourage empathy with the embattled Vietnamese. They observed parallels 
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between the experiences of Mexican-Americans at the hands of US foreign policy 
and the Southeast Asian population against which they were fighting. To this end, 
Chicano elites promoted an identification based on shared victimhood. As a Chicana 
activist wrote for an activist newspaper in 1969, the Vietnamese peasants had 
suffered the same process of illegal land-grabs by the government that Mexicans 
experienced after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This attempted to emphasise 
that, as was the case in 19th century Southwest, the American government was using 
its foreign policy instruments to back up property theft by local elites. 218  In a speech 
at Arizona State University in 1970, “Corky” Gonzales made the comparison explicit, 
outlining his rationale behind his opposition to the war: 
 
This is the same government that says you must fight for us. We say this is the 
same government that enslaved all the Blacks. The great white father is theirs, 
not ours; he belongs to that side of the Mississippi River… We can evaluate 
that. Then evaluate that this part of Mexico, Aztlán, was taken in an aggressive 
war of expansionism even worse than the war in Vietnam. 219 
  
Highlighting the socio-economic realities that the Vietnamese and Mexican-
American community faced offered two simultaneous advantages. Firstly, it forced 
the narrative of the war in Vietnam to focus on the very real human participants 
rather than a faceless an abstract communist threat. This perhaps helped to 
disentangle the conflict from its larger cold war narrative and place the suffering of 
the population as the central point of reference. Secondly, it re-emphasised the 
articulation of the Chicano movement that Mexican-Americans represented an 
oppressed people. By encouraging individuals to find comparisons between the 
conditions experienced by a rural peasantry in a far off ‘third world’ country, it 
offered a much starker portrait of the position of Mexican-Americans in the United 
States. In an official statement on the place of Mexican-Americans in the war in La 
                                                     
218 L. Oropeza, ¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!, P. 94. 
219 R. Gonzales in Antonio Esquibel (ed.), Message to Aztlan: Selected Writings of Rodolfo “Corky” 
Gonzales (Houston: Arte Público Press, 2001), P. 37. 
 129 
Raza, the Chicano Moratorium Committee emphasised the shared victimhood of 
both the Chicanos and Vietnamese: 
 
Historically, Chicanos have only been offered the dirtiest work of American society. 
Chicanos pick the crops, man the factories, sew the clothes, was the dishes and clean the 
mess of white America… the demonstrations aim to expose the fact that second to the 
Vietnamese, the heaviest burden for the war have fallen on the Chicano community.220 
 
Other uses attempted to portray the cultural values of the Vietnamese as something 
to be aspired to in their own struggle against the United States. Luis Valdez, an UFW 
activist, playwright and poet established the amateur theatre company El Teatro 
Campensino, which produced and performed plays highlighting Chicano issues and 
in particular encouraged empathy between Mexican field workers in the US and rural 
farmers in Vietnam. In his 1971 poem Pensamiento serpentino, he makes his 
admiration for the Vietnamese clear: 
 
Cesar Chavez’s, NON-VIOLENCE is one of the most violent forces around because it is 
positive and because it originates with God. And for those who don’t understand all this, 
ell, there’s Vietnam with all its human love, its pristine positive spirit which it will not allow 
to be conquered… And that is the true victory of Vietnam: to not be devoured by HATE 
when every day death rains down upon them. We all have that moral strength thanks to 
the resistance of those heroic peasants. In the face of that, how can we let the enemy rob 
us of our humanity with a little racism and police brutality? Compared to the Vietnamese, 
our life at the hands of the gringo has been an afternoon stroll set to accordion music. 221 
 
Challenging the US government’s narrative that the Vietnamese represented a 
menacing threat, Chicano elites attempted to present them as a nation with similar 
socio-economic backgrounds and histories of oppression at the hands of imperial 
powers. The hope, therefore, was that the emphasis on the shared mistreatment 
would build domestic support for the Chicano civil rights agenda. However, for such 
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arguments to draw sympathy and be endorsed by Chicano activists and elites alike, 
they relied on theoretical assumptions around the imperialist nature of the US state 
and a belief in the characterisation that both Mexican-Americans and Vietnamese 
peoples were part of a wider struggle against the domination of international 
oppressors. That popularity of such sentiments reflect the role and influence of 
Marxist and internationalist thought on the Chicano movement. 
 
The role and influence of Marxism 
 
A significant factor in the foreign policy perspectives of different Chicano 
organisations and a determining factor behind the stance against Vietnam War for 
many, was the influence of Marxism on significant segments of the movement. In his 
seminal analysis of the ideological construction of Chicanismo, Brown-Eyed Children 
of the Sun, Mariscal delineates the various strands of Chicano nationalism and 
identifies that Marxist ideas and political theory fed into an interest in 
internationalism that was popular with a number of Chicano elites.222 Informing, in 
particular, the claims of solidarity with the Vietnamese people was a worldview that 
saw Mexican-Americans as part of an international third-world movement, struggling 
against the oppressive foreign policy of US imperialism. As Mariscal points out, such 
a radical engagement with Marxist ideas sat alongside other, more essentialist 
strands of cultural nationalism within movement ideology that rejecting traditional 
White, European philosophy, but nevertheless played an influential role in the 
thoughts and actions of movement leaders. As Muñoz Jr points out, It’s influence 
varied significantly across different groups, and within organisations, which often 
saw different levels of subscription to Marxism depending on geographic area.223 For 
example, within the Californian branches of the Raza Unida Party, there was 
significant variation: The Riverside branch contained virtually no Marxist influence at 
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all, whereas the Oakland branch included a significant number of members from the 
Socialist Workers Party. 224 
The level of engagement with Marxism often had a direct impact on the extent to 
which groups took an active interest in international issues. As one of the most 
Marxist-influenced branches, the Oakland RUP chapter included a foreign policy 
agenda in their party platform that reflected a belief in the global, tyrannical nature 
and scope of the US state and the imperialistic designs of their foreign policy: 
 
 La Raza Unida Party supports the right of self-determination of all nations. We are 
opposed to the intervention of the United States into the internal affairs of any nation. We 
demand an end to United States support to every oppressive regime from Mexico to 
Vietnam. 
A. We demand the release of all political prisoners in Latin America, especially our 
brothers in Mexico. 
B. Free Puerto Rico. 
C. Immediate withdrawal from Southeast Asia. 
D. Support of the Palestinian Liberation Struggle. 
E. Free all colonies and territories of the United States. 225 
 
The influence of a radical Marxist appraisal of US foreign policy can also be seen in 
other Chicano elite groups. In particular, the perspective that international struggles 
were fundamentally placed between oppressors and oppressed groups within the 
capitalist system helped to further dispel any notion of the US as possessing a 
legitimacy to operate as the exceptional actor in world affairs. Instead, through a 
portrayal as twentieth-century colonisers, and a parallel between the experience of 
Chicanos and those of other oppressed groups internationally was maintained. As 
Reies Tijerina demonstrates such sentiments in his memoirs: 
 
The Manifest destiny of the United States again was coming to pass since it was involved 
in the internal affairs of fifty other nations. Many people across the world were 
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championing their causes for homeland: The Philippines, India, Africa, and the Arab world. 
The United States forced the Arabs to leave their lands, which they had occupied for two 
thousand years, to make way for Israel. These are some of the explanations that I give our 
community about our struggle for the land. 226 
 
The advantages of presenting the Chicano struggle in this way in such a context are 
obvious. By contextualising their agenda as part of a larger moral plight to free 
oppressed peoples served the purpose of both increasing the importance of an 
otherwise specific and localised campaign such as La Alianza’s to the realm of an 
international struggle, but also alluded to a sense of inevitability that their campaign 
against the Anglo-Saxon elite would be successful, capitalising on the same 
momentum that was propelling third world movements across the globe.  
 
However, the engagement with Marxism was by no means universal within the 
Chicano movement, nor was it without its problems. As David Sanchez emphasised 
in his interview, the divides over Marxist ideology and campaign tactics ultimately 
brought down the Brown Beret organisation: 
 
We had our problems with some of the people who were more on the sides of the 
Soviets over the years and wanted us to take a more socialist point of view, but that was 
not our view, our view was for progress. It was the fight for progress and the Vietnam 
War was getting in the way of our progress in the community… We had those who were 
influenced by Cuba or the Socialist movement, they wanted an organisation that was 
more violent in its fight against the system. I found myself in a situation where I was 
opposed to violence. But I was worried that violence would drain us because we'd be 
stuck in court all the time. And it was very difficult because for me, the Brown Berets 
were not a socialist organisation we were a civil rights organisation, and to me the 
Vietnam War was a civil rights issue, because we were going there disproportionately.227  
  
Whilst engaging with US foreign policy discourse presented opportunities for Chicano 
elites to fashion a cohesive identity for the movement, as well to increase support 
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and exposure for their movement, it was not the only type of engagement with US 
foreign policy that they utilised during this period. There were also examples where 
elite organisations conducted independent outreach to foreign governments, 
populations and political actors to further their specific agendas. 
 
Chicano international outreach 
 
Chicano elites attempted to reach out on their own and form international links with 
external political actors, demonstrating that they recognised the importance of 
reaching beyond their local environments to find sympathetic voices that could 
become allies for the Chicanos’ domestic agendas. This included both outreach with 
official governments as well as opposition groups, foreign media and appeals to 
sympathetic elements within foreign populations. 
 
Given the proximity and links, Mexico was a popular target for Chicano groups. Reies 
Tijerina, in an attempt to promote awareness and gain foreign support for La 
Alianza’s campaign for land grant reform, made numerous visits and appeals to 
Mexican political actors. Ahead of a trip to the country in 1961, he outlined in a 
speech to his followers how a direct appeal to Washington by the Mexican 
government on behalf of La Alianza, would make the land grants an international 
relations issue and would elevate their agenda up the priority list of the US 
government: 
 
The United States is too busy with the nations of the world to attend to us. Besides, the 
letter we sent to President Eisenhower on December 12, 1959, had a cold response. They 
told us there was no justice. That’s why Mexico is our only hope… if they listen, investigate 
our case and then present it to the United Nations. 228 
 
Tijerina and La Alianza recognized the potential benefits of making their campaign a 
diplomatic issue at a time when the White House was prioritizing international 
security. On a trip in 1959 he sent a memorandum to the Mexican foreign secretary 
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on behalf of the former Mexican states that had been ceded to the US in 1848, setting 
out their plea over the land grant question. On a visit in 1961 he met with former 
President and general in the Mexican Revolution, Lázaro Cárdenas, Tijerina 
suggested that were all peaceful options for reform to be exhausted, then La Alianza 
and Chicanos would have “no other road but to choose between death and 
slavery”.229  This was followed by a conference for the Mexican media at the National 
Press Club in Mexico City, in which he stressed that Mexican-Americans were a 
colonized and oppressed people who had been subjected to decades of theft and 
discrimination at the hands of Anglos backed by the US government. He further re-
emphasised the Chicano critique of the narrative of Manifest destiny that dominated 
teaching of the history of US foreign policy towards Mexico:  
 
They teach that the Anglo pacified and civilized the Southwest, but they do not teach that 
our parents were the Spanish and Mexicans that settled from St. Augustin, Florida, to San 
Francisco, California… Our children never learn about the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or 
the history of the loss of our lands. They only know Anglo history and how the Anglo wants 
it to be known. 230 
 
In his memoirs, Tijerina indicates that the Mexican press was enthusiastic in its 
support for La Alianza, and assured him that the “secret” true history of American 
oppression of Mexican-Americans would be told across Mexico. When Luis 
Echeverría became President of Mexico in 1970, Tijerina used capitalized on the new 
administration’s active promotion of a tercermundismo foreign policy to seek out a 
powerful international ally, and in November of 1972, he made the first of several 
visits to the President in Mexico City. According to Tijerina’s memoirs, the US 
government was so concerned about the exchange that they applied pressure to 
resist Tijerina receiving a visa, and it was only after personal intervention by 
Echeverria that his visit was confirmed. 231 The President hosted Tijerina and other 
Chicano elite representatives on several occasions during the mid-1970s, and 
authorized and facilitated a vehicle convoy of Chicano protestors to travel from Texas 
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through to Mexico on June 12th, 1976, where 86 activists were greeted at the 
presidential residence. 232 As he recounts in his memoirs, Tijerina and the La Alianza 
leadership used their address to the President to once again emphasised that they 
wished for the Mexican state to help elevate their land-grab campaign to the level of 
a foreign relations issue, using the institutions of international relations to do so: 
 
What my brothers and I asked the president was for Mexico to take our complaints to the 
United Nations. This treaty was an international one, between the United States and 
Mexico, and jurisdiction applied in that forum. In 130 years since the United States signed 
the treaty, it has not done justice and has violated our human rights. That’s why it was 
natural that we would come to Mexico and ask this country to present our case before the 
United Nations and to form a special international commission to investigate our 
complaints. 233 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, Tijerina and La Alianza’s leadership saw the potential 
benefits of internationalizing their local civil rights activism, and devoted 
considerable resources to encouraging Mexico to become their sponsor at the level 
of diplomatic relations (Echeverría, for his part, promised to raise the issue in 
bilateral meetings with President Nixon rather than formally take it through the 
mechanism of the UN). Tijerina also reflected on the potential danger of this 
approach: the more the Chicano movement reached out to the Mexican government 
in an independent capacity, the more it risked the movement being seen as a security 
threat by Washington. After further meetings with the Mexican Attorney General 
and officials as part of a formal investigation into the Land-grant issue, he speculated 
that he was under greater surveillance by federal intelligence agencies: “They 
consider me the most dangerous man because I am establishing the relationship of 
the U.S. Southwest with Mexico and all of Latin America”. 234  
 
At the same time as Tijerina’s efforts for La Alianza, José Gutiérrez also invested time 
into reaching out to the Mexican government. He believed that the RUP had a unique 
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opportunity to influence Echeverría’s administration to align Mexico’s foreign policy 
with the interests of the RUP and the Chicano community. 235 Gutierrez met several 
times with Echeverría both in Mexico and the US. 236  His main lasting successes came 
through the establishment of cultural and educational ties between Mexico and the 
Chicano movement – in 1972 Echeverría and Gutiérrez organized a scholarship for 
Mexican-American would-be medical students to train in Mexico and avoid potential 
discrimination in the US from medical schools. Under President Portillo these 
scholarships were widened to include arts and social science students. 237  
 
Given these examples of attempts at reaching out to foreign political actors to further 
the goals and influence of El Movimiento, it is somewhat surprising that they are 
omitted from analyses of Latino elite engagement with foreign policy. In the 
occasions where they are considered, the potential significance is often downplayed.  
De la Garza, for example, suggests that the reason for Tijerina’s enthusiasm for 
outreach with the Mexican government was simply because they were too radical in 
their domestic politics to be able to achieve their goals within the existing US system 
and therefore were left with no other option. 238 He also cites Mexican officials who 
suggest the primary reason Echeverría entertained delegations from La Alianza was 
for a calculated political advantage, rather than genuine sympathy for their 
campaigns. 239 
 
While it will likely never be possible to ascertain with any degree of certainty how 
genuine the administration under Echeverría was in its public commitments to 
helping La Alianza, other indicators would suggest the president was indeed earnest 
in his offers of support. As Gómez-Quiñones and Vásquez observe, his outreach to 
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the Chicano community was consistent with his commitment to a foreign policy that 
proactively engaged with disenfranchised “third world” groups. 240 Additionally, a 
number of his senior advisors and officials had close ties to the Chicano movement 
through family and friends. And as Garcia-Acevedo points out, Echeverría did indeed 
express his desire to see greater treatment of Chicanos during private meetings with 
President Nixon, as he had promised Tijerina. 241  Regardless of the lasting influence 
of these visits on Mexican policy towards the Mexican-American community or 
Mexican foreign policy towards the United States, it nevertheless demonstrates the 
willingness of elites within the Chicano movement to reach out directly with Mexico 
as they felt it would benefit their domestic socio-economic agendas through the 
prestige that comes with a formal diplomatic relationship. 
 
For Cesar Chavez and the UFW, it was the US government under Nixon that made 
the first move to utilise foreign policy to influence a local Chicano campaign, in this 
case the outcome of the grape boycott. They discovered that the Defense 
Department, which was officially forbidden from using its resources to influence the 
boycott, increased its purchase of grapes from 6.9 million in pounds in 1968 to 11 
million in 1969, and the quantity shipped to Vietnam had jumped from 550,000 
pounds to over 2 million the following year. 242 In testimony before the Senate Labor 
Committee in 1970, Delores Huerta presented these figures and outlined what the 
UFW saw as the government capitalising on its foreign policy infrastructure to 
subvert the boycott:  
 
How can any American believe that the U.S. Government is sincere in its efforts to 
eradicate poverty when the military uses its immense purchasing power to subvert the 
farmworkers’ nonviolent struggle for a decent, living wage and a better future?... It is a 
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cruel and ironic slap in the face to these men who have left the fields to fulfil their military 
obligation to find increasing amounts of boycotted grapes in their messkits? 243 
 
This brought an international dimension to their campaign in California and provided 
a stark reminder that if their campaign was to be successful they would have to 
engage with the international nature of the market for grapes. In addition, Chavez 
and the UFW leadership understood the potential benefits of reaching out beyond 
the local political area and that attracting international sympathy could be beneficial 
both in terms of providing greater publicity as well as putting further pressure on the 
global supply.  
 
Chavez and the UFW leadership therefore dispatched UFC members to spread the 
boycott to foreign markets. In Canada, a UFW campaigner named Jessica Govea 
worked with a number of Anglo and Chicano volunteers in a successful campaign to 
convince grocery businesses in Toronto and Montreal to refuse to purchase 
California grapes. They held news conferences and rallies across Canadian cities and 
encouraged public overtures of support from the Canadian labour movement.244 In 
the UK, Chavez instructed Elaine Elinson, a London-based activist, to organise 
European support for the UFW’s efforts in the late 1960s. Britain was identified as 
the fifth largest importer of grapes and was a primary target for distributors to 
potentially unload the grapes that they were unable to sell domestically due to the 
boycott. As a result, growers were selling twice as many grapes to UK buyers than 
they had before the boycott began.245 
In 1960s London, Elinson found an audience within the labour movement that was 
sympathetic to Chavez and the UFW and was already involved with boycotts of South 
African imports in protest of the apartheid government.246 Given that support for 
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anti-colonial movements around the world had been a recent hallmark of left-wing 
criticism of British and American foreign policy in the UK, Elinson recognised the 
benefit of representing the UFW boycott as an extension of the same campaign: 
 
There was a great deal of support at the student and political meetings. This was a time 
when many of the former European colonies— Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia, 
Mozambique, and Angola—were fighting for liberation, and the height of the Vietnam 
War. British workers and students were anxious to learn about the UFW struggle and to 
take action to help. 247 
 
She made efforts to develop ties and commitment of support from with British trade 
unions, and in particular the powerful Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) 
which made public guarantees to disrupt the importation and transport of 
Californian grapes and refused to unload shipping containers of grapes at London 
docks. The British press covered the efforts to internationalise the boycott, and the 
TGWU made a formal complaint to the US embassy in London that suggested the 
image of the US in the eyes of the international community was placed in jeopardy 
by the denial of workers’ rights. In the sternly-worded address, it stated that: “the 
millions of dollars which are expended to portray America as the bastion of 
democracy caused some delegates so to make an analogy of the late Dr. Goebels and 
Adolph Hitler’s Germany in respect of these workers”.248 Elinson continued this 
campaign of encouraging trade Unions to refuse to unload California grapes the 
following year in Sweden, when the growers attempted to unload their excess 
produce on the Scandinavian market.249 
 
Building on the international solidarity with the UFW movement and capitalising on 
his international renown, Chavez visited London himself in 1974. This was likely an 
attempt to raise further awareness of the plight of Chicano farm workers and solidify 
support, and perhaps in an effort to develop friendly relations with the newly-
installed Labour government under Harold Wilson and thus gain an influential 
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international ally. He met with Clive Jenkins, the general secretary of the high-profile 
and rapidly-growing Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs and 
had just been appointed the National Research and Developed Council, a body 
established to investigate labour relations. Following his visit, the Trades Union 
Congress formally re-affirmed their commitment to the boycott, and the ASTMS 




Figure 1: Cesar Chavez meets Clive Jenkins at ASTMS Head Office in London, 18th 






This chapter demonstrated that Chicano Generation elites during the period from 
1965 to 1975 were far more engaged with US foreign policy and international actors 
than had previously been appreciated. This engagement came in three principal 
forms: Firstly, the Chicano ideology incorporated as a central idea the concept of 
Aztlán, which included a tacit rejection of Anglo-Saxon Manifest destiny as a 
narrative of legitimisation for the history of US foreign policy in the Southwest region 
and a justification for aggressive territorial expansion. It instead offered an 
alternative argument for the sovereign rights of Chicanos based on their ancestral 
claims to the land.  
 
Secondly, opposition to US foreign policy in Southeast Asia formed a central 
component of the agendas for a large number of Chicano groups, which incorporated 
both reflections of their domestic situation as well as empathy for the Vietnamese, 
and could be seen in both artistic expression as well shown in large scale protests 
that were organized and led by Chicano activists. Finally, Chicano elites also utilised 
efforts to reach out to international actors. In the case of some groups, such as 
Tijerina’s La Causa, this was to encourage the Mexican government to turn their local 
land-grand campaign into an international relations issue. For other groups, it was a 
way to encourage solidarity between oppressed groups, such as Cuban 
revolutionaries. And for the United Farmworkers Union, international engagement 
was an attempt to both increase international publicity for their local campaign, as 
well as attempting to extend the power of a national boycott into an international 
one. Overall, Chicano elite engagement with foreign policy and international 
outreach comprised a much greater element of their overall strategies than 
previously thought, and reflects an appreciation for the importance of foreign policy 
and as well as an understanding of the advantages of internationalising domestic 
Latino agendas. 
 
The relative diversity of this foreign policy engagement during this period serves to 
highlight the extent with which Hispanic Americans involved themselves in 
 142 
international issues in a diverse set of different ways. This included engagement with 
foreign policy discourse through the critical re-evaluation of the history of US 
expansion into the Southwest as well as the de-legitimisation of the concept of an 
Anglo-Saxon manifest destiny, instead providing a Hispanic parallel claim to the 
territory through the presentation of, and advocation for, Aztlán as a Chicano 
homeland. In addition, in included engagement with actual policy, through the high-
profile organised campaigning against the military draft, the unequal treatment of 
Mexican-Americans in the army, and ultimately the war in South East Asia itself. 
Finally, it included engagement in international political outreach, through the 
establishing of relations with the government of Mexico as well as with labour unions 
in Europe. 
 
In addition, this chapter illustrates how the case study of Chicano elite engagement 
with US foreign policy supports the main thesis claims. Firstly, by highlighting the 
three types of foreign policy elite engagement that were evident during the main 
decade of the Chicano movement, the thesis claim that Hispanic American elites do 
in fact engage in significant ways with US foreign policy discourse is reinforced: By 
widening the scope of the enquiry beyond an attempt to measure a causational link 
between the efforts of an organised Hispanic lobby and the outcomes of US foreign 
policy, it is possible to identify a broader and more focused engagement by Chicano 
elites that was less concerned with affecting administration policies internationally 
and more concerned with wielding foreign policy issues to engineer change in their 
local communities.  
 
This highlights a second thesis finding: That Hispanic elites engage with foreign policy 
where it supports and complements their domestic agenda. In the case of Chicanos 
elites, these agendas concerned building a cohesive and functioning Chicano 
movement ideology, as well revolved promoting their civil rights campaigns for 
Mexican-Americans in the Southwest.  
 
Finally, this case study supports the thesis claim that a generational approach to 
analysing Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy reveals the contextual 
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detail necessary for understanding this engagement. In the case of the Chicano 
generation, the distinctive organisational structure based around charismatic 
individual leaders, the ethnic nationalism based on a critique of the US polity, and 
the backdrop of the cold war and the conflict in Vietnam, all served to create a set of 
conditions that enabled a specific Chicano foreign policy engagement that was 
unique to the time-period and to Chicano elites.  
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Chapter 4: Foreign policy engagement among Cuban 





This chapter will look at foreign policy engagement by elites within the Exile 
generation. As was outlined in chapter 2, this consists of national origin groups that 
emerged out of the new wave of immigrants from the mid twentieth century through 
to the 1980s, that arrived in the United States as refugees fleeing political turmoil in 
their states of origin. This chapter will focus on Cuban and Central American exiles 
during the 1980s. Foreign policy elites within these groups were characterised by an 
active intention and desire to return to their home countries, and thus, as will be 
outlined, their domestic interests were inextricably tied to US foreign policy. 
 
As will be demonstrated in this chapter, these groups came closest to organising 
along the lines of an ‘ethnic foreign policy lobby’ akin to the Israel or Armenian 
lobbies: Exile generation elites devoted time and resources in the attempt to 
influence US foreign policy towards their country of origin, through direct appeals to 
both the US government as well as actors within wider US civil society. In the case of 
the Cuban exiles, this involved the establishment of organisations with the stated 
goal of influencing foreign policy outcomes, drawing on significant sources of 
funding. In this sense, Exile generation elite engagement in the 1980s best fit the 
ethnic lobby template that has become a subject of considerable inquiry within the 
academic literature. 
 
The case study of the Exile generation highlighted in this chapter provides evidence 
for the main claims of this thesis. Firstly, it reiterates the importance of widening the 
scope of analysis to incorporate a broader focus beyond examining a particular 
group’s influence on the outcomes of US foreign policy. Whilst the Cuban Exile 
community has been previously studied by the existing literature, there has only 
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been limited attention on the foreign policy efforts of other Hispanic Exile groups. 
Whilst an assessment of policy outcomes helps to illuminate the strength of Cuban 
influence on the US government, it risks overlooking activities and efforts by other 
Exile groups that did not achieve the same level of impact on foreign policy 
outcomes, but nevertheless demonstrated a significant level of engagement with 
foreign policy discourse.  
 
Secondly, the chapter emphasises the extent to which Exile generation elites were 
choosing to focus on foreign policy because it promoted or complemented their 
domestic agendas. As these groups principally consisted of diaspora communities 
that, at least initially, had the intention to return to their countries of origin, their 
‘domestic’ concerns were outside of the US. As a result, it was only through hoping 
to influence US policy towards their home country that they could address their 
domestic agendas. In addition, in the case of the Cuban exiles, once it became clear 
that return to the island was unlikely, they continued to leverage the benefits of 
adopting a pro-US foreign policy stance to enrich their local socio-economic and 
political circumstances in south Florida.  
 
Finally, these case studies emphasise the importance of adopting a generational 
approach to Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy. Utilising this approach 
reveals how engagement with foreign policy was fundamentally different for 
Hispanic Exile communities than it was for Chicanos, Mexican-Americans or pan-
ethnic Latinos. Furthermore, it emphasises the extent to which the organisational 
structure of the elites within the Exile communities was unlike those of the Chicano 
or Latino generations, influencing the extent to which these elites were able to 
incorporate foreign policy into their campaigns.  
 
The structure of this chapter consists of an examination of attempts by Cuban Exile 
elites to influence and legitimise the Reagan administration’s foreign policy towards 
Cuba. It outlines how, as the Exile community became fully-fledged Cuban-Americans 
in the 1980s, this foreign policy stance was rewarded with political and economic 
enrichment for the Florida-based Cuban population. The chapter then examines 
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attempts by exiles from the conflicts in Central America to influence sympathetic 
voices within US civil society to provide resources for the region, as well as to 
pressure the Reagan administration into changing its Central American policies. 
Finally, it demonstrates how Mexican-American elites at the time abandoned the 
focus on foreign policy seen during the Chicano movement in favour of incorporation 
within the US political system, leaving exiles as the most prominent Hispanic elites in 




Cuban exiles began arriving in the United States in significant numbers following Fidel 
Castro’s revolution in Havana in 1959, arriving as political refugees from the newly-
installed socialist regime. According to María Cristina García, this new Exile 
community consisted of three broad ideological groups: the former conservative 
allies and supporters of ousted President Fulgencio Batista, those that wished to see 
a return to the democratic institutions promised in the 1940 constitution, and the 
left wing former allies of Castro that had rejected revolutionary socialism.250 These 
groups were united in their desire to see the overthrow of the new Cuban 
government.  
 
The exiles settled in Florida, establishing an enclave in Miami. By the end of 1980, 
the initial wave of Cubans had been joined by a second: over one hundred thousand 
Cubans arrived between April and October of that year as part of the Mariel boatlift, 
in which a number of Cubans were allowed to leave Cuba and take up refuge in the 
US by Castro. Whereas the original exiles had consisted of a disproportionate number 
of wealthy, educated individuals arriving in the United States with a high degree of 
social and economic capital, the second wave of arrivals contained a high number of 
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unskilled workers with low levels of education compared to those that arrived twenty 
years earlier.251 
 
By the start of the 1980s, a political elite had firmly established itself within the 
Cuban-American community living in Miami. This elite was dominated by individuals 
from the initial wave of exiles that arrived immediately following the revolution, as 
well as by their second-generation children that had been born in the United States. 
These political elites were drawn from the community’s economic leadership; they 
were dominated by wealthy Cubans that owned businesses and were politically 
conservative in their outlook. The most prominent vehicle through which this elite 
involved themselves in foreign policy was through the establishment of the Cuban 
American National Foundation (CANF). Established in 1981 by a charismatic second-
generation Exile named Jorge Mas Canosa, CANF served as a means through which 
Cuban Exile elites were able to channel resources and efforts into overthrowing the 
Cuban government. Principally, this was to be achieved through aiding and 
promoting the Cuba policy of the Reagan administration. CANF was organised along 
the lines of the highly-successful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPEC) 
which lobbied to influence US foreign policy towards Israel, with its leaders aspiring 
to emulate that organisation’s success.252 CANF’s efforts included a lobbying 
organisation, the Cuban American Foundation (CAF), as well as a Political Action 
Committee (PAC), the Free Cuba PAC. As Susan Eckstein points out, the PAC 
dominated in this area, receiving 99% of all financial donations made to PACs by 
Cuban-Americans from its establishment in 1982 to the turn of the century.253 
 
CANF engagement methods in the 1980s consisted of a variety of approaches 
designed to encourage a hard-line stance against Castro. These included providing 
political donations to the election campaigns of Congressional candidates based on 
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the strength of their opposition to the Cuban regime, as well as lobbying the US 
government and the Reagan administration itself on Cuba to encourage an 
uncompromising policy towards the Island. In return for the support of the 
government over Cuba, CANF offered vocal public support and endorsement for the 
administration’s anti-communist policies in Central America.254 
 
One of CANF’s most notable single achievements during this period was the 
establishment of the Radio Martí radio station in 1983.255 Modelled on Radio Free 
Europe, the station was designed to broadcast pro-US propaganda to the island. 
Named after Cuban cultural icon José Martí, the hope was that the station would 
serve to weaken Cuban popular support for the regime. The Cuban government was 
able to block the signal and prevent islanders from listening, however in spite of this, 
CANF was still able to persuade Congress to allocate $10 million worth of funding for 
the project, emphasising their influence on Cuba policy spending.256 
 
On first impressions, the nature of Cuban Exile elite engagement with US foreign 
policy would seem significantly different to that of Chicano elites a decade earlier. 
However, the fundamental difference between the two generations – that Cuban-
Americans represent an Exile community whereas Chicanos look to represent a 
community of US citizens – actually illustrates the similarities between the rationale 
for engaging with foreign policy: The importance of the domestic political agenda of 
the Hispanic elites is still key for both generations and determines the nature and 
extent of foreign policy engagement. For early Cuban Exile elites, these domestic 
social, economic and political concerns were fundamentally tied to the island, as they 
fully expected to return. Torres emphasises how strongly this influenced the identity 
and mindset of the Exile elite:  
 
As long as there was a possibility of returning to Cuba, those who left identified 
themselves as citizens of the island and temporary visitors to the United States. From 
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the beginning of the revolution almost everyone, refugees and U.S. policymakers alike, 
had anticipated that Cuban exiles were only in the United States for the short time it 
would take for the Cuban revolution and Castro to fall.257 
 
As a result, Cuban Exile foreign policy engagement can be viewed through the lens 
of their domestic, home country civil rights agenda. Even as it became clear by 1980 
that a swift return to the island was increasingly unlikely and that Cuban exiles were 
here to stay in the United States, the mentality of this Exile status continued to 
inform the attitude of second generation Cuban-Americans like Mas Canosa and the 
CANF leadership. As Fernández pointed out in 1987, their “unyielding posture is born 
out of their collective Exile experiences. Inspired by the “loss of their homeland,” they 
have felt compelled to alert the United States to the dangers of communism and to 
eradicate it wherever it appears”.258 For second generation elites, preserving this 
Exile mind-set remained critical to retaining a cohesive and relatively homogenous 
community identity. In the quest to ensure its continued dominance, elites enforced 
Cuban-American support for a staunchly anti-Castro policy in the 1980s through the 
continual suppression of dissenting opinions within the community, allowing elites 
to present a unified voice to non-Hispanics.259 Thus, their operationalisation of US 
foreign policy discourse allowed CANF leaders and other elites to legitimise their 
claim to represent the interests of the Cuban exiles, affording them political status 
within national foreign policy discussions as well as allowing them to consolidate 
power within the Cuban-American community. 
 
For Cuban-American elites, maintaining a high-profile engagement with US foreign 
policy also brought additional benefits to the community beyond furthering their 
eventual goal of realising regime change in Havana: It also provided considerable 
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political and economic rewards both for the Exile elites themselves, as well as for the 
wider Cuban American community in South Florida. In particular, as organisations 
such as CANF had built a reputation as staunch supporters of the Reagan 
Administration’s foreign policy doctrine of ardent anti-communism, Cuban-
Americans became the beneficiaries of significant government patronage, enjoying 
privileges and opportunities not available to other Hispanic groups. 
 
The Cuban-American community had already been the recipients of significant 
amounts of government financial support. As Stepick and Stepick point out, the 
Cuban Refugee program had been established to provide assistance to those fleeing 
the island in the wake of the revolution. Cuban exiles that arrived between 1965 and 
1976 had received close to one billion dollars in financial aid from the program. This 
was in part to help with the cost of transportation from Cuba to the United States, 
and in addition, the program provided the remaining funding to Exile families as well 
as to the local public bodies in Miami that assisted them.260 No other arriving 
immigrant group had received this level of funding, and reflected the symbolic 
location of Cuban exiles within the context of the cold war. 
 
In addition, by the 1980s, the Cuban exile elites in southern Florida had leveraged 
their status as victims of the cold war for government patronage in terms of 
employment. Capitalising on their willingness to both strongly align with the 
government’s anti-communist stance as well as their desire to return to the island, 
the government enthusiastically incorporated the community into their foreign 
policy infrastructure. From the early 1960s, the CIA employed nearly twelve 
thousand Cuban-Americans within Miami.261 In fact, the agency became one of the 
biggest employers in Florida itself, running a considerable variety of front businesses 
employing exiles, including, according to Stepick & Stepick, “boat shops, gun shops, 
travel agencies, detective agencies, and real estate agencies”.262 Cuban exiles also 
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benefitted from special legal accommodations that facilitated their incorporation 
into US life. For example, the state of Florida passed laws that allowed Cubans to 
easily recertify themselves, so that they could work in the US. Dade County, which 
held jurisdiction over the city of Miami, had introduced a bilingual education 
provision for newly arrived exiles in 1960. Cuban-American firms were also 
advantaged in their treatment as economic partners by the local government, with, 
for example, 53% of the minority contracts for the county’s rapid transport system 
going to Latino-owned firms by the 1980s.263   
 
Beyond the wider benefits for the Cuban-American population as a whole, Exile 
generation elites were themselves direct beneficiaries of their foreign policy stance 
in the 1980s. CANF in particular enjoyed lucrative funding. As de los Angeles Torres 
observes, CANF and other exile groups benefitted from President Reagan’s 
ideological disposition that preferenced private spending over government 
intervention in local services.264 When dealing out contracts related to US-Cuba 
policy, Cuban Exile businesses led by pro-Reagan Exile elites were the obvious choice. 
CANF, for example, received just under 1.7 million dollars from the State Department 
to run a program that would relocate Cubans in third countries to the United States. 
Other Exile elite groups were subsequently sub-contracted to provide services such 
as health care and counselling to these new arrivals.265 Therefore, for CANF, 
maintaining an active, pro-US foreign policy engagement proved extremely beneficial 
for the personal enrichment of the Exile elites. In 1986, Mas Canosa was accused of 
using the foundations’ influence and status within Washington to secure a 25-million-
dollar development deal on an island in the Biscayne Bay owned by the city of Miami, 
which was rumoured to include Jeane Kirkpatrick, the-then former US delegate to 
the United Nations and Reagan foreign policy official, as an investor. The deal only 
fell through after the original financier was discovered to have had business ties to 
communist governments.266  
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For the Reagan administration in the 1980s, establishing a close association with the 
Cuban Exile elites on foreign policy issues brought the opportunity to present to the 
rest of the United States a face for the victims of communism, and provide a 
legitimising voice to their anti-communist foreign policy. In addition, it allowed the 
Republican party to advertise a Hispanic supporter base, at a time when their 
standing with other minority groups was low.267 For Exile elites, this close association 
brought the abovementioned economic benefits but also political access: Not only 
did Cuban-American elites enjoy a close dialogue with high-level administration 
officials, but Exile elites were appointed to positions within the federal 
government.268 Illustrating the extent of this mutually-beneficial relationship, by 
1988, CANF had received $390,000 worth of financing via grants from the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), a Congressionally-funded organisation designed 
to promote democratic values internationally, whilst CANF members had provided 
$385,400 worth of donations to the political campaigns of politicians willing to 
support the organisation’s anti-Castro agenda.269 
 
Altogether, the success of CANF in the 1980s demonstrated the extent of the socio-
economic and legal advantages available to the Cuban-American community - and to 
Exile elites specifically - due to their foreign policy engagement. As Stepick and 
Stepick emphasise: 
 
With about 75 percent of Cuban arrivals before 1974 directly taking advantage of some 
kind of state-provided benefits, and with virtually everyone profiting from indirect aid, 
the total benefits available to the Cuban community appear to surpass those available 
to any other U.S. minority group. Miami Cubans translated the favourable reception by 
the U.S. government and the millions of dollars of resettlement assistance not only into 
a self-sufficient economic enclave and thriving international economic city but also in a 
“direct line” to the centers of political power in Washington.270 
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Throughout the 1980s, these “direct lines” were utilised for an energetic foreign 
policy engagement by Exile elites, both for the promotion of a ‘domestic’ agenda tied 
not only to their desire to realise their eventual goal of a return to their island 
homeland, but also the ‘domestic’ agenda of improving their political and economic 
circumstances in their newfound Miami home. 
 
Central American exiles 
 
Whilst foreign policy engagement in the 1980s by organised Cuban exiles remains 
relatively well-known in both academic study and public discourse within the US, 
Central American exiles fleeing the conflicts in Latin America were also a notable 
source of engagement, with elites from political refugee communities participating 
in various forms of attempted influence. Central American exile elites shared with 
Cubans a desire to influence US foreign policy towards their countries of origin in the 
hope of impacting the internal political power structures. However, unlike the 
Cubans, Central American exiles did not, on the whole, attempt to lobby the US 
government directly, as their interests were generally at odds with the anti-
communist priorities of the Reagan administration. Instead, they attempted to lobby 
sympathetic actors within wider US civil society on the left, in the hope of both 
gaining resources to aid the war efforts within Central America, as well as generate 
public pressure on Reagan to end the US supply of aid to anti-communist groups. 
Central American exiles during the 1980s were dominated by refugees from three 
countries of origin: El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. 
 
El Salvador in the 1980s was in a state of civil war, which began at the start of the 
decade in 1980 and only ended in 1992. It was precipitated by years of political unrest 
between left and right wing factions, with CIA-backed generals suppressing reformist 
movements amongst the farming peasants in the Salvadoran countryside.271 A 
military Junta had been instituted following the election of Carlos Humberto Romero 
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in 1977, ushering in an era of significant violence, with an estimated eight thousand 
civilians being killed in 1980 alone in clashes between the military, its associated 
paramilitary factions, and the coalition of left wing guerillas under the banner of the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL).272 
 
The political situation in Nicaragua in the 1980s was characterised by violent 
confrontation between the Sadinista government and US-backed armed opposition 
groups known collectively as the Contras. The socialist Sadinistas had taken control 
of the country in a popularly-supported revolution in 1979.273 The Reagan 
administration imposed an economic embargo in 1985 and resisted international 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.274 From 1981 and throughout the decade, the 
CIA began working with and training the Contras, directing their counter-
revolutionary activities. These included the organised killings of suspected pro-
Sandinista civilians, kidnappings and sabotage. In addition, the CIA undertook direct 
action in Nicaragua itself, conducting an aerial bombing campaign and mining 
harbours.275 
 
Guatemala also witnessed considerable violence and political turmoil in the 1980s. It 
saw conflict between the pro-US right wing government and the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), which had formed as a coalition of the four 
largest guerilla rebel groups in 1982. The US government supported the efforts of the 
Guatemalan military through a direct aerial bombing campaign against suspected 
rebel villages, and the Pentagon supplied a thousand special forces to train 
counterinsurgents in the Guatemalan highlands.276 In addition, the US and 
Guatemalan governments supported a range of clandestine anti-communist death 
squad that orchestrated killings against the rural population.277 
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Given the extent of the violence within Central America and the significant political 
and military role that the US was willing to take to influence the outcomes, the 1980s 
also saw the emergence of organised campaigns on the part of elements within US 
society to oppose US foreign policy towards the region, and to bring about an end to 
the conflict more generally. These campaigns, led by non-governmental 
organisations, church groups and civil society organisations and incorporating a 
variety of tactics to undermine the Reagan administration’s efforts, became known 
as the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement (CAPSM). Their activities 
included sending aid and volunteers to the region, bringing refugees into the United 
States, lobbying Congress to deny funding to the administration’s policy efforts, and 
promoting public awareness campaigns for the plight of the Central American 
civilians. 
 
However, despite the relatively high-profile position of the CAPSM in the story of US 
foreign policy towards Central America during the Reagan years, the role of Central 
American exiles themselves within this movement has been historically overlooked 
by academic literature.278 This is, in part, due to the fact that many Central American 
exiles within the United States were at a disadvantage compared to Cubans, which 
limited their ability to involve themselves in foreign policy lobbying. Héctor Perla 
suggests three principle reasons to explain this disadvantage: Firstly, the majority of 
Central American arrivals were political refugees and not US citizens. Unlike Cubans, 
they did not enjoy preferential treatment from the US government that saw an 
expedited legalised immigration process. Therefore, the status of many Central 
Americans was highly precarious, restricting their ability to participate in political 
activities.279 Secondly, unlike the early Cuban exiles that left the island with their 
family units, many Central American refugees arrived from countries where their 
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families and associates faced the possibility of being targeted for violent reprisals 
were they to become high-profile activists. Thirdly, the Reagan administration had 
deliberately portrayed the CAPSM as a Soviet-backed movement in which well-
meaning US citizens were being misled into supporting communist activities. As a 
result, there was a deliberate attempt to downplay Central American attempts to 
directly lobby the US public.280 
 
Despite these obstacles, Central American exiles played a significant role in the 
CAPSM. As Perla points out, this was largely left to political and social elites that had 
the resources and ability to overcome the risks of angering the political powers back 
in their home countries.281 Again, as with the Cuban exiles community, Central 
American exile elite engagement with US foreign policy was fundamentally driven by 
a domestic concern: As the individuals residing within the United States had the 
intention to return to their countries of origin, attempts to influence US policy 
towards the region was out of a concern to resolve their domestic conflicts at 
home.282 As Perla outlines, this participation included a range of different CAPSM 
activities: 
 
Firstly, exile elites participated in engineering nationally-focused ‘solidarity’ 
movements within the United States. The Nicaraguan solidarity movement, for 
example, began in the late 1970s and was in full force by the start of the 1980s, and 
was driven by Nicaraguan left-wing Exile elites. Initially, these groups promoted the 
aim of highlighting the brutality of the Samoza regime within US civil society. By 
shedding light on both the violence within Nicaragua as well as the involvement of 
the US in supporting the government and local militaries, it was hoped that a 
sufficient amount of public solidarity could be engineered so as to put pressure on 
the Reagan administration into dropping its support for Samoza.283 Initially, Exile 
elites had formed organisations targeting the Central American immigrant 
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populations already living in the US, including the Comité Cívico Latinoamericano Pro-
Nicaragua en los Estados Unidos in San Francisco, and the Nicaragua Solidarity 
Organization, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua, and Los 
Muchachos de DC in Washington. Other organisations had branches across the US, 
including the Casa Nicaragua.284 The hope was that Central American immigrants and 
other Hispanic groups would show a concern for the escalating violence in the region. 
However, due to the obstacles to refugee engagement identified above, Exile elite 
organisations quickly turned their attention to building political solidarity within the 
wider US population in opposition to Reagan’s pro-Samoza policies. Once the 
Sadinistas took power in Nicaragua, these groups began instead to focus on building 
relationships between the government and sympathetic actors within US society. 
These efforts included raising money for the government’s political agenda and 
organising visits to the US by Sandinista officials.285 
 
A similar effort was made by Salvadoran Exile elites looking to build a solidarity 
movement within the US population. A precursor to what would become the main 
Salvadoran solidarity network had already been established in 1975, when a group 
of Salvadoran student immigrants in San Francisco, outraged at a mass killing of 
protesting students in San Salvador, formed the Comité de Salvadoreños 
Progresistas (The Committee of Progressive Salvadorans) in San Francisco. These 
students established ties with their counterparts within El Salvador, producing and 
sharing literature for both Central American and US audiences and organised a 
protest outside the Salvadoran consulate.286 By the 1980s, Salvadoran exiles had 
established fully-fledged solidarity organisations, with the Committee in Solidarity 
with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), the most prominent and successful of these, 
being founded in 1980.287 CISPES was the end result of an active attempt by the FMNL 
leadership to build a solidarity movement within the US that could limit the 
effectiveness of US foreign policy in the country, with rebel commanders visiting the 
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US in 1980 to facilitate the creation of CISPES out of existing Exile organisations.288 
CISPES maintained regular contact between Exile communities in the US and rebel 
groups within El Salvador, taking delegations of US activists to witness the brutality 
of the US-backed regime first hand, and bringing victims of violence to the United 
States to provide public testimony of the atrocities to public audiences.  
 
Central American exiles also played a key role in the ‘sanctuary’ movement and its 
goal of undermining Reagan-era policy towards the region. As Stoltz Chincilla et al. 
outline, the movement represented the collective, organised efforts of churches, 
religious groups and Central American exiles to provide shelter and protection within 
the US for refugees fleeing the violence in Guatemala and El Salvador that had 
entered the country illegally.289 Whilst this movement was a broadly religious one 
that was led by and drew in a large percentage of non-Hispanic members, Central 
American Exile organisations nevertheless provided significant logistical support. In 
particular, the Central American Resource Center (CARACEN) was formed in Los 
Angeles as an overseeing organisation to coordinate sanctuary efforts by Central 
Americans living within the United States to take in new refugees.290 A similar Exile-
ran organisation, El Rescate, was established to provide medical services for newly 
arrived refugees.291  
 
As with the solidarity movements, one of the main goals for exile elites was to 
leverage the refugees seeking sanctuary to raise awareness of the Reagan 
administration’s foreign policy in Central America, along with increasing public 
sympathy for the plight of the exiles themselves. In the case of the sanctuary 
programs, the physical havens themselves provided a space in which refugees could 
openly provide a counter-narrative to the administration’s framing of the CAPSM as 
a pro-Soviet agenda. The importance of this as part of the overall effort to undermine 
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US policy is emphasised by a refugee, quoted in Stoltz Chinchilla et al.: “It was a place 
where we could tell our own stories – a place from which we could challenge U.S. 
policy toward Central America”.292 In addition, the sanctuary network provided a 
continual source of first-hand testimonies from the refugees themselves, who were 
often dispatched across the US to advertise their cause by organisations within the 
movement by telling their stories of being the victims of US-backed violence.293 Perla 
summarises the importance of these testimonios when discussing a case study of a 
female refugee: 
 
This seemingly simple act of recounting her personal experience with state-sponsored 
terrorism to total strangers – and especially to citizens of the country whose government 
was responsible for bankrolling the atrocities committed against her – had been 
repeated innumerable times before by other Central Americans over the course of the 
1970s and 1980s. This narrative performance (testimonio) was essential for Central 
American refugee and immigrant activists’ organizing strategy of building public 
opposition to the Reagan and Bush administrations’ foreign policy toward El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua.294 
 
Therefore, the activities of Central American elites in both the solidarity and 
sanctuary movements during the 1980s reinforce the importance of their Exile status 
to understanding the rationale behind their engagement with US foreign policy. As 
with the Cuban exiles, their symbolic (and, in some cases, literal) status as temporary 
and unwilling political refugees in the US meant that their principal concern was the 
domestic situation in their homeland. Given their personal circumstances as being 
located within the US, and the significant role that the Reagan administration was 
playing within the region, it made logical sense for them to devote considerable time 
and resources in attempting to influence US foreign policy in the hope of bettering 
the situation in their countries of origin.  
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Mexican-American elites in the 1980s 
 
In contrast to the energetic and high-profile engagement with US foreign policy by 
Cuban and Central American Exile groups, Mexican-American elites during the 1980s 
largely turned away from the active incorporation and contextualisation of US 
foreign policy into major domestic campaigns that had been such a prominent 
feature of the activities and the agendas of the Chicano generation elites. Instead, 
they largely focused their efforts on re-incorporating themselves into the existing 
political framework of the US, running for elected office and inserting themselves 
into the machinery of the Democratic Party. In this sense, they largely abandoned 
the radical anti-US platform of Chicano nationalism in favour of the opportunities for 
the attainment of political power through the democratic process. This transition 
from ethnic nationalism to political incorporation played out in the context of surging 
numbers of new Latin America immigrants from the Exile generation, as well millions 
of new immigrants as from Mexico itself. As a result, Mexican-American elites in this 
period began the evolution from charismatic leader-led, relatively homogenous 
organisational structures, to formally-instituted Washington lobbies that began to 
claim to represent this collection of new immigrants under a ‘Hispanic’ label.  
 
Before the movement was overshadowed by these new, politically-incorporating 
elites, the Chicano Generation elites had certainly been willing to engage with US 
foreign policy towards Cuba and Central America during the mid-to-late 1970s, 
providing a critical perspective on the same issues that would go on to dominate the 
Exile generation’s agenda during the 1980s. Chicanos typically interpreted the 
actions of the US government in Latin America within the context of oppression, and 
the Cuban revolution as an inevitable consequence of decades of US-backed 
exploitation. For example, a 1972 article in La Raza covered a visit by Chicano activists 
to the island on behalf of the magazine, extolling the virtues of the socialist regime’s 
approach to addressing the same problems of socio-economic inequality that 
Chicanos had been campaigning on, such as improving access to healthcare and 
 161 
levels of education.295 Reflecting a widely-held sentiment within the movement, the 
editorial claimed the Cuban revolution to be a result of a history of “aggression 
enacted upon her” from the ever-present threat of an imperialist United States.296 A 
similar interpretation had been provided for making sense of the violence in Central 
America: In a 1970 article on the conflict in Guatemala, La Raza editors pointed to US 
foreign policy as the source of the conflict, describing the Guatemalan government 
as having “strengthened its neocolonialist conditions and of direct dependence, not 
only in its relations with the United States but also through the indirect mechanisms 
resorted to by U.S. imperialism in Central America for penetration and control.”297 
Thus Chicano movement elites found themselves largely at odds with the sentiment 
of Cuban Exiles, but in solidarity with Central American refugees, with a critical 
appraisal of US policy towards Latin America complementing their narrative of the 
US as an oppressive regime. 
 
However, whilst the Chicano movement elites may have been willing to engage with 
US policy, their place as the dominant and high-profile representative voice of a 
politically active Mexican-American community was rapidly diminishing. With the 
winding down and withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia by the mid 1970s, the 
momentum and cohesive energy of the movement’s central foreign policy platform 
had evaporated, and the various, disparate campaigns across the Southwest that had 
made up the movement were either in a process of resolution or were being 
marginalised. By the 1980s, Chicano elites were no longer able to command the 
attention of the US media or organise campaigns in the way that they had in the late 
1960s. This loss of influence coincided with the arrival of the wave of new immigrants 
from Mexico and Latin America. In his personal interview, David Sanchez reflected 
on the dramatically transformative impact this immigration had on the existing 
Hispanic population, which had previously been relatively homogenous, dominated 
by second and third generation Mexican-Americans. As he suggested: 
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Let me tell you what happened. In the late 1970s, millions and millions and millions of 
people came across the border from Central America and Mexico. Those are your 
Latinos. They don't identify with the people that have been here for many years. Half of 
them are Spanish speakers and most of them speak more Spanish than English. And it's 
changed. I don't know if it was done on purpose or what. But I think to some degree, the 
Latinos were brought in to kill the Mexican American movement. Because when you 
bring in refugees to overpopulate you, you kill the movement… Mexico was having such 
bad, double digit inflation and so was the whole region. All of a sudden you have millions 
of people crossing the border and they don't identify with Mexican-Americans, they 
don't identify with Chicano, they identify with Latino. So they have a different focus: it's 
half here and half in their foreign country. So in a way they killed the movement over 
here. All of a sudden here in LA, it used to be 75% Chicano surnames and 25% Latino, 
now it's the other way around... They don't speak English, it's only Spanish. Their world 
is in Mexico, or Central America. It's not here. So it kills the possibility of a movement.298 
 
Such a fatalistic appraisal reflected a general sense of disappointment that the 
historical zenith of political power for the Chicano Generation had passed, but 
nevertheless touched upon the reality that, during the 1980s, the Mexican-American 
community had begun transitioning power towards a new set of elite leaders that 
were better placed to accommodate the new immigrant arrivals. These elites 
reflected a desire to work within the established political system rather than in 
opposition to it, opting to focus on gaining power through elections, and re-double 
the efforts to use both new and existing Hispanic organisations to focus on 
conventional lobbying efforts. This not only saw a re-legitimasation of the US political 
infrastructure and modes of governance, but witnessed the ascendancy of a new 
generation of Mexican-American leaders that wanted to distance themselves from 
the Chicano label. As Laura E. Gómez identified in her interviews with Mexican-
American senior elected officials in the mid-1980s, there was a clear preference 
among elites to shift from the Chicano label to a pan-ethnic ‘Hispanic’ one, due to, in 
the words of one interviewee, a desire to avoid the association with radical 
opposition to the US as “all words are associations, and so those people who said ‘I’m 
a Chicano,’ were greeted with “All right, you’re a Chicano, and you’re going to give 
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me trouble””.299 As Gómez explains, this reflected the new Mexican-American 
political elite’s desire in the 1980s to commit to a strategy of political incorporation 
to address their domestic agendas: “Many of those interviewed conveyed a conscious 
decision to depart from the confrontational politics of the 1960s and 1970s… 
Frequently, this new political outlook was denoted by euphemisms such as 
“pragmatic”, “issue-oriented” and “coalition-building”.300  
 
This shift in focus towards working with large-scale, national organisations and 
committing resources to the democratic system saw significant political 
breakthroughs for Mexican-Americans during the 1980s. Toney Anaya became only 
the second Hispanic elected governor of New Mexico in 1982, the same year that 
Henry Cisneros was elected mayor of San Antonio and Federico Peña became the 
first Mexican-American mayor of Denver a year later in 1983.301 At the national level, 
three Mexican-American Congressmen, “Kika” de la Garza (TX), Ed Roybal (CA) and 
Henry B. González (TX) had joined up with two Puerto Rican colleagues to establish 
the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) in 1976.302 As was outlined in Chapter 2, 
this period also witnessed a significant change in the structural architecture of elites 
themselves: Non-elected Mexican-American political elites abandoned the local, 
grassroots movements based around charismatic leaders and instead began focusing 
on permanent, national organisations as the principle vehicle through which they 
could claim to represent the community, heralding an evolution that would 
culminate in the emergence of the Latino Generation in the 1990s. 
 
As a result of these changes, Mexican-American engagement with US foreign policy 
in the 1980s depended significantly on the disposition and enthusiasm for foreign 
policy issues by individual organisation leaders. As Chicano-influenced leadership 
was replaced by Latino-influenced control throughout the decade, the level of 
engagement dropped accordingly. For example, Mario Obledo, who served as 
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president of LULAC for two terms in 1983 and ‘84, used his presidency of the 
organisation to criticise Reagan administration foreign policy. He led a delegation of 
LULAC leadership to Cuba on a fact-finding mission in September 1984, meeting with 
senior government officials including a four-hour meeting with President Castro, a 
meeting in which both sides agreed that a normalisation of relations between the US 
and Cuba should be a goal of US foreign policy.303 The following month, he led a 
similar fact-finding trip to Latin America, spending five days across Mexico and 
Central America. As part of that expedition, Obledo met with Nicaraguan Sadinista 
junta leaders Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez and agreed to send a LULAC 
representative to observe the 1984 elections, as well as using the meeting to 
denounce the US government’s support for the Contras.304 However, the following 
year, LULAC delegates elected a Republican, Oscar Moran, to the presidency. Moran 
dramatically reversed the anti-Reagan stance of Obledo and, over the three 
successive terms as leader, moved the organisation away from any criticism of US 
foreign policy, instead worked to build positive corporate and governmental 
relations and kept LULAC’s focus squarely on domestic issues.305 In addition, 
Mexican-American nationally elected officials in the 1980s were generally unwilling 
to involve themselves in the administration’s anti-communist policies towards Latin 
America. The CHC never spoke out against the conflict in Central America, and three 
Mexican-American members actually voted in favour providing ‘humanitarian’ 
funding for the Contras.306 
 
This shift away from the level of foreign policy engagement seen by the Chicano 
generation elites perhaps reflects a recognition on the part of Mexican-American 
elites by the mid 1980s that a critical interpretation of US foreign policy was no longer 
complementary with promoting their political agenda. Unlike the grassroots protest 
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movements of the 1960s and 70s that characterised the Chicano generation, a 
commitment to political incorporation and seeking elected office necessitated 
strategies for building electoral coalitions beyond the Mexican-Americans 
community. This meant engagement with US foreign policy, for which there was little 
space to find common ground or obvious political interest between different 
communities, was abandoned. 
 
Furthermore, the emerging adoption of pan-ethnic labels such as ‘Hispanic’ and 
‘Latino’ by Mexican-American elite organisations was beginning to impact the types 
of representative claims that the elites could make, which in turn impacted the type 
of political agendas they could build. As will be explored in further detail in Chapter 
5, the transition to a pan-ethnic audience from a relatively homogenous national 
origin group severely limited the ability of Mexican-American elites to engage in 
foreign policy discussions: They could not participate like Exile generation elites 
concerned with a country ‘back home’ engulfed in political turmoil, nor could they 
deploy a critique of US foreign policy to build a common ethnic identity, as had been 




This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which Hispanic elites from the Exile 
generation were heavily involved in US foreign policy during the 1980s. This included 
both through the establishment of organisations designed to lobby the US 
government directly, as well as through generating wider public solidarity and 
awareness for particular aspects of Reagan-era policy. This was highlighted through 
the case studies of the Cuban as well as Central American Exile communities and their 
political leadership in the United States. Whilst the example of Cuban-American 
influence has been previously well-documented, the case study of engagement by 
Central American refugees has received less academic attention. However, as this 
chapter has underlined, the impetus for foreign policy engagement was the same 
between both groups, despite radically different audiences for this engagement and 
different levels of success at influencing foreign policy outcomes. 
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The main dynamic that informed Exile elite engagement with US foreign policy was 
their desire to influence the political situation ‘back home’ in the countries from 
which they found themselves involuntarily separated. Recognising the power of the 
US over the fortunes of Latin American governments, Exile organisations sought to 
affect the disposition of both the US government and US society towards a particular 
faction within the political conflicts that raged both in Cuba and Central America. In 
contrast, Mexican-American elites by the 1980s were much less interested in foreign 
policy than their Exile generation Hispanic counterparts, due to a fundamental 
unwillingness to tie US foreign policy towards the domestic priorities of the Mexican-
American community. This, therefore, reflected a significant departure from the 
strategies of the Chicano generation elites seen a decade before. 
 
These findings offer support for two of the principle claims of this thesis. Firstly, it 
further confirms the claim that the domestic relevance of US foreign policy is 
important to understanding foreign policy engagement by Hispanic elites: For Exiles, 
their principle domestic agenda did not lie within the United States as was the case 
with other Hispanic generations, but in fact with their countries of origin, to which 
they had either an actual intention to return, or saw their own interests as tied to the 
political outcomes within these ancestral homelands. Therefore, given the 
importance of US foreign policy in influencing these outcomes in both the Cuban and 
Central American examples, it is not surprising that elites from both groups sought 
to sway the Reagan administration’s position through a campaign of high-profile 
engagement. Secondly, it supports the claim that a generational approach is 
necessary to examine and make sense of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign 
policy over time: The unique circumstances that the Exile generation found 
themselves in during the late 1970s and 1980s and the generationally-specific 
context in which they operated provides an explanatory framework for 
understanding why Cuban and Central American elites were much more willing to 
engage with US foreign policy, whereas those Mexican-American elites caught in the 
transition between the earlier Chicano and later Latino generational identities, 
 167 
representing an increasingly heterogeneous demographic and fully committed to the 
US as ‘home’ over Mexico, were not. 
 
In addition, the Exile generation case studies examined here provided a useful 
historical context in which much of the existing literature on Hispanic engagement 
with US foreign policy can be considered. Given the explicit attempts at forming 
coordinated lobbies and the dedication of time, energy and financial resources to 
influencing the bilateral relations between the US and the countries of origin by Exile 
elites, the nature of foreign policy engagement in this period does in fact most closely 
resemble the ‘divided loyalty’ fears that pervaded much of the early literature, led 
by Huntington and Buchanan, and provided the inspiration for the ‘ethnic lobby’ 
model that de la Garza, Dominguez and others sought to identify in the Latino 
demographic in the 1990s. Given the then-prominence of these Exile lobbying efforts 
providing the backdrop for the academic debate in the 1990s, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the literature was predominantly concerned with a narrow focus 
on home-country lobbying efforts. 
 
However, the utilisation of the generational approach confirms that there is little for 
Huntington et al. to fear. The prism of generation illuminates a picture in which the 
1980s represented a unique moment in the history of Hispanic American foreign 
policy engagement, in which relatively small demographic communities led by 
political Exiles had the disposition, incentives and resources to involve themselves in 
the public discourse on US foreign policy. However, the antecedent and subsequent 
patterns of both Hispanic immigration and elite organisation confirm that this was 
indeed a unique moment in US history: The foreign policy engagement by the earlier 
Chicano generation had taken on a different manner and was driven by different 
concerns. Likewise, Mexican-American elites in the 1980s shied away from US foreign 
policy because they saw themselves as committed to participating in mainstream 
politics and saw little purpose in challenging Reagan’s international agenda. Unlike 
the Cuban Exile elites who found significant political and economic benefit in 
supporting the government’s anti-communist policies even after their prospects of 
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returning to their island homeland had diminished, Mexican-American elites in the 
1980s had nothing to gain and plenty to risk by engaging with foreign policy issues. 
 
Intellectual and public fears over the prospect of Hispanic American divided loyalties 
based on the experiences of Exile generation engagement in the 1980s was therefore 
misplaced. As will be outlined in Chapter 5, it would be the stance of the cautious 
Mexican American elites, rather than the lobbying Exile elites, that would better 
reflect the nature of foreign policy engagement by the Latino generation from the 
1990s and into the contemporary period.  
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Chapter 5: “The world is getting smaller”: Intermestic 
issue engagement among national Latino advocacy 




This chapter examines the nature of foreign policy engagement amongst Latino 
advocacy organisations (LAOs). It demonstrates that whilst LAOs continue to priortise 
the bulk of their resources towards domestic policy issues over foreign affairs, on two 
particular topic areas there is notable Latino interest: Immigration continues to be a 
key policy around which LAOs organise, and the environment and climate change 
represents an emerging area of concern. In both cases, it is the inherently intermestic 
nature of these issues that has encouraged LAOs to engage: both topics are as much 
grounded in the day-to-day lives of Hispanic Americans within the US as they are in 
international policy. As a result, Hispanic survey respondents are disproportionately 
likely to emphasise these topics as priorities than non-Hispanic citizens. Therefore, 
this chapter highlights these topics as forming the potential basis of a future unique, 
Latino foreign policy agenda. In addition, it demonstrates that Latino-generation elite 
organisation continue to engage with foreign policy where it promotes and 
complements their domestic agenda. 
 
The chapter illustrates several important factors relevant to the wider context of 
Hispanic generational elite engagement with US foreign policy. Firstly, it 
demonstrates that the pattern of Latino-generation engagement has not significantly 
changed since it was first examined by Pachon, De la Garza & Pantoja in their study 
of Hispanic elites in the 1990s.307 This represents an important finding, given the 
considerable changes that have occurred across the US foreign policy landscape since 
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the late 1990s. Secondly, it confirms that the generational shift from country-of-
origin groupings to pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ organisations as the principle vehicle through 
which elites claim representation of the Hispanic community is entrenched within 
both the policy discourse and the political networking mechanisms within 
Washington. As a consequence, LAOs are no closer to operating as ethnic lobbies for 
Latin American governments in 2018 than they were in the 1998. Finally, by analysing 
the nature of LAO engagement in policy areas rather than direct influence on foreign 
policy outcomes, potential topic areas for a future Latino foreign policy agenda are 
revealed that had previously been overlooked by the existing literature. 
 
The structure of this chapter consists of a brief history of the development and 
ascendancy of Latino advocacy organisations as the principle representatives of the 
Hispanic population in national politics during the 1990s, and charts their limited 
engagement with foreign policy issues. It then examines the seminal 2000 study by 
Pachon, De la Garza & Pantoja that surveyed the foreign policy positions of Latino 
elites during the late 1990s, before comparing the findings from that study with more 
recent survey data and insights from interviews with LAOs conducted between 2015 
and 2017. It finally examines how on the two intermestic issues of both immigration 
and the environment and climate change, there is a developing interest among LAOs 
that has the potential to form the basis of a unique Latino foreign policy agenda in 
the future. 
 
LAOs and the Latino Generation 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, by the 1990s, the principal arena of Hispanic elite 
engagement had shifted from country-of-origin, regional organisations to large-scale 
bodies with a presence in Washington, DC. These LAOs had, to varying degrees, 
adopted pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ labels and made claim to represent the interests of the 
entire Hispanic demographic.308 In addition, their organisational model had evolved 
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away from the local civil rights protests and ethnic nationalism orchestrated around 
high-profile leaders of the Chicano generation, towards a focus on lobbying the 
federal government to commit energy and resources to Hispanic causes, to a point 
where, as Garcia argues, “Latino organizational leadership has become more 
institutionalized in the sense that organizational skills, networks and institutional 
positioning has supplanted charismatic appeal”.309 
 
This general transformation is highlighted most prominently in the creation of the 
National Hispanic Leadership Agenda in 1991. The NHLA, which represents the forty 
oldest and largest Latino advocacy groups, includes formerly Mexican, Cuban, Puerto 
Rican and Central American groups among its membership, as well as those that have 
always explicitly claimed to represent Hispanics, such as the National Association of 
Latino Elected Officials (NALEO).310 Of the current forty members, only two – the 
Cuban National Council and the National Puerto Rican Coalition – maintain a national 
origin label in their name. The rest have moved to express a commitment to 
representing a national Latino constituency as overtly as possible, including in some 
cases, by changing their organisational name entirely.311 
 
The NHLA represents bodies from business, professional associations, advocacy and 
education. Yet this loose conglomeration of diverse groups is able to successfully 
endorse a cohesive political agenda whilst claiming to represent a single, united 
minority, deploying pan-ethnic terms such as ‘Latino’ and ‘Hispanic’ over national-
origin groups. Mora contests that this ambiguousness is strategic and deliberate on 
the part of the organisations so that their representative claims to be the 
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ambassadors for a large voting block remain unchallenged.312 Therefore, for such 
representative claims to work, LAOs have to rely on centering their day-to-day 
advocacy concerns on issues that concern the community as a whole, rather than 
national-origin specific interests. Given the high level of feeling of pan-Latino shared-
fate reported amongst Hispanics, the primary efforts and political activism lies with 
the socio-economic concerns that affect the daily reality of the majority of the 
Hispanic population.313  
 
Latino elite engagement with foreign policy during the 1990s 
 
It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that these structural changes in the 
organisational architecture of the Latino generation elite was correlated with a 
declining interest in US foreign policy: Throughout the 1990s, there was a significant 
absence of engagement with either international issues or US-Latin American 
relations by LAOs. On the surface, this could be considered somewhat surprising 
given that it coincided with increased speculation among both the academic and 
public sphere that the end of the Cold war would herald a new era in which ethnic 
concerns could rise to the forefront of US foreign policy debates, with the prioritizing 
of super-power engagement no longer taking up the oxygen of immediate geo-
political concerns.314 
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Anticipating such a scenario, public intellectual and political scientist Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. warned of the anger of promoting multiculturalism within education, 
fearing that the United States would lose perspective of its own identity (and by 
extension, its political priorities) now that categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which had 
once been conveniently provided by the Cold war, were no longer available to keep 
US identity from fragmenting.315 At the same time, International Relations scholars 
were forecasting that a new era of international politics based on ethnic identity lines 
was about to commence. The international order was on the precipice of a new era, 
one in which states would play a diminished role in the immediate conduct of foreign 
policy, with the ascendancy of non-state actors taking its place, including domestic 
populations organised into interest groups.316 
 
Against the backdrop of such speculations and coupled with a growing population 
that seemed to increase exponentially with each decade, it is unsurprising that there 
was a level of anticipation surrounding the role that Latino Generation elites, now 
representing a legitimate and ascendant pan-ethnic block, might play in the post-
Cold War US foreign policy landscape. Much of this speculation took the form of 
negative and alarmist warnings about the potential dangers of increased 
immigrations swelling the ranks of a Latino demographic that, with a culturally 
distinct set of values and foreign language, would threaten American identity at 
home, and through a failure to the American way of life, would maintain dangerous 
ties to their countries of origin, where their political allegiances really lay. At best, 
they would struggle to reconcile divided loyalties to both the United States and the 
homeland they left behind.  At worst, Latinos could actively lobby on behalf of the 
interests of Latin American governments and actively pursue their political agendas. 
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As previously outlined in Chapter 1, best-selling books by public intellectuals, such as 
Peter Brimelow’s Alien Nation317 and former Reagan staffer Patrick Buchanan’s The 
Death of the West318 typify this sentiment. However, the most high-profile warning 
(and intellectually impactful) came from renowned Harvard historian and political 
scientist Samuel Huntington. In a 2004 book entitled “Who are we?: The Challenges 
to America’s National Identity “319, he set out the case that the growth of the Latino 
demographic threatened both American identity and sovereignty. Continuing a 
theme established in his influential book Clash of Civilizations320, he claimed that 
Hispanics possessed an essentially different set of cultural values from those found 
within the traditional American Creed that had dominated the US from its colonial 
origins. Unlike previous new arrivals of ethnic immigrant groups, Latinos were 
unwilling to shed these different cultural values in favour of assimilating to the Creed. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the extension of this argument was that this failure to 
assimilate not only threatened to undermine or erode the national values that go 
into formulating the US’ national interest in the world, but were immigration into the 
southwest to be left un-checked, Hispanics could remould the region as an 
autonomous Spanish-speaking province with the effective political and cultures 
values of Mexican communities.321 
 
Despite these negative forecasting for Latino ethnic lobbying, as part of an 
anticipated explosion of ethnic identity politics seizing the discourse of US foreign 
policy, Latino elite involvement with foreign affairs during the 1990s was notable by 
its absence. From the end of the Cold war, there has been very little in the way of 
high profile initiatives emerging from Latino organisations, or political commentary 
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on administration foreign policy goals or conduct that would seek to proffer any kind 
of critique from a Latino perspective.322 
 
One exception in which Latinos did play an active participatory role concerned the 
ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Both the US and 
Mexican governments were eager to elicit the support of the Latino community (and 
in the case of Mexico, specifically their diaspora population living and working in the 
southwest United States), hoping that they would readily endorse a project that they 
would perceive as beneficial for the two countries to which they had significant 
ties.323 
 
As Dominguez notes, as part of this campaign, the Mexican foreign minister 
established a ‘General Directorate’ with a responsibility for promoting a new 
dialogue between Mexico and Mexican-American leaders324. National honours were 
bestowed upon prominent Mexican-American elites by the administration of Carlos 
Salinas, the then president. The Mexican Trade and Industrial Development Ministry 
actively encouraged influential Mexican-American politicians and organisations to 
lobby for NAFTA’s ratification, of which the most actively prominent were LULAC and 
the NCLR.325 
 
However, the impact of these initiatives were not particularly successful in mobilizing 
Latino elected officials to vote for NAFTA due to any perceived Mexican benefits. 
Whilst all but one Mexican-American Congressman voted in favour of the ratification, 
this was only after the Clinton Administration sought to assuage the concerns of Rep. 
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Esteban Torres, a leader of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, that job losses in 
members’ constituencies would be tackled with a multi-million-dollar investment 
package.326 All Cuban-American and Puerto Rican members voted against the bill, 
fearing it would unduly hurt their respective local communities.327 
Beyond the NAFTA example, Latino elite engagement with US foreign policy during 
the period were largely restricted to matters concerning immigration reform or 
topics over which Latino elected officials were functionally required to involve 
themselves, such as where a bill on refugee status for Central Americans or Cubans 
necessitated a vote.328 Beyond this, organisations have not taken on any prominent 
initiatives.329 
 
Given that initial historical examination of Latino elite engagement with US foreign 
policy shows an apparent record of inactivity, it is somewhat surprising that the same 
period of time has been overshadowed by fears of Latinos lobbying to represent their 
countries of origin. It was this somewhat contradictory state of affairs provided the 
emphasised for academic research on the subject. As a result, the 1990s saw a 
number of studies undertaken that looked at Latino systematic involvement with US 
foreign policy. During the middle of the decade, the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, a 
California-based think tank that focuses on Latino polling, conducted several studies 
on Latino involvement with a range of foreign policy-related topics, from remittances 
to local ties with foreign diplomatic corps. As was outlined in chapter 1, these findings 
were collated and published in the edited volume Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: 
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“Representing the Homeland”? by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry P. Pachon.330 As 
was discussed in Chapter 1, of particular relevance within the collection was a survey 
of the foreign policy views of 454 Hispanic elite individuals, drawn from 
organisations, academia, media representatives, business leaders and public 
officials. The study, by Pachon, De la Garza and Pantoja and entitled ‘Foreign Policy 
Perspectives of Hispanic Elites’, looked at the priorities of Latino leaders as well as 
comparing their foreign policy positions with non-Hispanic elite actors.331 The  
findings, explored previously in Chapter 1, are presented here again in Table 2. 
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Issue % U.S. leaders 
saying issue is 
“very important” 
% Latino leaders 









spread of nuclear 
weapons 
90 62 1 1 
Defending allies’ 
security 
60 8 2 8 
Stopping illegal 
drugs 




54 20 4 9 
Protecting U.S. jobs 50 39 5 5 
Improving the 
global environment 
49 60 6 2 
Combatting world 
hunger 
41 41 7 4 
Reducing trade 
deficit 
49 21 8 6 
Reducing illegal 
immigration 
28 14 9 7 
Table 2: Elite foreign policy preferences, from Pachon, de la Garza and Pantoja (2000) 
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The study found that of the top five US policy goals that Latino elites were asked to 
rank, all were domestic considerations except for preventing the spread of nuclear 
arms. Improving education and race/ethnic relations were considered the immediate 
and most pressing priorities, whilst traditional foreign policy concerns such as 
‘strengthening the United Nations’ and ‘defending the security of US allies’ were at 
the bottom of the list of priorities, only ranked as ‘very important’ by 19% and 8% of 
Latino leaders respectively. Other common areas of focus for US foreign policy, such 
as combatting international terrorism, improving the United States’ relations with 
other states, and maintaining position of international military superiority were all 
considered ‘very important’ by less than half of all respondents. 
 
When considering the specific foreign policy views of Latino elites in comparison with 
those of their non-Latino counterparts, the authors of the study emphasise that with 
regards to the majority of the nine issues that they were asked to consider, there was 
only a small variation in the priorities given to each topic. For example, preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons was considered to be the top priority for both groups, 
and roughly equal percentages reported that stopping the flow of illegal drugs was a 
‘very important’ goal of US foreign policy. What is also notable is the extent to which 
Latino concerns for the Latin American drugs trade – something often seen as an area 
of particular interest due to the unique Latin American dimension – is equally shared 
with non-Latinos, suggesting it may principally be seen through a security lens over 
an ethnic one. 
 
These statistics are useful in indicating for the first time with empirical data the 
priorities of Latino elites. However, there are several shortcomings with this study: 
Firstly, as was highlighted in Chapter 1, this study was conducted to serve as a 
response to Huntington et al.’s assertions about the supposed dangers of Latinos 
harboring loyalties and political ties to their countries of origin. The authors of the 
edited volume explicitly frame it as such, noting the public negative speculation that 
was occurring at the time about the supposed true motives of Latinos and their elite 
representatives. The subtitle of the text, “Representing the Homeland?” illustrates 
this fact, suggesting a very real motive for the authors was to actively counter the 
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claims that Latinos are lobbyists for Latino America. Possibly as a result of this, the 
authors avoided highlighting and analysing the points over which Latino elites and 
non-Latino elites differ, perhaps out of a concern to emphasise that Latino elites’ 
foreign policy interests are the same those of wider America. Nevertheless, notable 
differences in policy preferences between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic elites are 
evident from the responses. For example, as is clear from Table 2, there is a 
substantial difference between Latino and non-Latino elites on the issue of defending 
allies’ security, which is only considered a ‘very important’ issue by 8% of Latinos 
compared with 60% of non-Latinos, and on improving the global environment, which 
is ranked second in the order of importance by Latinos, it is however considered ‘very 
important’ by less than half of US elites generally. 
 
Secondly, and likely also as a result of the specific focus on the Latinos’ relationship 
with the Latin American ‘homeland’ and the extent of any national origin group 
interaction with the governments in their place of origin, this study fails to examine 
or take into account broader foreign policy considerations. For example, it does not 
consider how the focus on domestic issues could also have a possible international 
dimension, or the extent to which cultural values amongst Latinos may lead to an 
alternative interpretation of issues that may be never the less considered low 
priority.  
 
Thirdly, the study is somewhat limited due to its restrictions as a principally 
quantitative study. Whilst it is certainly helpful in capturing a useful perspective and 
introducing empirical data into an erstwhile entirely speculative debate, it does not 
offer the ability to help make sense of precisely why Latino elites made the choices 
that they did. Whilst the study did include several ‘follow up’ interviews with a 
handful of respondents, it was not always clear who these were with and they mostly 
served to provide separate, complementary information (such as that Hispanic elites 
considered Mexico to be the most important international ally for the United States), 
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rather than going into depth behind why an elite individual chose the rankings that 
he or she did for foreign policy preferences.332 
 
Finally, the analysis and conclusions that the authors draw from the survey data and 
the accompanying interviews suggest that Latino elites are not interested in foreign 
policy topics because of the immediacy of domestic concerns such as access to 
education and healthcare that take priority for the Latino population that the elites 
are representing.333 Foreign policy is a luxury to which they cannot afford to devote 
energy and resources to. However, if this conclusion is indeed accurate, then it can 
only offer us at best a static analysis that captures the sentiment of the specific 
leaders at the time. Much has changed since the respondents were polled in 1997, 
including the international environment in which the United States operates. This 
leaves a question of how far these stated perspectives are pertinent and relevant to 
the discussion of Hispanic elite foreign policy engagement in later years, with a new 
cohort of Latino elite leaders. 
 
The invasion of Iraq and its continued troop commitment during the Bush 
administration provided a notable source of analysis of the Hispanic population’s 
preferences on a key foreign policy issue in the time following the de la Garza and 
Pachon study, with a number of surveys of Hispanic support for the war being 
conducted by the Pew Research Center from before the invasion, through to 2007. 
These results showed that overall, Latinos were consistently more likely to oppose 
the invasion and the continued presence of troops in Iraq, with only 46% of Hispanics 
indicating support leading up to the war compared with 60-70% among the general 
population334, and 66% of Hispanics wanting to a troop withdrawal by 2007, 
compared to 50% of survey respondents generally.335 At the same time, Hispanics 
                                                     
332 H. P. Pachon, R. O. de la Garza & A. D. Pantoja, “Foreign Policy Perspectives of Hispanic Elites”, 
PP. 25- 30 
333 Ibid., P. 23 
334 Pew Research Center, “Survey Of Latino Attitudes On A Possible War With Iraq” Washington, DC: 
18th February, 2003. [http://www.pewhispanic.org/2003/02/18/survey-of-latino-attitudes-on-a-
possible-war-with-iraq/] 
335 Pew Research Center, “Latinos and the War in Iraq: Fact Sheet”, Washington, DC: 4th January, 
2007. [http://www.pewhispanic.org/2007/01/04/latinos-and-the-war-in-iraq/] 
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were heavily targeted by the US military as part of their recruitment efforts during 
the Bush administration, who saw the Hispanic population as a relatively untapped 
source for potential enlistment during the early 2000s.336 Some high profile Latino 
organisations, such as the National Council of La Raza and LULAC, accepted 
sponsorship financing from the US military in exchange for access to Hispanic 
members at their national conferences and local meetings to promote military 
careers.337 These efforts were largely successful, with participation rates in the 
military increasing to 12% at the end of the war (and 18% in the Marines), compared 
to a low of 4% during the early 1980s.338  
This mix of increased military participation by Hispanics, coupled with a developing 
consensus that the Hispanic population was largely opposed to the continuation of 
keeping troops in Iraq, led LAOs to take a stance advocating a full military withdrawal, 
and it was included as a resolution in the NHLA’s 2008 policy agenda.339 
 
However, aside from LAOs adopting a collective stance against the war by the end of 
the Bush administration, there was limited involvement in – or commentary on – 
Bush-era foreign policy during the era of the ‘war on terror’. In a 2007 article, 
Brandon Valeriano attempted to contextualise the Pew Research Center survey data 
within the academic responses to Huntington and the anti-Hispanic narrative of the 
culture wars, suggesting that despite the relatively lower level of support for Bush-
era policy compared to the rest of the population, Hispanics were on the whole 
supportive of the invasion of Iraq.340 To Valeriano, this indicated that as a population, 
Hispanics supported the national security policy of the government and thus 
                                                     
336 A. Gumbel, “Pentagon targets Latinos and Mexicans to man the front lines in war on terror”, The 
Independent, 10th September, 2003. 
[https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pentagon-targets-latinos-and-mexicans-to-
man-the-front-lines-in-war-on-terror-86229.html] 
337 R. Lovato, “The War for Latinos”, The Nation, 15th September, 2005. 
[https://www.thenation.com/article/war-latinos/] 
338 G. Lerner, “The Iraq Conflict: The War That Changed Latinos”, The Huffington Post, 20th 
December, 2011. [https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/iraq-war-changed-latinos_n_1158488] 
339 National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, ‘2008 Hispanic Public Policy Agenda’, 2008. 
[https://www.maldef.org/resources/publications/nhlapublicpolicyagenda.pdf]. P. 3. 
 
340B. Valeriano, “The International Politics of a New Latino America: The Foreign Policy Preferences 
of Latinos and the National Interest”, Journal of Latino/Latin American Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, P. 
40. 
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disproving any accusations of disloyalty.341 This suggests that the legacy of the 
culture wars continued to cast a shadow over Hispanic elites during the early part of 
21st century and limited their ability to contribute to national foreign policy 
discussions in the aftermath of 9/11. 
 
LAO engagement under Obama and Trump 
 
Whilst there is little evidence of active foreign policy engagement by LAOS during the 
Bush administration, there remains a question over whether the attitudes identified 
in the Pachon, de la Garza and Pantoja are equally present in the contemporary-era, 
under the administrations of Presidents Obama and Trump, or whether they have 
changed. To help answer this question, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with representatives of seventeen LAO constituent members of the National 
Hispanic Leadership Agenda. Member organisations from the NHLA were chosen as 
these constituted the most significant national voices serving as ‘ambassadors’ for 
the Latino community on policy issues to the federal and state governments, as well 
as the media. In addition, membership indicated the organisations invoke the 
legitimacy of the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label. 
The LAOs interviewed represent the diversity within the NHLA umbrella: They 
included business-focused organisations such as the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of 
Commerce, others were national-origin focused groups like the National Puerto 
Rican Coalition; industry-association groups such as the National Association of 
Hispanic Publications and the National Hispanic Medical Association, as well as 
historical civil rights organisations like the NCLR and the League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC). Questions were semi-structured so each individual 
conversation was different, but were broadly anchored around seven principle 
questions, listed in Table 3. 
 
                                                     
341 Ibid., P. 42. 
 183 
 
The interviews were conducted as a means of testing how far the findings from the 
Pachon, De la Garza & Pantoja study could still be seen to apply in the immediate 
contemporary period, as well as to produce more recent evidence of LAO 
perspectives to help understand the current state of engagement of elite 
organisations towards US foreign policy issues. The resulting insight suggests that 
Latino generation LAOs are, as anticipated, continuing to prioritise domestic policies 
over international issues in their lobbying and advocacy efforts. Following the 
generational framework, this suggests that rather than evolving towards a new 
generational model, the characteristics of organisation and representation that 
1.) Could you give me some background on your role and how you came to 
work in this field? 
 
2.) Do you believe Latinos share a common culture, or a common identity? If 
so, what do you think that common culture or identity is comprised of? 
 
 
3.) What kind of role do you feel Latinos have played, and will play, in foreign 
policy? 
 
4.) Are there particular foreign policy topics or areas that may be of particular 
interest or relevance to the Latino community as a whole? If so, what do 
you think those are? If not, why do you think so? 
 
5.) There is a perception that Latinos traditionally have not taken as much as an 
active role in foreign policy, including working in foreign policy related 
careers. How accurate is that and why might that have been the case? 
 
6.) Do you think Latinos will play a larger role in foreign policy in the future? 
What do you think this will look like? 
 
 
7.) A February 2015 survey found that Latinos were more likely to rate climate 
change as a ‘critical threat’ to the US and that combatting world hunger 
should be a ‘very important goal’ of US foreign policy compared with the US 
population as a whole. Furthermore, Hispanic respondents were more likely 
to have a favorable view of the United Nations than non-Hispanic 
respondents. Based on your experience, what do you think might account 
for these differences? 
 
Table 3: Interviewee semi-structured questions 
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defined the Latino Generation elites in the 1990s have become entrenched over the 
subsequent two decades. However, by expanding the definition of foreign policy 
engagement to incorporate intermestic issues, the interviews highlighted two areas 
of foreign policy interest in which there is an emergent Hispanic LAO agenda: 
Immigration as well as the environment and climate change. 
 
The continuing salience of domestic issues 
 
The first and most striking observation was that Latino organisations, on the whole, 
do not actively campaign on foreign policy issues: None of the seventeen 
organisations represented had a set of policy positions on US foreign policy topics, 
and none actively sought to actively communicate to the federal government their 
organisation’s perspective on a foreign policy issue.  
 
The majority of respondents articulated that whilst the decision to exclude foreign 
policy was not necessarily a conscious one, they were focused primarily on domestic 
policy concerns, such as those related to immigration reform, educational access and 
healthcare. Pressed further on why they had focused on these areas, the majority of 
respondents communicated that this was due to the fact they were of an immediate 
pressing concern for the Latino community that they represent: The socio-economic 
reality for the majority of Latinos means that education, the economy, jobs and 
healthcare top the agenda and these concerns are communicated from the Latino 
population through to the organisations that represent them on a national stage. 
Others reported that their focus on domestic concerns was due to a limitation of 
resources. A perceived lack of available funding, access to decision-makers within 
government, and a lack of foreign policy expertise within the organisations 
themselves, meant that the majority of organisations could cover only a relatively 
small range of policy issues, and foreign policy was not considered a high priority. 
Others argued that as the policy positions of many Latino organisations were 
designed to reflect the consensus views of their membership, it would be difficult to 
take a foreign policy stance due to a lack of a common viewpoint amongst 
organisational membership. As José Rámón Sánchez, the Chair of the National 
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Institute for Latino Policy (NILP) (a New York-based policy center established in 1982 
as a Puerto Rican-focused organisation that publishes research studies on Latino and 
Puerto Rican issues), articulated in his interview, this lack of consensus was in part a 
reflection of the continuing strength of national origin group identity continuing to 
play a role within the Hispanic population: 
 
A lot of Latinos still have connections to their country of origin. Both emotionally, 
psychologically and sometimes physically because they travel back and forth and 
sometimes economically because they provide remittances back to their families in their 
home countries. So there is this issue of how to bring together these various Latino 
groups. And there are some groups that have tried to do that and have succeeded 
organisationally, there are a few that have local chapters across the country that bring 
in various groups, and on paper it looks like a good way to bring together groups but 
they haven’t been able to develop Latino leaders. So, it’s a bureaucratic organisation of 
Latinos but not a political organisation of Latinos in the sense of being able to develop 
leaders that they feel can represent their community.342 
 
Given these obstacles, a commitment to engage with foreign policy was not 
considered to be worth the expenditure of time and resources. 
 
On the whole, this lack of an active foreign policy focus by elite organisations, instead 
choosing to favor an immediate focus on domestic issues, is broadly in line with the 
findings of the 1997 study. As then, the principle response given as to why foreign 
policy topics were not a central feature of Latino elite engagement with politics is 
that foreign policy is not an immediate concern for the majority of Latinos within the 
United States who continue to exist in positions of socio-economic disadvantage 
compared to the angle population. 
 
The second notable observation is that overall, the organisations were highly 
skeptical of the possibility of a cohesive and unified ‘Latino’ consensus on foreign 
policy, or that Latino elite actors have a discernable foreign policy agenda that is 
                                                     
342 Interview with José R. Sánchez, Chair, National Institute for Latino Policy (NILP), 9th February, 
2017. 
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different from non-Hispanic political elites. Instead, they demonstrated a significant 
range of perspectives over what could be considered Latino foreign policy 
preferences, and why said preferences were important. As Amy Hinojosa, the 
president and CEO of Mana, ‘A National Latina Organisation’ (founded in 1974, 
MANA is the largest women-focused Hispanic organisation, and has focused efforts 
on campaigns related to reproductive rights for Hispanic women), emphasised in her 
interview: 
 
That is where you get a little more segmented due to regional loyalties and different 
countries of origins; you'll get a different answer from South Americans, to Central 
Americans, to people from the Caribbean to people from Mexico. So I think that's where 
you start to see segmentation on their opinions on international issues. So in that regard, 
I don't think there's anything that’s over-arching. Now, if we are talking about 
international relations as it relates to the war on terror, or to the global economy, there 
I think you get back to where Latino and Hispanics fall in line with average Americans.343 
 
Whilst there was significant variation amongst responders, there was general 
disagreement with the possibility of a consensus among Latinos over what issues 
were important for foreign policy, or indeed over which methods of conducting 
foreign policy were preferable. The overwhelming majority indicated that any 
political consensus was limited to domestic policy, (with the exception of 
immigration, depending on whether this was considered to be primarily a domestic 
or foreign policy issue).344 Whilst many responders indicated that Latinos might have 
foreign policy issues that they care about, there was reluctance in many cases to 
articulate what these issues might be. In addition, the majority, however, 
emphasized that foreign policy preferences will stem from the experiences of Latinos 
within the United States, just as it informs domestic priorities.  
                                                     
343 Interview with Amy Hinojosa, President and CEO of MANA, 15th September, 2015. 
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The third general observation that can be taken from the interviews is that Latino 
organisations are unsure about what role they should, and likely will, play in any 
future Latino engagement with foreign policy. They are doubtful that their role as 
ambassadors for the Latino community at the national political level on domestic 
issues being replicated when it comes to foreign policy. 
 
When asked why they have not engaged with foreign policy, they point to the same 
structural factors that they use to explain why the Latino demographic as a whole is 
not interested in foreign policy. Firstly, a number of representatives identified a lack 
of available resources that could be devoted to foreign policy matters, even if they 
were of potential interest to the Latino community or the elites themselves. As Rafael 
Fantauzzi, the President and CEO of the National Puerto Rican Coalition (NPRC) (a 
non-partisan group that seeks to lobby for the interests of Puerto Ricans in 
Washington and raise the profile of Puerto Rican economic and political concerns), 
explained in his interview: 
 
I will tell you that the majority of our organisations are very under-funded… and right 
now, the Latino community has so many disparities from within our own borders, that 
trying to also reach outside of our borders will probably be stretching ourselves.345 
 
This also highlights the second factor most frequently cited as an explanation: The 
continuing sense that domestic concerns such as jobs and education should take up 
the immediate time and energy of organisations. Finally, they also highlighted the 
need to find a consensus amongst their respective’ membership bases on policy 
positions – something that is often elusive over foreign policy matters. Furthermore, 
two interviewees suggested that due to the reliance of many organisations on private 
funding bodies, the leadership of many groups will often be sensitive to avoid taking 
positions on issues that could jeopardize potential sources of revenue, which 
maintaining established foreign policy preferences could do. 
                                                     
345 Interview with Rafael Fantauzzi, President and CEO, National Puerto Rican Coalition (NPRC), 4th 
September, 2015. 
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When interviewees expressed optimism that Latinos would increase their 
engagement with foreign policy in the future – or were asked to make a judgement 
working under such an assumption – there was no consensus over how that 
engagement should be translated to the national stage through elite Latino actors, 
or which actors should take the initiative on foreign policy matters. Many 
interviewees expressed doubt that Latino organisations would ever take on this role 
in a significant way, suggesting that in the both the short and long term, goals would 
likely remain focused on domestic issues. Miguel Ferrer, the former managing editor 
of Huffington Post’s Latino Voices and Black Voices and the director of programming 
at AOL Latino, illustrated that sentiment in his interview: 
 
I don’t think [a concern for foreign policy] will come from the large domestic-focused 
organisations, for the reason that they are domestic-focused. Even as things improve 
there are still challenges and things to be defended so I don’t think their sphere is likely 
to change to foreign policy.346 
 
Where they did see a role for advocacy and interest organisations, it was largely 
limited to focusing on getting more Latinos elected to national office, which would 
increase their exposure to foreign policy through increased opportunity to oversight 
positions, as well as increasing the percentage of Latinos within foreign policy jobs in 
the federal government, both through pressuring the government to diversify their 
workforce, and through encouraging Latinos in high school and college to consider 
foreign policy careers. Indeed, there was a strong consensus amongst LAOs that 
Hispanic Americans are under-represented in the foreign policy establishment within 
the federal government.347 The majority of respondents pointed to structural and/or 
cultural barriers to explain this, but were divided on the specific reasons or solutions 
needed to correct this. 
 
                                                     
346 Interview with Miguel Ferrer, former Managing Editor of HuffPost Latino Voices and Black Voices, 
10th May, 2016. 
347 For example, this was expressed in interviews with Al Zapanta, President and CEO, United States-
Mexico Chamber of Commerce (USMCC), 11th September, 2015, Laura Maristany, NALEO, 15th 
September 2015; Julian Teixeira, NCLR, 12th September, 2015 and Carmen Jorge, CHCI, 17th 
September, 2015. 
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A significant number suggested that there was insufficient investment in outreach to 
the Latino community on the part of the recruiting agencies such as the Department 
of State or the US Agency for International Development (USAID). As Luis Maldonado, 
the Chief Advocacy Officer of the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (a 
non-profit organisation representing the interests of 492 higher education 
institutions that have over a 25% Hispanic student demographic), and a member of 
the Council of Foreign Relations, offered an example of this sentiment in his 
interview: 
  
The data shows us the limitations in the current makeup of the federal government's 
team that sets foreign policy in this country. Hispanics are just nowhere to be found 
there. They are not part of the decision making tree. The State Department has done a 
piss-poor job of recruiting, diverse workers.348 
 
Maldonado echoed other interviewees in arguing that recruitment into foreign policy 
careers had traditionally focused on targeting universities located in the geographic 
North East that traditionally had low levels of Latino enrollment: As Al Zapanta, the 
CEO of the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce (USMCOC) and former Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Interior summarized in his interview, there is a perception 
that foreign policy agencies “don’t recruit west of the Mississippi”.349 Additionally, 
there is an expectation amongst recruiters that applicants would be expected to take 
up departmental internships; something that Latinos often lack the resources to do.  
 
Another common suggestion was that the Department of State and other foreign 
policy agencies fail to appreciate the potential of Latinos as foreign policy 
practitioners, either because they have traditionally focused on Middle East and 
Asian regional experts over those with Latin American expertise, or that they do not 
recognise the language and cultural understanding that many Latinos can bring to 
foreign policy conduct in Latin American. In his interview, Luis Maldonado presented 
                                                     
348 Interview with Chief Advocacy Officer, Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), 
17th April, 2017. 
349 Interview with Al Zapanta, USMCC, 11th September, 2015. 
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this problem in terms of the inevitable limitations it will have for US foreign policy 
delivery if the government overlooks the unique diplomatic skillset of Hispanic 
Americans:  
 
At HACU, we are trying to not only show the government the future, we are trying to 
point to the wave that is coming, demographically speaking. And we'll miss those 
opportunities if we do not educate Latinos and entice them to enter these worlds, 
because there are certain limitations in American foreign policy, being driven by people 
who have no affinity and no cultural ties. I'm generalising here I understand that, but 
foreign policy as it relates to the Western Hemisphere is what it is because Hispanics are 
not part of it. And I would argue that we would bring a different set of perspectives, both 
historical, linguistic, cultural - you name it, because that’s where our community 
originates from.350 
 
A third explanation put forward was that the foreign policy bureaucracy displayed an 
institutional reluctance to diversify its workforce: That there was an assumption that 
foreign policy careerists were traditionally characterised as being ‘Yale, pale and 
male’, and that, unconsciously or not, there was an inclination amongst recruiters to 
continue hiring patterns that according to Zapanta, reflected “An old boy and old girl, 
Eastern, Ivy League, elitist institution.”351 
 
However, the advantage of conducting qualitative in-depth interviews with these 
organisations over the survey of policy preferences taken in 1997 is that it makes it 
possible to ‘shed light’ on the possible dynamics that are underlying these stated 
positions that have remained so remarkably unchanged in twenty years. The majority 
of stated reasons put forward to explain the lack of foreign policy engagement – the 
immediate focus on domestic issues, the necessary lack of political consensus, and 
the problem of lack of resources and access to political decision-makers to justify 
allocating limited time and funding to foreign policy – at first reflect two possible 
explanations for why there has been no engagement with foreign policy from the 
1990s until the present day. 
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The first is that the socio-economic realities for Latinos have remained static since 
the 1990s: that the over-riding need for domestic issues continues to take 
precedence. This analysis would be even more surprising given the growth of the 
Latino population in the intervening period, having more than doubled from 22.3 
million in 1990 to an estimated 55.3 million by 2014, suggesting that the socio-
economic situation for Latinos has remained flat despite the increase in size both of 
US-born and foreign born Latinos.352 
 
The second explanation is that these proposed accounts are all a consequence of the 
structural changes that had occurred in the organisational composition of the most 
prominent Latino organisations by the 1990s. The move to represent a pan-ethnic, 
national minority over a collection of distinct national origin diaspora groups has 
limited the ability of elite organisations to take up policies that are of interest to the 
majority of the ‘pan-ethnic’ demographic. 
 
The emerging foreign policy agenda 
 
It would appear on first analysis that this transition to the pan-ethnic representative 
model will mean that foreign policy will remain as excluded from their agendas in the 
future as it has been since the beginning of the 1990s. However, through an 
examination of additional survey data, the possibility of an identifiable set of Latino 
foreign policy preferences remains viable. 
 
A survey of 2,108 Latino adults, conducted in 2015 by the Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs, examined the foreign policy preferences of the Hispanic population353. It was 
conducted in both English and Spanish, and is the first attempt in the 2000s to 
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quantify the foreign policy positions of the Latino demographic. Whilst concluding 
that there was agreement on the majority of issues between Latinos are the 
mainstream population, they found three areas in which Latino respondents had a 
notably different preference: 54% of Latinos considered climate change to be a 
‘critical threat’ to US security, as opposed to just 34% of non-Latinos; they were 
considerably more likely to state that combatting world hunger should be an 
important priority for US foreign policy (56% of Latinos, compared to 39% of the 
general population), and that Latinos were more supportive of the United Nations as 
an actor in international affairs than non-Latinos (79% of Latinos were in favour of 
strengthening it as an institution, over 62% of non-Latinos. Furthermore, 66% of 
Latinos were in favour of using the UN to ‘resolve international conflict through 
negotiation’, compared to only 47% of non-Latinos). 
 
This would indicate that there are indeed some issues that the Latino population has 
a noticeably different position on to the non-Latino population and that would 
appear to be tangible enough to be observed under the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label. 
What de la Garza et al. failed to identify in the 1997 survey of Latino elites is that 
some of these same preferences are also discernable amongst the elite respondents. 
For example, where respondents were asked to rank what they considered to be the 
‘very important’ goals of US foreign policy, Latino leaders ranked ‘improving the 
global environment’ as the second most important goal after nuclear non-
proliferation, compared to U.S. leaders generally who ranked in 6th. Similarly, Latino 
leaders ranked ‘combatting world hunger’ as the fourth most important goal, 
compared to 7th amongst non-Latino respondents. By contrast, where non-Latinos 
ranked ‘defending allies’ security’ 2nd and ‘maintaining superior military power’ 4th, 
such traditional foreign policy concerns were considered of far less importance to 
Latino leaders, who ranked them 8th and 9th (out of 9 options), respectively.  
 
The similar observable differences in both the 1997 and the 2014 surveys suggest 
that there had at least been historically a time where Latino elites had a different 
interpretation of US foreign policy priorities to non-Latinos, and that this sentiment 
would appear to be traceable amongst the general demographic in the contemporary 
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period. Therefore, the data from these questions were put to the representatives 
from the Latino organisations as part of the interviews to determine whether a 
similar response is evident today. They were told of the differences between Latinos 
and non-Latinos in the 2015 Chicago Council survey, and asked what they thought 
might account for these differences. 
 
In their responses to this question, the majority of interviewees identified two likely 
explanations for these differences. Firstly, that these priorities were a reflection of 
the daily experiences of a very high proportion of the Latino population within the 
United States. As Julian Teixeria, the director of communications at the National 
Council of La Raza (NCLR) (the largest and best-resourced Hispanic advocacy 
organisation, that campaigns for immigration reform and a ‘path to citizenship’ for 
undocumented immigrants) articulated in his interview:  
 
A lot of Latinos here in the US have to deal first hand with climate change. Farmworkers 
for example are exposed to pesticides and there are huge problems associated with 
climate and climate change. With world hunger, there are Latinos in the nation that still 
live in slums: they don’t have portable water, they don’t have money, they don’t have 
food.354 
 
The contention, then, is that Latinos are disproportionately likely to live in polluted 
areas, work in sectors that were at risk from the effects of climate change, and were 
more likely to have experienced food poverty in the United States or have left a 
country of origin in which they did. This would mean that these foreign policy issues 
are more likely to be directly relevant to their daily lives. Secondly, some interviews 
attributed them to cultural differences. In particular, they focused on general 
commonalities that were often listed as the most commonly cited different value 
between Latinos and non-Latinos, that of the central importance of family: either 
that Latinos were more likely to have family members in countries of origins which 
were suffering from poverty or environmental degradation, or that the value of 
                                                     
354 Interview with Julian Teixeria, NCLR, 4th September, 2015. 
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family afforded Latinos with a greater capacity for empathy with the plight of foreign 
population suffering from such hardships. 
 
In both cases, interviewees were able to point to explanations that fell within the 
possible remit of pan-ethnic model: a cultural value that was broad enough in 
definition to encompass a heterogeneous mix of different national origin groups, as 
well as a shared socio-economic situation that affected a large proportion of the 
population. 
 
These responses would indicate not only identifiable areas of difference between the 
foreign policy priorities of Latinos and non-Latinos, but that that there is also a viable 
avenue for these topics to be engaged with by organisations, working in the context 
of the domestically-grounded, socio-economic explanations provided for them. This 
would appear to be particularly feasible in two topic areas: immigration and the 
environment. 
 
The immigration agenda 
 
Jones-Correa had previously identified immigration as the only detectable foreign 
policy topic on which the Latino community could galvanise the support of both US-
born Hispanics and foreign-born Hispanic immigrants, based on the behaviour of 
Latino advocacy groups and elected Hispanic officials during the 1990s.355 Since then, 
immigration has remained a touchstone of LAO policy campaigns, to which they 
continue to devote considerable energy and resources. They played a significant role 
in organising and supporting the large-scale Hispanic protests against the proposed 
2006 immigration reform bill that would actively target undocumented 
                                                     
355 M. Jones-Correa, “Latinos and Latin America: A Unified Agenda?”, in T. Ambrosio (ed.), Ethnic 
Identity Groups and U.S. F.oreign Policy (United States: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002) PP. 124-
125 
 195 
immigrants356, organising demonstration across the country.357 They campaigned 
heavily against the anti-immigration laws passed in Arizona in 2010 that allowed for 
the detention or arrest of suspected illegal immigrants based on racial profiling.358 
Furthermore, there was an overwhelming consensus among interviewees that 
immigration reform was of paramount importance to their particular organisation’s 
efforts, as well as emphasising the continued importance of immigration as a unifying 
subject area for LAOs, anticipating this would only grow as immigration once again 
became a prominent topic of public discussion.359 Ahead of the 2016 election, 
Immigration reform remained a principle agenda piece for the NHLA, appearing in 
their official agenda for the election.360  
 
Issues associated with immigration took on a position of prominence during the 2016 
election cycle, including the advocation of anti-immigration narratives by numerous 
candidates during the Republican primaries361 as well as drawing considerable media 
coverage throughout the election campaign. This increased attention, coupled with 
subsequent focus of policy efforts aimed at reducing immigration by the Trump 
administration, will likely serve to increase the organised efforts by LAOs to campaign 
                                                     
356 A joint letter to President Bush by NALEO, LULAC, MALDEF and NCLR stated that the bill would 
serve to “alienate the Latino community”. See: A. Behdad, “Turn of the Century Anti-Immigration 
Sentiment and Laws” in K. R. Arnold (ed.), Anti-Immigration in the United States: A Historical 
Encyclopedia, Volume 1. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CIO, LCC, 2011), P.471. 
357 The then-president of LULAC, Hector Florez, spearheaded a narrative reminiscent of the Chicano 
Generation’s Vietnam protest messaging. At a rally in Dallas in 2006, he complained that Latinos 
were being presented as national security threats in Bush-era securitisation policies, despite being 
disproportionately represented in the casualty statistics of the “war on terror”: “There were 19 
people that attacked our country. None of them had the name of Rodriguez, Martinez, Flores, 
Gonzalez. But, most certainly, many of the dead that are coming back from Iraq do have the names 
of Gonzalez, Martinez, Flores.”. See: J. Ludden, “Hundreds of Thousands March for Immigrant 
Rights”, NPR, 10TH April, 2006. [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5333768] 
358 In a statement by the NHLA responding to the bill being signed into law, they framed the law as 
part of larger efforts to discriminate against the Latino community: “During a time when hate crimes 
against Latinos and immigrants is on the rise, the signing of this bill increases the fear of violence and 
insecurity among Latinos in Arizona and the entire country.” See: NHLA, “Statement of the National 
Hispanic Leadership Agenda Condemning Arizona Governor Brewer on Enacting Anti-Latino, Un-
American and Un-Constitutional Law”, Washington, DC. 26th April, 2010. 
359As reiterated in interviews with Laura Maristany, NALEO, 15TH September 2015; Julian Teixeira, 
NCLR, 12th September, 2015; Hilda Crespo, Aspira, 14th September 2015; Luis Torres, LULAC, 16th 
April, 2016 and Luis Maldonado, HACU, 17th April 2016, among others. 
360 National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, ‘2016 Hispanic Public Policy Agenda’, 2016. PP. 16-17 
[https://nationalhispanicleadership.org/images/Agenda/NHLA_2016_Hispanic_Policy_Agenda.pdf] 
361 P. Elliott and A. Altman, “The Republican 2016 Field Takes a Hard Right on Immigration”, Time, 
20th August, 2015. [http://time.com/4005245/republican-president-immigration/] 
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on immigration issues in the immediate future. LAOs have been active opponents of 
plans to construct a wall along the Mexican border362, as well as opposing the ending 
of the DACA program for Hispanics who entered the US illegally as children.363 More 
recently, the NHLA in coordinated effort with the Hispanic Caucus has spear-headed 
opposition to the removal of temporary protected status (TPS) to Central American 
refugees, leaving them at risk of deportation. 
 
This continued, intense focus on immigration by LAOs is insightful. Firstly, it confirms 
the hypothesis of Jones-Correa that immigration is an area of intermestic focus 
around which Hispanics can organise effectively, unifying all sub-sections of the 
Hispanic demographic. In addition, given the relative ferocity with which illegal 
immigration has become a feature of hostile narratives of security threat for Latinos, 
it suggests that both the security and international dimensions of the immigration 
debate are likely to become an increasingly important component of the wider 
discourse, necessitating that LAOs engage with the foreign policy element of the 
debate. Such a shift in focus is already apparent, with the 2016 NHLA agenda calling 
for the US to devote resources to addressing the political and economic factors 
within Latin America that are propelling illegal immigration.364 
As Luis Torres, the Director of Policy and Legislation at LULAC365, suggested in his 
interview that both the effects of immigration policy would continue to be of 
particular importance to Hispanic Americans due to personal experiences, as well as 
                                                     
362 In their letter to Congress objecting to proposed funding for the border wall, the NHLA frame the 
immigration policies of the Trump administration as a “humanitarian crisis”. See: National Hispanic 
Leadership Agenda, “Re: NHLA Opposition to H.R. 6136, Border Security and Immigration Reform Act 
of 2018”, 20th June, 2018. 
[https://nationalhispanicleadership.org/images/06_20_18_NHLA_Ryan_Immigration_Bill_Oppositio
n_Letter_FINAL.pdf] 
363 National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, “Latino Leaders United in Condemning Decision to End 
DACA and Call on Congress to Act Immediately”. Press statement. 5th September, 2017. 
[https://www.nationalhispanicleadership.org/about-nhla/nhla-mission/17-press/456-september-5-
2017-latino-leaders-condemn-actions-to-end-daca-and-declare-consequences-will-follow] 
364 National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, ‘2016 Hispanic Public Policy Agenda’, 2016. PP. 15-17. 
[https://nationalhispanicleadership.org/images/Agenda/NHLA_2016_Hispanic_Policy_Agenda.pdf] 
365 LULAC is the oldest Hispanic advocacy organisation in the US, having been founded in 1929 in 
Texas as a Mexican-American group. It campaigns on Hispanic civil rights issues and operates 
principally as a decentralised structure of local chapters and activist networks. 
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that the economic drivers behind immigration are increasingly being viewed within 
a wider international context by LAOs: 
 
Number one, Mexico is right across the border. Two, Mexicans continue to be a large 
amount of the immigrant population that comes to the US every year, although we're at 
net zero migration from that country, it's still a very sizeable shift in people. So I think on 
the Mexican American front, there's sort of a constant replenishing of the immigrant 
experience into the Latino fabric, so that there's a constant stream - a friend, a 
neighbour, that is directly impacted by the US hardline immigration policy or the US 
economic deals and policies, which to many of our folks translate into economic 
immigration policies because if you strike NAFTA for example, when NAFTA happened 
many farmers lost their jobs and many of them ended up picking tomatoes and whatever 
else in the US, and many folks on our side who oppose NAFTA saw that not only as an 
economic policy but an immigration policy because you're going to get those people 
migrating for work. So I think, if you look at it from that lens, you can see how some of 
these seemingly domestic issues are international issues, especially when economic 
policy forces Latin Americans to emigrate to the north out of desperation or whatever it 
is.366 
 
This sentiment highlights both the extent with which LAOs continue to anticipate 
immigration being a central topic of importance to the Hispanic community and 
therefore for the agendas of LAOs, as well as the recognition that this issue is 
inextricably linked with numerous themes of international economic, security and 
diplomatic policy, offering an avenue for potential further engagement by directly 
addressing these intermestic qualities. 
 
The environment and climate change agenda 
 
An analysis of findings from both the Pachon et al., as well as the 2015 Chicago 
Council surveys, demonstrate that the environment and climate change are foreign 
policy topic areas in which there is an immediately discernable difference between 
the preferences of Hispanics and non-Hispanics. The Pachon et al. survey found that 
                                                     
366 Interview with Luis Torres, LULAC, 16th April, 2016. 
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Hispanic elites were most likely to rate ‘improving the global environment’ as the 
second most important foreign policy goal for the US, compared to a rank of sixth 
from non-Hispanic respondents. As has been previously stated, the Chicago Council 
survey found that Hispanic Americans were significantly more likely consider climate 
change as a critical threat to the US. This suggests that there is a clear and consistent 
pattern amongst the Hispanic demographic to prioritse the environment as a foreign 
policy issue compared to mainstream population, and offering an identifiable 
position with which LAOs could develop a policy platform. 
 
Historically however, there has been no substantive engagement with environmental 
or climate change as an aspect of foreign policy by the NHLA or any major LAOs. This 
may be in part be explainable by historical lack of recognition of the environment as 
a foreign policy topic area in its own right: When interviewees were asked to suggest 
areas of foreign policy engagement, many proffered more conventional topic areas 
of foreign policy, such as those related to military intervention, security, and 
alliances.367 This would suggest that for the majority of LAOs, foreign policy as an 
abstract concept has historically constituted a relatively fixed and alternative ‘world’ 
with clear, defined borders that is inherently distinct from the domestic issues with 
which they engage on a daily basis. 
However, this position has begun to change. In recent years there has become a 
recognition of both the environment as well as immigration as legitimate foreign 
policy topics. As Amy Hinojosa emphasised in her interview, Latino organisations 
were becoming increasingly aware that, particularly on the topic of immigration, 
there is a recognition developing that effective policy can only be considered with 
reference to the international political ‘push’ factors that are compelling many 
Latinos to leave Latin American states for the US, highlighting an acceptance that the 
traditional boundary between the domestic and the international is dismantling: 
 
                                                     
367 Such sentiments were expressed in a number of LAO interviews, including those of: Hilda Crespo, 
Aspira, 14th September 2015; Luis Torres, LULAC, 16th April, 2016, Luis Maldonado, HACU, 17th April, 
2016. and Amy Hinojosa, MANA, 15th September, 2015. 
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 Traditionally we have been reactionary to the realities of poverty, low education, and 
high dropout rates… But the world is getting smaller, meaning we now have to look at 
human trafficking, and the drug war, and all those things that are pushing folks into the 
United States… I think we need to start thinking about it in those terms.368 
 
It is further beginning to manifest also in the policy positions taken up by some 
organisations. In recent years, a number of smaller organisations have begun to 
specialise directly in the issue of climate change, including the DC-based 
GreenLatinos, Voces Verdes, and the Latino Coalition on Climate Change. And whilst 
the interviews clearly demonstrate that the most prominent Latino organisations 
under the NHLA banner have yet to take up these issues as part of their active policy 
positions, there are signs that they are beginning at least to recognise the foreign 
policy implications of these issues on which they campaign from a domestic-focused 
perspective. In the 2016 version of the NHLA’s Policy Agenda, a document released 
every four years ahead of the general election that details the policy areas considered 
of highest concern for the collective membership, includes for the first time a call for 
the US to take action on climate change through leadership in the international 
community.369  
 
There is further evidence that the topic of the environment and climate change is of 
growing importance to the Latino community. The findings of the 2015 Chicago 
Council study are supported by findings from others. A 2017 study by the Yale 
Program on Climate Change Communication found that Latinos are 
disproportionately likely to consider climate change to be real and represent an issue 
of vital importance.370 In addition, Latinos are more likely to report in surveys that 
they support Congressional action to combat climate change than non-Hispanics.371 
 
                                                     
368 Interview with Amy Hinojosa, MANA, 15th September, 2015. 
369 National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, ‘2016 Hispanic Public Policy Agenda’, 2016. P. 21. 
[https://nationalhispanicleadership.org/images/Agenda/NHLA_2016_Hispanic_Policy_Agenda.pdf] 
370 A. Leiserowitz, M. Cutler and S. Rosenthal, Climate Change in the Latino Mind: “Report 
Summary”, Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, New Haven, CT, 2017. 




Mark Magaña, the founder and CEO of GreenLatinos (a DC-based coalition of 
environmental and Hispanic activist networks, that campaigns on both climate 
change and domestic environmental issues that affect Hispanic communities) argued 
that there are three principle reasons why Hispanic Americans are disproportionately 
likely to care about the environment and climate change: Firstly, that Latinos care 
about the environment because it represents a cultural attribute. Secondly, that 
Hispanic Americans are more likely to show an interest because a significant 
proportion is likely to have Latin American connections, where the effects of climate 
change and environmental problems are more acutely felt. And thirdly, that they care 
about the environment because the consequences of environmental degradation are 
disproportionately likely to affect them personally in their immediate local 
surroundings in the US.372 
 
Environmentalism as a cultural attribute 
 
Magaña emphasised that Latinos are naturally more likely to engage with 
environmental policy as conservation and environmental protection are common 
cultural attributes amongst Hispanic Americans:  
 
I find that Latinos are more culturally conservationist than they are membership 
conservationist. I am not an environmentalist because I saw a movie, or joined Sierra 
Club, or because I bought a Prius. You find that Latinos are environmentalist because it’s 
what their grandma taught them and what their parents taught them. How to conserve, 
re-use, and re-repurpose… they have a natural respect that isn’t related to a policy 
issue.373 
 
For GreenLatinos, this cultural legacy makes Latinos inherently more concerned with 
environmental policy in general and explains differences in survey responses. The 
existence of a Hispanic ‘culture of conservation’ has long been hypothesised by 
                                                     
372 Interview with Mark Magaña, Founding President and CEO, GreenLatinos 15th May, 2017. 
373 Interview with Mark Magaña, GreenLatinos, 15th May, 2017. 
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academic literature374, but has only recently been incorporated into the narratives 
used within the environmental sector. For example, ‘Latino Outdoors’, a community 
programme designed to encourage urban Hispanic children to take part in outdoor 
activities, points to a “conservation cultura” that informs Latino engagement with 
the environment, whereby for Latinos, “conservation is woven in our cultural 
practices and rooted in our history and traditions”.375  
 
Using a similar narrative, Irene Vilar, the founder of the Americas Latino Eco-Festival 
– an annual gathering of Latino environmentalists – emphasises that respect for the 
environment is ingrained within the cultures of Latin America, which makes it 
relatively easy for US-based environmental movement to harness these cultural 
legacies when drawing on Latino support.376 
 
Environmentalism as a legacy of Latin American extraction 
 
In his interview, Magaña suggested that for many Latinos, the experience of the 
consequences of environmental degradation were something that they either 
experienced first-hand, or were likely to have close friends or relatives that had done 
so:  
 
Latinos look at the effects of climate change for their brother and sister’s friend in their 
countries of origins, where there are much more significant effects and repercussions 
from weather-related events associated with global warming and climate change. So the 
immediate thought is, I have to give more remittances to help rebuild the well in my 
country of origin. My cousin’s farm is flooded or there is a drought, so maybe they’ve 
got immigrate. Here, when those things happen, FEMA comes in and you get relocated 
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375 Latino Outdoors, “Unearting our Conservation Culture”, latinoutdoors.com, 8th June, 2015. 
[http://latinooutdoors.org/2015/06/unearthing-our-conservation-cultura/] 




and get help with a new job. But there, you have to make life-changing decisions about 
what to do. 377 
 
This was an explanation with which Adrianna Quintero, the founder and executive 
director of Voces Verdes (a non-partisan network of Hispanic political activists, 
environmental scientists and businesses that encourages Hispanic interest and 
activism in public debates over climate change) concurred in her interview. As she 
explained: “the most consistent finding of our polling and focus groups was that 
people would state that… “I remember when I visited my grandmother in Mexico and 
I could barely breath”. So there is a focus not only on what’s happening here but also 
there.”378 For both GreenLatinos and Voces Verdes, the potential of a strong Latin 
American connection provides an immediate international dimension to the wider 
discourse on the environment and climate change for Latinos, which would not 
necessarily exist amongst other demographic groups.  
 
Environmentalism as a domestic priority  
 
However, to both Magaña and Quintero, it was the importance of the first hand, lived 
experience of environmental problems that were of most importance when making 
sense of Hispanic Americans’ disproportionate interest in the topic as a matter of 
policy. As Magana argued in his interview:  
 
If I see a coal-fire power-plant in my neighbourhood but not one in the wealthier 
neighbourhood -and they don’t have the recycling plant or the freeways or anything – 
and my child has asthma and there’s inequity, then they’ll get into the policy political 
debate. But they’ll do it at a very local level: “I want to get rid of old smoky right here”.379 
 
This sentiment is supported by recent statistical evidence. A report by the National 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in 2016 found that Latinos consider themselves 
to be disproportionately affected by environmental issues living in the United States 
                                                     
377 Interview with Mark Magaña, GreenLatinos, 15th May, 2017. 
378 Interview with Adrianna Quintero, Founder and Executive Director, Voces Verdes, 15th May, 2017. 
379 Interview with Mark Magaña, 15th May, 2017. 
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than non-Hispanics.380 A separate poll conducted by the New York Times, Stanford 
University and Resources for the Future (an environmental NGO) in 2015 found that 
Latinos were more likely to consider climate change as a problem that affected them 
personally, and were in favour of increasing government spending to tackle it.381  
 
This last motivator – the domestic grounding of Latino interest in the environment – 
that has begun to spur the more traditional LAOs to engage with the environment 
and climate change and incorporate them into their advocacy agendas. To 
accompany the NHLA’s decision to add climate change to its official agenda for the 
first time in 2016, it hosted a conference jointly with LULAC and the Hispanic 
Federation to promote the environment as a topic for with which Latinos should be 
proactive campaigners.382 This was hosted on Capitol Hill by Representative Raul 
Grijalva (D AZ-3rd District), a Hispanic Congressman long noted for his support of 
environmental causes.383 In addition, in 2017 LULAC launched a protest campaign 
outside the EPA to protest President Trump’s proposed cuts to the department’s 
funding.384 
 
Therefore, there is clear evidence that LAOs are beginning to engage with the 
environment and climate change in a substantive and organised way, embracing the 
intermestic nature of the policy by campaigning on both domestic and foreign policy 
aspects. This suggests that it is likely to join immigration as a significant, intermestic 
policy area to which LAOs devote resources and lobbying efforts. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that, despite significant changes in the foreign policy 
landscape since the late 1990s, Latino advocacy organisations are no closer to 
conforming to the model of an ethnic lobby advocating for a specific foreign policy 
towards Latin American governments than they had been twenty years ago. This 
does not mean however, that the conclusion of De la Garza et al. that this means that 
Latinos do not concern themselves with foreign policy is accurate. Instead, this 
chapter has presented a case that, when the definition of ‘foreign policy 
engagement’ is sufficiently broadened so as to incorporate intermestic issues, there 
is clear evidence of an emerging Latino lobby on the topics of both immigration as 
well as the environment and climate change.  
 
Firstly, this chapter has confirmed the findings of De la Garza et al. that the nature of 
foreign policy engagement by LAOs is relatively similar to the findings of their study 
with regards to the extent to which Latino elites participate in home-country 
lobbying. None of the 17 Latino organisations interviewed had participated in any 
substantial organised efforts to lobby on behalf of a particular Latin American 
government, or on behalf of the political or economic interests of the region as a 
whole. This is an important conclusion for several reasons: 
Firstly, it confirms that the dynamics of the Latino generation elites operate the same 
in 2018 as they had done during the 1990s. Given the significant changes to the 
foreign policy landscape in the intervening period, it is a useful finding in-and-of 
itself. In addition, it also highlights a further observation: That the dynamics of the 
Latino generation elite, based on pan-ethnic representative claims made by national 
advocacy organisations as outlined in Chapter 2, remain firmly entrenched within the 
political power networks of Washington and within subsequent policy discussions. 
Given the significant organisational and demographic changes that occurred within 
the Hispanic American elites in the preceding thirty years, it is pertinent to confirm 
that the LAOs, claiming to represent the entirety of the Hispanic American 
demographic, retain their position as the legitimate ambassadors of the Latino 
population within foreign policy discourse. 
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In addition, by viewing foreign policy engagement in the context of the operating 
mechanics of the Latino Generation elite, this chapter has demonstrated 
circumstances in which Latino elites do indeed engage with foreign policy. Whereas 
de la Garza et al. dismissed the lack of evidence of an organised home-country 
lobbying effort as evidence of non-interest in foreign policy on the part of Hispanic-
elites, using the framework of the Latino Generation established in Chapter 2, it is 
possible to reach an alternative perspective: Given that LAOs make representative 
claims to represent the entirety of the Hispanic demographic, they can only advance 
an agenda that reflects the broad, shared interests of the various sub-groups within 
that demographic, which invariably reflect domestic interests. However, unlike the 
findings of De la Garza et al., this does not leave the domestic and foreign policy 
realms as mutually exclusive: Under this analysis, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Latino elites are uninterested in foreign policy due to the need to focus on domestic 
policy. It only confirms that any foreign policy engagement would be predicated on 
the relevance of a foreign policy issue to a wider Latino domestic policy priority. 
 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, there is indeed evidence of Latino foreign 
policy engagement where there is a clear overlap between the domestic policy 
agenda of LAOs and foreign policy components. On the intermestic issues of 
immigration and the environment and climate change, there is clear evidence of a 
growing interest and organised campaigning by LAOs that engage with the foreign 
policy discourse. On immigration, this finding confirms the hypothesis of Jones-
Correa that immigration is a foreign policy area on which Latinos can reconcile the 
interests of both foreign and domestic born Hispanics, and suggests that this 
engagement is only likely to increase in the future.385 On the topic of the environment 
and climate change, this is an area of intermestic policy interest that has not been 
previously considered by the existing literature. The fact that there is clear evidence 
since 2014 that LAOs are engaging with the topic in conjunction with Hispanic elected 
                                                     
385 M. Jones-Correa, “"Latinos and Latin America: A Common Agenda?", PP. 124-125. 
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officials, offers a new avenue for which Latinos may well develop a unique 
perspective and policy advocacy around a key foreign policy issue. 
 
Therefore, there is evidence that there are tentative, identifiable foreign policy issues 
around which LAOs can build a unique Hispanic foreign policy agenda. These findings 
support the central thesis’ claim that the extent of foreign policy engagement is only 
apparent once the definition of foreign policy engagement is broadened beyond 
simply analysing direct lobbying efforts to influence policy outcomes towards Latin 
American states, as well as supporting the claim that the nature and texture of 
foreign policy engagement is best understood through the framework of changing 
generational elites within the Hispanic American population. Finally, it supports the 
principle thesis claim that Latinos can and do engage with foreign policy, but do so 
where this supports and complements their domestic agendas. In the case of LAOs, 
this is apparent in the growing advocacy of intermestic issues, and on the issues of 
immigration and the environment, there is evidence that this engagement is only 
going to grow in the future. 
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Chapter 6: “I’m here because I want to contribute”: 
Narratives promoting Hispanic participation in US 
foreign policy among Latino foreign policy 






This chapter demonstrates how Hispanic foreign policy practitioners (FPPs) of the 
Latino generation engage with US foreign policy discourse by deploying narratives 
that the cultural heritage of Hispanic Americans leaves them particularly suited to 
careers in diplomacy and foreign policy analysis. In doing so, they complement the 
wider domestic agenda of Latino generation elites of increasing employment 
opportunities for Hispanics within the federal government. 
 
The chapter reveals several aspects in which Hispanic FPP engagement has evolved 
since the 1990s and suggests a changing attitude towards the conceptual and 
organisational presentation of a pan-Latino ethnic identity within a foreign policy 
setting. Firstly, in pursuit of greater access to jobs and promotion opportunities for 
Hispanics in foreign-policy related careers, FPPs have transitioned away from a 
reluctance to discuss any shared cultural attributes of Hispanics, towards a 
willingness to actively promote the organisation and mobilisation of Hispanics as a 
pan-ethnic minority group with a common culture and common experience. 
Secondly, compared to the late 1990s, there is a substantial level of active co-
ordination between FPPs and the foreign policy agencies of the federal government 
based on this conceptualisation of a pan-ethnic, culturally homogenous Latino 
minority: Explanations behind, arguments for and solutions to the topic of Latino 
under-representation as agents of US foreign policy are now filtered through this 
lens, leaving a pan-ethnic Latino label firmly ensconced within the wider discourse. 
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The structure of this chapter consists of an examination of the two main arguments 
used by Latino generation foreign policy practitioners to encourage the federal 
government to make the institutions of US foreign policy more accessible for Hispanic 
Americans: The first, that the heritage and lived experience of Hispanic Americans 
produces individuals that are ideally-suited to careers in diplomacy. The second, that 
increasing the percentage of Hispanics in the workforce will diversify the overall pool 
of talent tasked with implementing US foreign policy, benefitting its delivery as a 
whole. 
It then examines the structural and conceptual consequences of the promotion of a 
pan-ethnic Latino minority label within the foreign policy agencies themselves, 
before framing these activities within the wider context of Hispanic generational elite 
engagement with US foreign policy. 
 
The ethno-cultural argument for foreign policy participation 
 
Foreign policy practitioners have forwarded several principal arguments as to how 
Hispanic Americans, due to their experience and cultural traits, can benefit the 
execution of foreign policy. In addition to this, various agencies and departments of 
the federal government concerned with foreign policy have themselves forwarded 
these arguments, as well as separate arguments used to justify diversifying their 
employee base to include Latinos based on the utility of having a more heterogonous 
workforce related to foreign affairs. In recent years, Latino foreign policy elites and 
the federal government have coordinated these narratives as part of wider efforts to 
encourage Latino recruitment into foreign policy-related careers. 
 
The arguments most typically forwarded by Latino foreign policy elites reflect the 
sentiment that greater Latino involvement in foreign policy at the day-to-day level 
would bring advantages due to the unique status of Latinos themselves: Given their 
heritage, circumstances and historical domestic experience in the United States, 




The most prominent of these arguments is the suggestion that Latinos themselves 
would come to a career as official US representatives with an ideal skillset already 
acquired from a lifetime of navigating their own social realities: For many US-born 
Latinos who are either from families with high number of first generation immigrants 
or are from local communities that retain strong cultural traits of their country of 
origin, they have experienced two simultaneous ethno-cultural environments: that 
of their immediate family and ethnic community, as well as that of the ‘traditional’ 
US culture that they will have encountered through their institutional experiences in 
the education system.386  
 
According to this argument, this experience of socialisation has resulted in US-born 
Hispanics having to have navigated these two different cultures in order to adapt to 
US life, as well as internally reconciling both cultures in order to form their own 
identities. Ramon Escobar, a Rusk Fellow teaching at the Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy at Georgetown University and former Latin America specialist at the State 
Department, puts forward this argument in his interview:  
 
Latinos are essentially born and raised to be effective diplomats because they are often 
already, before they are even in middle school, understanding, deconstructing and then 
repackaging complex cultural experiences to their parents, who might not understand 
what they are seeing, and then vice-versa; translating linguistically and contextually what 
their father or mother or grandfather or grandmother are saying and seeing and then 
translating back to whoever they are interacting with in the States.387 
 
                                                     
386 It should be noted that, whilst recognising the role played by educational institutions in the 
cultural integration of Hispanic American children, a 2003 report found a considerable number of 
Hispanics were concerned that “teachers were not able to bridge cultural divides in the classroom.” 
(See: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, ‘National Survey of Latinos: Education, 
Foundation and Chartpack’, January 2004. P. 2. [http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/25.pdf]. 
For additional research on the difficulties of navigating the cultural transition between home and 
school life for Hispanic students, see N. P. Stromquist, ‘The education experience of Hispanic 
immigrants in the United States: integration through marginalization’, Race and Ethnicity and 
Education, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2012. P. 8.  
387 Interview with Ramon Escobar, State Department Rusk Fellow, Georgetown University, 2015-
2016, 11th April, 2016. 
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To Escobar, who had previously been Special Assistant to the Special Envoy for the 
Colombia Peace Process in his career as a diplomat, many Hispanic Americans have 
had to act as language and cultural interpreters to both first generation immigrants 
acclimatising to their new life in the United States, as well as to Anglo Americans 
interacting with these new immigrant communities. The effective sentiment of this 
argument therefore being that the formative experience of second and third 
generation Latinos means they are natural diplomats: they have an inherent 
appreciation of the existence of cultural divides; an innate ability to psychologically 
reconcile these differences, and intrinsic capabilities to both communicate across 
them and translate between them. 
 
Such an argument relies on a premise that there exist specific cultural differences 
between Hispanic communities from Latin America and Non-Hispanics within the 
United States, and that these differences have formed a significant enough disparity 
that the Latino children of first generation immigrants would need to develop skills 
to navigate both. This premise therefore appears to be invoking research from 
communications theory. In particular, it draws on Edward T. Hall’s Culture Context 
model, which contrasts ‘high context’ cultures such as those found in Latin America 
and the Middle East which are generally identified as favouring long-term 
interpersonal relationships, ‘insider status’ and verbal agreements, with ‘low 
context’ cultures such those in the United States and the United Kingdom which 
favour short-term relationships, written agreements and less identifiable ‘insider 
status’.388 389 As a result, in a high-context cultural environment like Latin America, 
information is communicated in a manner that relies heavily on context to be 
understood. 
 
Therefore, under this ethno-cultural argument presented by foreign policy 
practitioners, having a familiarity with the high-context culture of Latin America has 
advantages for US foreign policy, as the ability to successfully operate in those 
                                                     
388 Edward T. Hall, Beyond culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). 
389 Edward T. Hall & Mildred R. Hall, Understanding Cultural Differences: Germans, French and 
Americans (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1990). 
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environments can provide significant advantages for diplomats serving in other 
regions that contain similar high-context cultures, such as the Middle East. That such 
a cultural difference could be advantageous for Hispanics was discussed in an 
interview with a Hispanic postgraduate student and Pickering Fellow, who advocated 
this position:  
 
Latinos tend to be high context culture and so that brings in a different perspective, 
where most people in the State Department are low context culture… but we understand 
how that works, even if its intuitive, subconsciously. So when we go to these policy 
meetings and somebody is asking about how our family is doing or is kind of going around 
the subject, we can get to the point because we understand how that works: we’ve seen 
it, we’ve grown up with it.390 
 
For this interviewee, who was about to begin their career as a foreign service officer, 
Latinos are able to leverage an intrinsic understanding of the dynamics in which these 
cultures operate, and are thus able to thrive in these environments and adapt back 
and forth between the two cultures. Furthermore, this is something that they are 
more likely to manage than Anglo-Americans who have only experienced the low-
context culture that is predominant within the US as well as within the US federal 
government.   
 
Of the specific foreign policy institutions, the CIA has been the most enthusiastic to 
champion this importance of the Latin American cultural heritage as an asset to 
foreign policy delivery. In a 2014 official publication that focused on an ambition to 
promote ‘diversity in leadership’ within the agency, they provide a ‘business case’ for 
why diversity amongst their staff, generally speaking, is important: 
 
One of the principal lessons of our nation’s recent history is that culture matters. 
Multinational corporations hire individuals who are familiar with local languages and 
cultures in order to make inroads into foreign markets. Research shows that teams that 
include even one member of the team’s target demographic are more likely to 
                                                     
390 Interview with a Hispanic Pickering Fellow, 11th April, 2016. 
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understand their audience. The effectiveness of the Agency’s analysis and operations 
depend on understanding, valuing and leveraging the full diversity of the workforce.391 
 
The CIA frames this desire to have the target demographic for a specific foreign policy 
goal represented at the planning table as achieving ‘cultural competence’. This logic, 
once established as an assumption for increasing workforce diversity, can then be 
seen explicitly applied in a Latino context. A typical example of this is offered in a July 
2014 booklet produced by the agency to encourage applications from ethnic minority 
candidates, where a case study of Javier, a current Latino CIA operative is presented: 
 
Over the past 12 years, he has worked shoulder to shoulder with CIA officers and foreign 
officials in support of counterterrorism and counter-narcotics efforts around the world. 
His native language ability and keen understanding of Latin culture has allowed him to 
contribute to the CIA’s mission in a meaningful way.392 
 
The message here is clear: by employing Latinos who demonstrate a familiarity with 
high-culture Latin American heritage, including speaking Spanish, then the CIA is 
better placed to overcome the cultural dissonance between US and Latin American 
culture, to the benefit of furthering their foreign policy goals. 
This sentiment, of the inherent value to US foreign policy of the Latin American 
cultural heritage of Latinos, is also incorporated in a November 2015 report on the 
future of US diplomacy by the Center for American Progress, an influential DC-based 
think tank. Here, they present the case that in future it will be possible for a Latino 
to reconcile their loyalty to the United States with a loyalty to their Latin heritage. 
Again, they encourage this to be thought of as an asset for US foreign policy: 
 
These are only first steps; as their political and economic influence expands, U.S. Latinos 
will play a much more relevant role in defining U.S.-Latin American relations. Countries 
throughout the Americas—including the United States— need to realize that strong 
                                                     
391 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs: ‘Director’s Diversity in Leadership Study: 
Overcoming Barriers to Advancement’, 17th April, 2015, P. 12. 
[https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/dls-report.pdf] 




identification as a U.S. Latino and loyalty to the United States can comfortably co-exist 
with strong ties to countries of origin.393 
 
Another report by the Wilson Center and the Pacific Council on International Policy 
in 2012, entitled ‘Sharing Space with our hemispheric partners: A Latino Perspective 
on U.S. Policy toward Latin America’ made this point even more forcefully: 
 
Latinos know Latin America better than most other segments of the U.S. population 
because of their personal and linguistic ties, family histories, and consequent cultural 
kinship with the region. These language skills and cultural affinities can help form a 
bridge between the United States and its southern neighbors. Even more important, 
Latinos’ personal and familial histories cause them to look at U.S. foreign policy from a 
perspective that is both different from the current crop of foreign policy practitioners, 
and better suited to the demands of the current and future U.S. relationship with Latin 
America.394 
 
The ‘Latin America specialist’ argument for foreign policy participation 
 
The tone of the Wilson Center et al. report incorporates an additional component of 
this argument: That the cultural knowledge that Latinos can bring to foreign policy 
delivery extends beyond the inherent ability to reconcile high-culture and low-
culture divides, and in many cases includes a level of expertise of Latin America itself, 
based on the Hispanic cultural heritage. This argument is therefore contextualized 
towards US foreign policy aimed towards Latin America specifically, and suggests that 
Hispanics with Latin America expertise can benefit foreign policy both in terms of 
their potential capacity as diplomats interacting with local officials, as well as in terms 
of strategic thinking towards the region more generally. 
                                                     
393 Center for American Progress & Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas: ‘Latinos are 
Shaping the Future of the United States: How the United States and Mexico are Growing Together’, 
November 2015, P. 20. [https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/23114334/CAP-CIDE-report2-WEB.pdf] 
394 Wilson Center and the Pacific Council on International Policy, Latino Leadership Taskforce, 
‘Sharing Space with our hemispheric partners: A Latino Perspective on U.S. Policy toward Latin 





The justification for the claim that Hispanic Americans are likely to bring a higher 
level of expertise related to Latin America is based on interest, language and ethno-
cultural receptivity. Firstly, several interviewees stressed that Hispanic Americans are 
disproportionately likely to have an interest in the politics and events within Latin 
America and their particular countries of origin. As one former Latino ambassador 
explained: “We don’t think of it as foreign policy but we care about what happens in 
the region. We care about the earthquake in Nicaragua for example, or the floods in 
Mexico, because of the family and cultural ties. We haven’t lost those over several 
generations.”395 
 
Secondly, Latinos as a population have a much higher percentage of Spanish 
language fluency and general-understanding than non-Latinos, which provides 
organisations like the State Department with a rich pool of potential candidates that 
can be immediately inserted into local communities, thus allowing them to begin 
working quickly without the need to be trained to a sufficient level.396 In addition to 
this, as one interviewee noted, individuals who are raised in dual-speaking 
households are in better position to be able to learn additional languages more 
quickly; given the high rates of bi-linguists among Latinos, this should make them 
theoretically more attractive to recruiters in the US government. Eduardo Vargas, 
Deputy Director at the Centre for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives at the 
USAID, encouraged this idea in his interview: "Most Hispanics come from bilingual 
homes. Whether or not one language is more dominant than the other, studies have 
shown, the more languages you speak and the more you are exposed to, the easier it 
is for you to do analytic thinking and the easier it is for you to pick up a different 
language."397 
                                                     
395 Interview with Ambassador Lomellin, United States Ambassador to the Organization of American 
States, 2009-2016, 12th April, 2016. 
396 According to the 2013 US Census Bureau’s American Communities Survey, an estimated record 
35.8 million Hispanics speak Spanish at home, despite a rise in English proficiency. See J. M. 
Krogstad, R. Stepler & M. H. Lopez, “English proficiency on the Rise Among Latinos”, Pew Research 
Center, 12th May, 2015. [http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/05/12/english-proficiency-on-the-rise-
among-latinos/#fn-22303-1] 
397 Interview with Eduardo Vargas, Center for Faith Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) Deputy 
Director, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014-2017, 15th April, 2016. 
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Thirdly, under this argument, Latinos are better placed to successfully represent the 
United States in Latin America due to avenues for access that their ethnic heritage 
affords them. Whilst there has historically been a suggestion that Latinos would be 
unsuitable in diplomatic roles in Latin America because they would be unwelcome in 
their receiving state by the local political elites (either due to a sense that the 
demographic inferiority of the Latino population as a whole in the US would be 
reflected in the political order within the State Department, or out of a fear that they 
had been sent a ‘Trojan horse’)398, Latino interviewees emphasized the opposite: that 
being of the same ethnicity as the local population was, in fact, advantageous as it 
allowed them to be seen with greater levels of commonality. There is a greater 
chance that they will be received as fellow ‘Latin Americans’ and that this can afford 
them more avenues for successfully conducting diplomacy than non-Latinos would 
have in the same environment. In an interview with Dr Frances Colon, the Deputy 
Science & Technical Advisor to the Secretary of State with a background as an 
environmental expert in Western Hemisphere affairs, she offered a personal case 
study of such an interaction. A diplomat and scientist of Puerto Rican heritage, she 
recounted an example of how this dynamic advantaged her during an official trip to 
Cuba in which she met with the science and environment ministries: 
 
The fact that I was Caribbean, of Puerto Rican origin, that completely understood their 
day-to-day realities, that could speak to them not only in their language but their slang 
and idiosyncrasies, and that I was a scientist, was a completely different paradigm and 
they would often say “well you know what we are talking about”… so it was definitely a 
different approach than the many interactions they had had with US government 
officials that did not look like them, understood their issues because they learned them 
through books and tables – here was somebody that had grown up very much like them, 
but was behind the US flag… and there was sort of a “OK, she understands us, she has 
both best interests at heart” and they gave me access that for a while, people at 
                                                     
398 R. O. de la Garza, “Introduction” in R. O. de la Garza and H. P. Pachon (eds.), Latinos and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Representing the “homeland”? (Walnut Creek, CA, United States: The Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishing Group, 2000), PP. 10-12. 
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headquarters could not understand… and that certainly had everything to do with who I 
specifically was in their eyes.399 
 
Under this argument, Latinos, by their very nature, can strategically deploy their 
cultural and linguistic commonalities with other Latin Americans to gain 
disproportionate levels of access and opportunities than could be achieved by non-
Hispanic foreign policy practitioners. 
Therefore, it is evident that the argument that Latinos are ideally suited to be 
diplomats based on supposed analytical and communicative skillsets drawn from 
their ethno-cultural heritage exists as a valid, public-facing justification for efforts to 
increase Hispanic recruitment in foreign policy roles. As has been demonstrated, 
versions of this argument have been communicated by the federal government, think 
tanks, as well as by Hispanic foreign policy practitioners themselves. All of the above 
examples of this argument share two conclusions: Firstly, by increasing the number 
of Hispanics working in foreign policy roles, the federal government is able to harness 
the resources of a pan-ethnic Latino demographic where first generation immigrants 
often have direct experience of the culture of a region with considerable U.S. 
interests. Secondly, they are able to utilise the skillset of second and third generation 
Hispanic Americans who have developed cross-cultural interpretative skills that 
effectively makes them ‘natural born’ diplomats.  
 
The diversity argument for foreign policy participation 
 
The second major argument deployed by foreign policy practitioners to make the 
case that Latinos can benefit foreign policy is to emphasise what are perceived to be 
advantages of diversifying the US’ diplomatic corps more generally to include more 
recruits and senior staff from a more nationally-representative range of demographic 
backgrounds. Doing so would increase the number of Hispanics by default. This 
argument is set out in two ways: Firstly, by arguing that having a diverse diplomatic 
corps helps to present the US as a more legitimate meritocratic and egalitarian 
                                                     
399 Interview with Frances Colon, 7th April, 2016. 
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democracy. Secondly, by arguing that there are psychological benefits that greater 
diversity can bring to the foreign policy decision-making process.  
  
This argument goes beyond the specific benefits that Latinos can bring to foreign 
policy in-and-of themselves, and instead focuses more broadly on the virtues of 
widening the pool of talent within the foreign policy labor force to reflect more 
accurately the demographic composition of the wider US population. As Latinos 
are an actively growing relative percentage of this population, such arguments are 
favorable to Latino elites making a case for greater Latino involvement.  
  
The first strand of this argument is that, as the United States seeks to present itself 
to the world as an example of values such as democracy, freedom and equality of 
opportunity, it is vital that the foreign policy practitioners, which in the case of 
diplomats represent the literal ‘face’ of the United States to the international 
community, should accurately reflect the diversity and heterogeneity of the 
American population. Under this narrative, the US risks looking hypocritical if 
diplomatic overtures for states to promote equality of opportunity domestically are 
delivered exclusively by white, Anglo-Saxon men.  
  
By this same logic, the argument carries that by employing a wider range of ethnic 
individuals in front line foreign policy jobs, the US’ official positions of promoting 
democracy and civil society abroad carries greater legitimacy. A Hispanic ambassador 
that served during the Bush and Obama administrations and wished to remain 
anonymous, expressed this sentiment in his interview: 
 
It has become quite clear that as a business model for the United States, diversity - 
having a diverse representation - makes all the sense in the world because you are, after 
all, dealing with foreign cultures and if you bring people from different cultures - not only 
Hispanics but Asians, people from the continent, basically all parts of the world - that we 
as an institution would become much better able to do our job, not only because we 
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would be preaching diversity but we would be practicing it and we would be 
incorporating it within our own institutions.400 
 
For the ambassador, this is even more important in the State Department as US 
diplomats act as the front-line representation of the federal government, making it 
essential that they as an organisation make efforts to diversify. Thus, recruiting 
higher numbers of Latinos and increasing their level of participation in the foreign 
policy process is an essential component in ensuring this process of diversification is 
successful. 
 
The sentiment of this argument is identifiable in the official ‘Statement on Diversity 
and Equal Employment Opportunity’, issued in 2015 by then-Secretary of State John 
Kerry, a prominent feature of the State Department Careers website, in which he 
summarizes this position: ‘In order to represent the United States to the world, the 
Department of State must have a workforce that reflects the rich composition of its 
citizenry’401. The relatively high profile position of this short statement on diversity 
on the website for would-be diplomats indicates that this is a sentiment that the 
State Department is keen to see expressed as often as possible. This extends to not 
only its outward appearance to the general public, but internally as well. In a July 
2012 edition of the department’s official in-house magazine, State, Linda Thomas-
Greenfield, the then Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human 
Resources, echoed Kerry’s tone: “A diverse workforce demonstrates our country’s 
values and interests, reinforcing our message of inclusion and freedom… it is critical 
to our success as we conduct 21st-Century diplomacy. A Department that represents 
America to the world should be representative of America.”402 
In addition to this, Latinos serve additional advantage of being able to 
engage communities seen as ‘developing’, or in communities which also have a 
                                                     
400 Interview with a Hispanic ambassador and senior official in the Department of State, 11th April, 
2017. 
401 J. Kerry, Careers.State.gov, ‘Secretary’s Statement on Diversity and Equal Employment 
Opportunity’ n.d. [Consulted at: http://careers.state.gov/learn/diversity-inclusion] 
402 L. Thomas-Greenfield, ‘A Department of State Reflective of America’, State Magazine, 
July/August 2012 [Consulted at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195572.pdf]  
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heavily diverse population, in ways that Anglo-Saxon foreign policy practitioners 
would not necessarily be able to. As Latinos represent a community known to be 
socio-economically disadvantaged, they can be received with a greater level of 
solidarity than in communities that occupy similar socio-economic positions, or by 
political elites within developing states. Under this narrative, this affords Latinos 
additional opportunities to foster good-will with receiving communities as they can 
play a role that than Anglo-Saxons could not.403 An example of this, in a 2012 
Huffington Post article that argued for the benefits of having Latinos in the State 
Department as part of a more generally diverse workforce, they present the case that 
the very existence of this Hispanic Heritage Month, and its associated celebration of 
Latino culture, can pay dividends for foreign policy conduct by Latino diplomats: 
Latinos can help create relationships because they are born into a diverse background and 
master the world’s second most spoken language, Spanish. For instance, Pablo Quintanilla, a 
former member of the State Department’s Foreign Service said he used the Hispanic Heritage 
Month as a vehicle to engage in race diversity and language for young people in China. “When 
the Chinese community saw a Hispanic American speaking in Mandarin they were shocked, 
but welcoming. As a result, I realized that there was an instant bond in our South to South 
relationship.” This means that sending Latinos to Asia builds cultural trust more efficiently and 
effectively that can add value in building solid partnerships with the growing region.404 
 
The second strand to the argument that increasing the diversity more generally 
among foreign policy practitioners will improve foreign policy delivery is that greater 
diversity will lead to an improved capacity for decision-making. Under this narrative, 
the foreign policy organisations are drawing on the arguments that greater diversity 
in a workplace setting in a business has proven psychological benefits for those 
operating within a team or group: studies have demonstrated that the quality of 
problem-solving in groups is improved when the membership of that group is more 
                                                     
403 The CIA makes an alternative argument based on this same logic. Then-CIA Director John Brennan 
was quoted in a 2015 internal agency report on diversity as stating that the CIA needed a diverse 
workforce in order to “facilitate secret missions in countries where minorities go unnoticed.” As 
quoted in Yamily Habib, “The CIA is Looking For You”, AL DÍANews, 4th October, 2017. 
[http://aldianews.com/articles/politics/cia-looking-you/50144] 
404 J. L. Calderon, “How Hispanic Triangulation Can Help the U.S. Innovate in Foreign Policy’, 
Huffington Post, 18th May 2014. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josue-lopez-calderon/how-
hispanic-triangulatio_b_4976181.html] [Accessed on 28/1/2016] 
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heterogeneous. This approach builds on a growing body of research found within 
business, management and psychology.405 
 
The narrative presents this as being just as applicable in an institutional setting 
related to foreign policy as it is in a corporate setting: US foreign policy can best be 
served when a range of perspectives and backgrounds are featured in the planning 
and analysis of how it should be delivered.406 An example of this, in October 2015, 
Joaquin Castro, a Latino Congressman from Texas, introduced the ‘Foreign Affairs 
Inclusion Reporting Act’ Bill to Congress, which would force the State Department to 
take on more ethnic minority candidates and to report their progress every four years 
to a Congressional committee. He justified the bill using the idea of greater team 
decision-making: “A variety of views, backgrounds, and experiences contribute to 
more creative thinking and efficient problem solving, both of which play a crucial role 
in our nation’s diplomatic efforts”.407 
 
Foreign policy institutions have been quick to incorporate this argument into their 
narrative promoting diversity. In 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson 
emphasised the improved “work product” resulting from diverse the “points of view” 
brought by a more heterogeneous workforce.408 Similarly, a 2015 CIA published 
                                                     
405 See, for example: J. T. Polzer, L. P. Milton, and W. B. Swann, Jr., ‘Capitalizing on Diversity: 
Interpersonal Congruence in Small Work Groups’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
2007 PP. 296-324;  
B. J. Olson, S. Parayitam, & Y. Bao, ‘Strategic decision making: The effects of cognitive diversity, 
conflict, and trust on decision outcomes’, Journal of Management, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2007, PP. 196-222; 
and 
S. E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and 
Societies (2nd edition) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
406 An emergent body of research exists on the decision-making benefits of workforce diversity in 
foreign policy settings. See for example: M. Werz, Diversity as Foreign Policy Asset (Washington, DC: 
The German Marshall Fund of the United States: Policy Paper, 2006); and J. Wamala, "A Theoretical 
Approach to Demographic Diversity in the Diplomatic Service: A Study of the U.S. Foreign Service", in 
A. Chase (ed.), Transatlantic Perspectives on Diplomacy and Diversity, (New York: Humanity in Action 
Press, 2015). 
407 Joaquin Castro, quoted in P. Kasperowicz, ‘Dems demand more diversity at the State 
Department’, Washington Examiner, 28th October, 2015. 
[http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/dems-demand-more-diversity-at-state-
department/article/2575124] 
408 C. Morello, ‘Tillerson: Hate is not an American Value’, Washington Post, 18th August, 2017. 
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-hate-is-not-an-american-
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report into recruitment argued framed their need for greater diversity as a key part 
of their ‘business case’ for increasing diversity: 
 
Heterogeneous groups are more likely to reach sound decisions. Diverse groups benefit from 
collaboration among people with different perspectives - new ideas can emerge, individuals 
can learn from one another, and they may discover a solution to the problem… The Agency 
faces complex and weighty decisions and problems daily—in its analysis, operations, technical 
challenges, and support efforts—and diversity strengthens the CIA’s ability to arrive at the 
best decisions to enable mission success.409 
 
Ultimately, it is evident from an examination of the interviewee responses as well as 
published material from the federal government, that Latino generation foreign 
policy practitioners deploy two main arguments to promote greater recruitment, 
based on an argument that Hispanics are culturally advantageous to foreign policy 
delivery. The narratives used in these arguments range from the benefits of Latinos 
to act as ‘natural diplomats’, to their expertise of Latin America, to their ability to 
diversify the decision-making process.  
 
This reflects a clear shift from the reluctance to focus on culture that was observed 
among interview responses from Latino advocacy organisations in chapter 5. Instead, 
Latino foreign policy practitioners demonstrate a whole-hearted embrace of culture 
as a vehicle for the promotion of a key domestic goal: greater Hispanic recruitment 
into foreign policy related roles within the federal government. In addition, as has 
been demonstrated here, the narratives of these arguments have been mirrored in 
the official publications of foreign policy agencies and in the public communications 
of its representatives. This reflects the depth of coordination and mutual 
reinforcement between Hispanic FPPs and the federal government, treating a 
culturally-homogenous, pan-ethnic Latino block as the assumed organising principle 
of Hispanic Americans. 
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Foreign policy practitioners organising as a pan-ethnic demographic 
 
For Latino Generation elites, active identification with - and promotion of - a pan-
ethnic minority status extends deeper than the presentation of the argument that 
Latinos are natural diplomats, and has led to structural changes within the foreign 
policy infrastructure of the federal government. 
 
The first shift concerns the manner in which Hispanic employees have organized 
themselves within the organisational structures of the various foreign policy 
agencies, to reinforce a status as a minority demographic.  A key example has been 
the establishment, promotion and internal inclusion of the Hispanic Employees 
Council of Foreign Affairs Agencies (HECFAA) within the Department of State and 
USAID, to act as the internal association representing Latino employees.410 HECFAA 
follows a template that the federal government established within the foreign policy 
agencies to act as a voice for various minority groups, and there are parallel 
organisations representing female, African-American and LGBT employees. This 
platform has been used with notable success in recent years: HECFAA has lobbied 
senior leadership to promote targeted recruitment efforts and to encourage Hispanic 
promotions to senior positions.411  
 
Latino foreign policy practitioners have subsequently capitalized on this image of 
Latinos as a singular minority group, recognized and organized as such by federal 
employers such as the Department of State, and used it as a tool for encouraging 
greater targeted recruitment efforts. They have emphasized a focus on shared Latino 
cultural traits and socio-economic realities, including targeting universities located in 
the southwest United States and promoting opportunities for Latinos to be actively 
                                                     
410 ‘About HECFAA’, hecfaa.org. [http://www.hecfaa.org] last accessed on 01/04/2018 
411 For example, in his interview on the 16th April, Josue Barrera discussed a meeting in 2014 
between HECFAA leadership and Secretary Kerry in which they agreed on the importance of greater 
Hispanic representation within the State Department. 
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educated about foreign policy as a career choice.412 In addition they have advocated 
for formal mechanisms of support for them to overcome the structural obstacles to 
successfully navigating the competitive world of the foreign policy bureaucracy, 
including promoting the introduction during the 2000s of fellowship schemes 
designed to provide a structured pipeline for individuals from minority backgrounds 
to take up careers related to diplomacy.413 In addition, they have emphasised the 
importance of encouraging Latinos being promoted to senior leadership and high-
profile positions within foreign policy, to act as role models to encourage further 
Latino recruitment into foreign policy. Carmen Cantor, the Director of Civil Service 
Human Resource Management in the State Department with extensive previous 
experience in recruiting and employment within the Foreign Service, emphasised the 
importance of this last point:  
 
It's important you see yourself in those positions. This year, we had two Hispanics 
running for Presidents, Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz. ... It takes time but you do see it. We 
do need more Hispanic ambassadors. The more we get out there, the more our students, 
our children, can see that. It's a matter of being a role model.414 
 
The success of such narratives is not limited to the State Department. Structural 
efforts within the CIA to increase diversity in recruitment and promotion mirror this 
approach. The 2016-2019 ‘Diversity and Inclusion Strategy’ includes several 
initiatives designed to encourage the promotion and recruitment of minority 
applicants. These include the structured mentoring of existing employees, a 
                                                     
412 For example, a number of interviewees emphasised that they first seriously considered careers in 
foreign policy after being exposed to a ‘Diplomat-in-Residence’ at college. This is a program 
established by the State Department to combat the stereotype that foreign policy agencies do not 
recruit ‘West of the Mississippi’. The program assigns serving foreign service officers in campuses at 
historically-associated with minority students, and in geographic locations which are under-
represented in the department. ‘Diplomats-in-Residence’ then attempt to promote careers in the 
foreign policy to students in the region. 
413 For example, the Thomas R. Pickering Fellowship and the Charles B. Rangel fellowships are 
funded by the State Department and offer a fully-funded Master’s degree program for individuals 
from minority groups that have been historically under-represented within the State Department 
and incorporate a series of internships and mentorship schemes. Both require graduates to commit 
to five years of employment with the Foreign Service upon completion. The Donald M. Payne 
International Development Fellowship offers an equivalent program at USAID.  
414 Interview with Carmen Cantor, Director, Civil Service Human Resource Management, U.S. 
Department of State, 15th April, 2016. 
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framework of experience to build a “pipeline for leadership”, re-configuring the 
agency’s recruitment and student outreach efforts to better reach minorities, and 
fully integrate the recognised internal organisations of minority groups such as 
Hispanics so that they have access to senior leadership figures.415 
 
However, whilst the focus on an ethno-cultural minority status has secured 
organisational recognition, it has also resulted in the explanations for the lack of 
historical Latino participation in foreign policy being conceived and interpreted 
through the lens of culture: Just as the promotion of a culturally homogenous, pan-
ethnic label has delivered significant structural benefits to Hispanics within the 
federal foreign policy workforce, it also has meant that culture has become the 
organising principle through which explanations for Latino under-representation in 
foreign policy careers is framed and considered. As was highlighted in the following 
illustrations with several interviewees, these cultural explanations range from 
perceived family pressures to questioned political loyalties: 
 
One such explanation is that Hispanics are culturally averse to the lifestyle of 
frequent travel characteristic of a diplomatic career. As one interviewee, who was at 
a very early stage in their State Department career and wished to remain anonymous, 
reflected: 
 
When I told my parents that I wanted to be a Foreign Service officer, they said: “why are 
you going to a third world country when we just came from one so you wouldn’t have 
to?” So there’s a sense that this is the greatest country in the world, we left everything 
to come to the United States, why would you want to leave it? There’s again the sense 
of family where I’m the first person in my family to leave the state of Idaho… so there’s 
that family tie.416 
 
According to Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, a retired career diplomat of Cuban heritage 
that previously served as the ambassador to Nicaragua in the mid-to-late 90s and the 
                                                     
415 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2016-2019’, PP. 4-6. 
[https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Diversity_Inclusion_Strategy_2016_to_2019.pdf] 
416 Interview with a Hispanic Pickering Fellow, 11th April, 2016. 
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Ambassador to Argentina from 2003 to 2006, this kind of parental influence 
represents a significant problem when trying to encourage young Hispanics to 
consider diplomatic careers. In particular, a desire amongst first-generation Hispanic 
parents for their children to pursue more traditional careers thought of as 
aspirational puts pressure on Hispanic graduates to gravitate towards professions 
conventionally associated with higher socio-economic status such as “the traditional 
jobs like doctor, lawyer and businessman. Not the foreign service.”417 
 
Compounding the problem, these cultural assumptions of familial pressures on 
Hispanics are prevalent within foreign policy institutions themselves, forming a 
potential culturally prejudicial barrier for Latinos. For example, Josue Barrera, the 
Executive Diversity Outreach Manager at the Department of State and Vice President 
of HECFAA, stressed that assumptions about Hispanic culture could inform attitudes 
towards recruitment within the State Department. When asked whether he had 
encountered obstacles to recruiting Hispanics, he suggested that these perceived 
cultural traits had, over time, led to an institutional assumption within the State 
Department that Hispanics have a cultural bias against careers in the Foreign Service 
which hindered outreach efforts:  
 
We had, once upon a time, a stereotype that Latinos don't want to go far; they are glad 
to stay at home and work in agriculture. There was a predetermined idea about what is 
expected… Every now and then you'll still here it from a senior leader who will say "kids 
from Mexico never want to leave" and those of us who are here will put our hands up 
and say "I'm not in South Texas any more. I’m here because I want to contribute".418 
 
Such a concern for the problems of geographic mobility can evolve into cultural 
prejudices concerning the political loyalties of Hispanic Americans themselves: Some 
interviewees insisted that this sentiment did continue to exist within the foreign 
policy bureaucracy, suggesting that there remained a level of institutional 
                                                     
417 Interview with Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, United States Ambassador to Argentina, 2003-2006, 
12th April, 2016. 
418 Interview with Josue Barrera, Executive Diversity Outreach Manager, Civil Service Human 
Resource Management, U.S. Department of State, 16th April, 2016. 
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assumption from some government leaders that Latinos, with status as recent 
immigrants, are suspected of having questionable loyalty. For example, Eduardo 
Vargas reflected on the type of dialogues that perceptions of unconfirmed loyalty 
can produce within foreign policy agencies in his interview:  
 
I think one of the things that has kept us out is that if you are Hispanic and you are 
representing the US government, the question is “where are you from?... Where are you 
really from?... You are American but people might see it with a bit of an asterisk, that 
your primary alliance or your primary interests are going to be your parents’ homeland 
or where you came from, versus the United States. I think that kind of stigma is quite 
common in immigrant groups.419 
 
Therefore, the promotion of Latino culture as part of a strategy to increase structural 
reforms that benefit Hispanic recruitment have the consequence of compounding 
any perceived cultural limitations of the Hispanic demographic as much as helping to 
overcome them. From interview discussions with Hispanic FPPs, it is clear that 
presenting an image of confounded cultural stereotypes is as much a necessary 
component of engagement with foreign policy discourse as is the promotion of 
perceived positive cultural attributes. 
 
Ultimately, the extent to which Latino-generation elites have consolidated and 
institutionalised their minority status underlines the central importance of the Latino 
label within foreign policy institutions. The ethno-cultural framing as a pan-ethnic 
group with distinct shared cultural characteristics extend beyond mere rhetoric: It 
has had a substantive impact on the way in which Hispanics have been conceptually 
and logistically processed within the foreign policy infrastructure of the federal 
government. In particular, interviewee responses emphasise that the challenges to 
both recruitment and retention of Hispanic individuals are conceived of and 
processed through an ethno-cultural lens. As a result, potential solutions have been 
proffered with Latino pan-ethnic demographic as the central unit. 
 
                                                     
419 Interview with Eduardo Vargas, 15th April, 2016. 
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The federal government has responded to this challenge with the construction of an 
explicit architecture based on the assumption of a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ status. Within 
the Department of State and USAID, HECFAA has been recognised as the established 
platform for the promotion of Hispanic interests, enabling the effective advancement 
of a culture-based argument for Latinos as ‘natural diplomats’420, demonstrating the 
extent to which the government has reinforced a pan-ethnic label of ‘Latino’ as the 




Through an analysis of interview discussions as well as government policies and 
official publications, this chapter has demonstrated the extent to which Latino-
generation foreign policy practitioners engage with the discourse of US foreign policy 
by promoting arguments that Latinos can and should deploy specific cultural 
attributes to improve the execution of foreign policy.  
 
This has revealed important dynamics in the interaction between Hispanic FPPs and 
the government agencies responsible for foreign policy, as well illustrating the extent 
to which Hispanic foreign policy elites working within diplomatic and intelligence 
careers engage with foreign policy discourse in important but different ways to other 
Hispanic elites, both historical and contemporary. 
 
Firstly, unlike the positions of the Latino advocacy organisations examined in Chapter 
5 that stressed shared political interests as the main source of Latino perspectives on 
foreign policy, Latino FPPs emphasise the central importance of a common culture 
as the defining element with which to interpret the potential strengths and possible 
                                                     
420 Whilst HECFAA within both the State Department and USAID have the most visible external 
presence, equivalent organisations exist within other foreign affairs agencies. The CIA administers 
‘Agency Resource Groups’ along similar principles to the affinity groups within the State Department 
and USAID. In a 2008 interview promoting agency efforts to diversify, a Hispanic CIA employee 
named ‘Sandra’ described the role of the Hispanic Advisory Council (the Latino ‘Agency Resource 
Group’) as an opportunity to network with more senior Hispanic employees to encourage 
mentorship opportunities. (See “The People of the CIA… Hispanic Employees bring Diversity of 
Thought to the Agency”, 16th October, 2008. [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-
story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/hispanic-heritage-month-part-2.html]). 
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problems facing Hispanics pursuing foreign policy careers. This highlights a return by 
to a centralising of culture within the pan-ethnic Hispanic identity that had been 
successfully utilised by Chicano elites during the 1960s and 1970s, examined in 
Chapter 3. However, where Chicanos had used culture as part of a platform for the 
promotion of an ethno-nationalism centred on the political marginalisation of 
Hispanics, Latino-generation elites invoke particular common cultural traits as 
essentialised aspects of a pan-ethnic Latino identity. In addition, compared to 
findings from previous literature examining Hispanic foreign policy elites, over the 
past twenty years there has been more of an explicit and willing recognition of a pan-
ethnic ‘Latino’ status within foreign policy agencies among Hispanics.421 
 
The focus on shared cultural attributes has been used to great effect to promote 
further Hispanic recruitment and promotion within foreign policy agencies. It has 
allowed for the development of sophisticated arguments, coordinated and shared 
between Hispanic elites and the foreign policy departments and agencies of the 
federal government, that greater Hispanic recruitment would benefit the delivery of 
US foreign policy, in significant part due to the cultural heritage of Latinos, fortifying 
them a with cultural skillset that effectively renders them ‘natural diplomats’. In 
addition, the deployment of these arguments have been complemented by the 
consolidation of structured, recognised Hispanic minority groups within the foreign 
policy bureaucracy based around the premise of a pan-ethnic Latino identity. As a 
consequence, this has facilitated cultural explanations becoming the default lens 
through which the lack of Hispanic representation within the foreign policy agencies 
of government – as well as possible solutions to this lack of representation – have 
been conceived and processed by both Latino-generation elites and the federal 
government itself.  
                                                     
421 See for example, R. O. de la Garza, “Introduction” in R. O. de la Garza & H. P. Pachon (eds.) 
Latinos and U.S. foreign policy: representing the “homeland”?, PP. 10-12. FSO interviewees between 
1997-1999 indicated a reluctance to emphasise a Latino ethnicity within the State Department for 
fear of being tied to the “cucaracha circuit” of Latin American diplomatic posts. In addition, they 
stated that emphasising their Hispanic heritage can raise concerns over divided loyalties among 
colleagues, and can disappoint foreign governments that fear a Hispanic ambassador would be 
unlikely to carry the political weight of an Anglo-American ambassador. Thus, the emboldened focus 





This chapter will serve as a conclusion to the thesis. It will revisit the central findings 
from the case studies of the three generations examined in this study, and outline 
the principle themes drawn out of the analysis. It will then examine what these 
findings and themes reveal about Hispanic American elite engagement with US 
foreign policy, and demonstrate how the evidence gathered from these case studies 
support the main thesis claims presented in the introduction. Following this, it will 
emphasise why the findings of this research project make an important contribution 
to the existing literature, as well as why an academic examination of Hispanic elite 
engagement with US foreign policy is an important topic of study in 2018. Finally, it 
will examine the findings from this research project in the context of Donald Trump’s 
victory in the 2016 election and his administration’s subsequent policies on 
immigration and border security. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
possible avenues for further research enquiry, building on the findings from this 
project. 
 
Three generations of Hispanic American elites 
 
This thesis has presented an analysis of the diverse and complex ways in which 
Hispanic American political elites have engaged with US foreign policy. It has 
achieved through the utilisation and deployment of a generational approach to 
understanding Hispanic elite behaviour, having adapted the concept of a 
generational framework first conceived and popularised in the work of Mario T. 
García. The three Hispanic case studies examined in this study were the Chicano 
generation, the Exile generation and the Latino generation, with each case study 
revealing unique forms of foreign policy engagement by elites from individual 
generations, as well as commonalities across all of them. 
 
The case study of the Chicano generation elites examined their engagement with US 
foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. It found that this generation, which 
was characterised by decentralised, mass-movement campaigns centred around 
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charismatic individual leaders, engaged with US foreign policy in three distinct ways. 
Firstly, it engaged with US foreign policy discourse. This was evidenced through the 
way in which a critical re-interpretation of the history of US foreign policy, US 
western expansion and American manifest destiny were a central component in the 
construction of Chicano ethno-nationalism, which was the central identity of 
resistance adopted by the movement. A symbolic protest against the perceived 
illegitimacy of US sovereignty in the southwest United States formed a central 
narrative within Reies Tijerina’s land grant campaign during the 1960s, and the 
Brown Beret’s occupation of Catalina Island in 1972. Secondly, they critically engaged 
with administration policy, using opposition to the Vietnam War to generate support 
for their local civil rights campaigns, culminating with the Chicano Moratorium 
marches in 1969 and 1970. Finally, they engaged as private diplomatic actors, with 
Reies Tijerina’s La Alianza and José Ángel Gutiérrez’s Raza Unida Party attempting to 
lobby the government of Mexican president Luis Echeverría to make Chicano civil 
rights an international diplomatic issue, as well through the international outreach 
efforts of Cesar Chavez’s National Farmworkers Union to develop European trade 
union support for the California farmworkers strike. 
 
The case study of the Exile generation elites examined engagement with US foreign 
policy during the 1980s. It found that both Cuban and Central American elites, 
representing relatively homogenous populations that had been politically dislocated 
and wished to return to their actual or symbolic homeland, organised and 
participated in campaigns to influence the US foreign policy outcomes of the Reagan 
administration. In the case of the Cuban exile elite, this came in the form of support 
for the US government’s policies and was rewarded with political and economic 
benefits for the Cuban population in Miami. The Central American exile elites 
opposed US foreign policy, and joined a coalition of US political actors in an attempt 
to apply public pressure to the government to end their campaigns in Central 
America.  
 
The case study of Latino generation elites in the contemporary period examines 
engagement with foreign policy by national Latino advocacy organisations, as well as 
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by Hispanic Americans working as foreign policy practitioners within the federal 
government. This found that in the case of LAOs, there was very limited active 
engagement with conventional US foreign policy issues, as well as no consistent 
organised effort to influence US foreign policy towards Latin America. When 
interviewed, organisations stated that this was due to a need to focus on the socio-
economic, domestic concerns that were a priority for Hispanic Americans living in the 
United States, rejecting the suggestion of an ethnic, cultural homogeneity that could 
inform Hispanic elite preferences for a foreign policy agenda. The case study found 
that where they are most likely to engage with US foreign policy was on intermestic 
issues such as immigration, as well as the topic of the environment and climate 
change. The case study further found that for Hispanic foreign policy practitioners, 
advancing an ethno-cultural definition of a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ identity that 
emphasised the cultural advantages that Hispanic Americans can bring to foreign 
policy delivery, allowed them to promote a series of arguments to justify why 
Hispanic American recruitment into foreign policy careers within the federal 
government should be encouraged and promoted. These arguments were ingrained 
within the narratives around minority recruitment and were broadcast by both the 
Hispanic FPPs themselves as well as by various foreign affairs agencies of the 
government. 
 
The importance of the research 
 
In addition to illustrating the rich and multifaceted nature of US foreign policy 
engagement by elites from different political generations across several decades of 
US history, collectively these case studies reveal several important findings that, 
when considered in the context of the existing academic literature on ethnic interest 
group engagement with US foreign policy, offer an original contribution to 
knowledge. As was outlined at the outset of the thesis introduction, these findings 
have been categorised into four distinct ‘thesis claims’. 
 
Firstly, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that Hispanic American elites do 
engage with US foreign policy; engaging with discourse, with specific policy issues 
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and through acting as international political actors. However, as was evidenced 
across all three case studies, Hispanic elites will only engage with US foreign policy 
where it supports, promotes or complements their domestic political agendas.  
 
Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that by sufficiently broadening the analytical 
scope of US foreign elite engagement so as to encompass engagement with foreign 
policy discourse, policy preference discussion and international outreach, a 
considerable expanse of important and multifaceted engagement is revealed beyond 
a simple measure of explicit attempts to influence US foreign policy outcomes 
towards Latin America. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis provides empirical support to substantiate some of the findings of 
existing research. In particular, the observation in Chapter 5 that Latino advocacy 
organisations continue to resist engaging with a foreign policy agenda, and do not 
lobby for their ancestral homelands, support the findings and pioneering research of 
Rodolfo O. de la Garza et al. However, it also challenges a number of assumptions 
found within the literature, including the focus within existing research on separating 
the domestic agendas of Hispanic elites from the foreign policy agendas of ethnic 
lobbies, demonstrating that where the assumption of mutual exclusivity is removed, 
opportunities for foreign policy engagement where the foreign supports the 
domestic agendas of Hispanic elites are revealed. 
 
Fourthly, through the wealth of insight produced by the analysis of three political 
generations in this research, this thesis confirms the utility of employing a 
generational approach in order to research Hispanic American elite foreign policy 
engagement, and presents this approach as an alternative analytical framework. This 
in turn validates the analytical framework of Mario T. García, in which Hispanic elites 
are conceived through, and categorized into, distinct political generations, each with 
its own characteristics, behaviour and idiosyncrasies. 
 
These thesis claims provide an important addition to the existing literature and 
represent an original contribution to knowledge. In addition to the claims above, 
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adopting a generational approach for this research helps to offer additional 
explanatory context for the high-profile concern of Samuel Huntington in the 1990s 
that demographic change and immigration patterns were leading to a ‘Hispanic 
challenge’ in the United States. For Huntington, continued Latin American (and 
particularly Mexican) immigration risked leading to an influx of Hispanics that did not 
wish to assimilate into the mainstream US population, preferring instead to maintain 
their existing Hispanic cultural and political values, with the eventual consequence 
that this risked endangering the Anglo-Saxon ‘American Creed’ that underscored the 
US national interest.  
 
This thesis, by deploying a generational approach, reveals that Huntington’s claims 
were likely conceived against a historical experience of both the Chicano generation 
– which had indeed emphasised the importance of resisting assimilation, promoting 
a Chicano nationalism and delegitimising the US political system – and the Exile 
generation, which had seen many years of high-profile attempts to influence US 
foreign policy outcomes towards a specific Latin American country of origin to serve 
that Exile community’s interests. Against this backdrop, the claims of Huntington can 
be better understood. However, as the thesis demonstrates, by the 1990s, the 
Mexican American and later the pan-ethnic Latino elites had structurally and 
ideologically adapted to commit to working within the US political infrastructure, 
building coalitions of support with other US interest and business groups, and to 
focus on socio-economic concerns over foreign policy. By viewing US foreign policy 
engagement within the framework of a generational approach,  it becomes clear that 
by the time Huntington began expressing his concerns, they had already been 
resolved. 
 
Hispanic foreign policy engagement in the age of Trump 
 
As outlined above, the central claims of this thesis make an important contribution 
to the existing literature and help to further the academic understanding of Hispanic 
American engagement with US foreign policy, in addition to helping to frame this 
existing literature within its historical and political context. However, the findings of 
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this research also offer a potential utility beyond the literature debate: Given the 
domestic political environment in which Hispanic Americans find themselves in 2018, 
the findings of this research can serve as a relevant and timely tool with which to 
analyse, understand and anticipate the different possible ways in which Hispanic 
elites will choose to respond to the challenges and opportunities provided by the 
election of Donald Trump to the Presidency in 2016.  
 
Donald Trump’s election campaign introduced an unprecedented degree of focus on 
the Hispanic American population within the US and, from the outset of his 
campaign, he made attacks on Mexican immigrants a prominent campaign issue. In 
his original speech announcing his intention to run for president in June of 2015, he 
portrayed immigrants in a negative light: 
 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. 
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re 
bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.422 
 
Trump was quick to emphasise these comments within the context of the Mexican 
government’s hostility towards the US. In an interview a month after his speech, he 
blamed the Mexican government for deliberately sending “the bad ones” across the 
border.423 This was followed by a statement furthering this narrative, arguing that: 
 
The largest suppliers of heroin, cocaine and other illicit drugs are Mexican cartels that 
arrange to have Mexican immigrants trying to cross the borders and smuggle in the 
drugs. The Border Patrol knows this… likewise, tremendous infectious disease is pouring 
                                                     
422 M. Ye Hee Lee, “Donald Trump’s false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime”, The 
Washington Post, 8th July, 2015. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-
crime/?utm_term=.ede3593859cc] 
423 H. Walker, “Donald Trump just released an epic statement raging against Mexican immigrants 
and 'disease'”, Business Insider, 6th July, 2015. [http://uk.businessinsider.com/donald-trumps-epic-
statement-on-mexico-2015-7] 
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across the border. The United States has become a dumping ground for Mexico and, in 
fact, for many other parts of the world.424 
 
This account sought to emphasise Hispanic immigration within a context of a 
collection of different security threats, deliberately orchestrated by a foreign power. 
To combat this menace, Trump proposed the construction of a wall along the entirety 
of the southern border, to create a barrier of physical security between the United 
States and this proposed menace from the south. Trump repeatedly underlined the 
importance that the wall would be paid for by Mexico itself, promising to compel 
their government to do so through a threat of using the power of the presidency to 
end the flow of financial remittances from Mexican immigrants to their families back 
home.425 
 
Such rhetoric became a high-profile message of the Trump campaign, with such 
sentiments repeated at rallies across the campaign trail. By all accounts, this 
approach delivered the desired results. In a 2018 paper by Newman, Shah and 
Collingwood, they suggested that this anti-Mexican inflammatory rhetoric delivered 
Trump a cornerstone of his Republic voting bloc: Comparing data on the approval 
ratings for Trump amongst Republican voters before and after his initial speeches on 
Mexicans immigrants and the prospect of border wall, they found that support for 
his candidacy improved significantly after the speech, amongst voters in areas that 
had seen a high-degree of Hispanic population growth.426 
 
As a result, Hispanic Americans living with the United States, have, since 2016, found 
themselves as a legitimate topic of conversation within the wider public discourse on 
national security within the US. The rhetoric of the Trump campaign, and the 
subsequent focus on immigration and border security by the Trump administration, 
                                                     
424 Ibid. 
425 M. Pengelly, “Donald Trump backlash: 'I love Mexico' but promises border wall if elected”, The 
Guardian, 28th June, 2015. [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/28/donald-trump-
mexico-immigration-presidential-campaign] 
426 B. J. Newman, S. Shah & L. Collingwood, “Race, Place, and Building a Base: Latino Population 
Growth and the Nascent Trump Campaign for President”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 1, 
2018, PP. 122–134. 
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has resulted in the securitisation of Hispanic immigration: Since 2017, Trump has 
sought to focus the dialogue on his border policies around the threat posed by 
organised, violent Latin American gangs, rather than families or individuals. In 
particular, the Central American MS-13 criminal network has been a specific target 
of focus, with Trump emphasising supposed acts of violence carried out by the gang 
within the US, as well as encouraging the media and politicians to dehumanise them 
when discussing the risks they posed to the US border: Speaking at a May 2018 White 
House event to promote tightening border restrictions, Trump emphasised that MS-
13 were not “people, these are animals, and we’re taking them out of the country at 
a level and at a rate that’s never happened before.”427 These attempts at both 
dehumanising undocumented immigrants, as well as framing them within the 
context of violent criminal networks, has enabled the president, in conjunction with 
conservative media outlets, to present Latin American immigration to the US in terms 
of a national security ‘crisis’ for the US, one which necessitated the use of an 
aggressive response. In April of 2018, Trump instructed Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis to authorise the deployment of 4,000 US military personnel from the National 
Guard, along with vehicles, military equipment and helicopters, to the southern 
border to assist with border security, in response to a “drastic surge of illegal activity” 
from Mexico.428  
The justification for the administration’s decision to issue new guidelines in April 
2018 that sanctioned a “zero tolerance” policy for handling undocumented 
immigrants found at the border, which resulted in children being separated from 
their parents and housed inside wire mesh compartments at detention facilities, was 
similarly justified using this narrative. Vindicating the need for such measures in his 
authorisation of the policy, Attorney General Jeff Sessions suggested that the 
“national security” and “public safety” of the US was under threat, and that “a crisis 
has erupted at our Southwest Border that necessitates an escalated effort to 
                                                     
427 E. Shugerman, “Trump doubles down on 'animals' comment at immigration roundtable”, The 
Independent, 23rd May, 2018. [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/trump-immigrants-animals-ms-13-gang-long-island-a8366356.html] 
428 L. Ferdinando, “National Guard Troops Deploy to Southern U.S. Border”, press release, U.S. 




prosecute those who choose to illegally cross our border”.429 Homeland Security 
Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen similarly referred to Hispanic immigration in 2018 as a 
“national security issue” when defending the zero-tolerance policy, invoking Trump’s 
campaign images of Mexicans as rapists and criminals, stating that “these children, 
some of them were raped, they’re abused… they’re already recruited into a gang 
because that was the only way they could survive.”430 
 
For Hispanic Americans, the narratives around immigration in 2018 is therefore eerily 
familiar to the sentiments expressed at the height of the ‘culture wars’ twenty years 
earlier. The presentation of a ‘Latino threat’ in the 1990s share a number of 
characteristics with the current rhetoric emanating from the Trump administration: 
a viewing of Hispanic immigration within a national security lens, a pessimistic 
outlook for the consequences of an unchecked, growing Hispanic immigrant 
population, as well as the conceptualisation of the existence of a growing Hispanic 
American demographic as a ‘crisis’ that requires immediate address through security 
policy. 
 
Thus, the political landscape since the 2016 election is one featuring extraordinary 
levels of hostility towards Hispanic Americans, legitimised into public discourse 
through its deployment by the apparatus and infrastructure of the US government, 
driven by an anti-Hispanic mandate following Trump’s victory. For Hispanic 
Americans living within the United States, this new-found antagonistic environment 
presents them with two possibilities: the first being to react with open hostility 
towards the adherents of these policies, organising political protests and aligning 
with political allies that oppose the administration, with the second being to engage 
in a more conciliatory dialogue that legitimises the securitisation of the immigration 
debate. In addition, the new political landscape presents the possibility of Hispanic 
                                                     
429 Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, “Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance 
Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry”, press release, 6th April, 2018. 
[https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-
entry] 
430 K. Karson, “DHS Secretary Nielsen casts immigration crisis as 'a national security issue'”, ABC 
News, 21st June, 2018. [https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dhs-secretary-nielsen-casts-immigration-
crisis-national-security/story?id=56057714] 
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Americans furthering the process of pan-ethnic identification, strengthening inter-
Hispanic ties on solidarity in opposition to the president’s policies. It also presents 
the possibility of a fracturing of the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label, with the pressures of 
public antagonism towards Latin American groups encouraging some national origin 
groups to disassociate themselves from new arrivals from Mexico and Central 
America. 
 
Utilising the generational approach adopted in this thesis therefore offers an 
important analytical tool for making sense of the ways in which Hispanic Americans 
may choose to process and react to this new political environment since 2016. 
Through a consideration of the different methods of foreign policy engagement seen 
across the three generations examined in this research, it is possible to anticipate 
and understand the different ways in which Hispanic elites are likely to engage with 
US foreign policy when responding to President Trump’s policies. 
 
Since 2016, the administration’s policies have touched on themes that have been 
present in the case studies of the Chicano, Exile and Latino generation eras. Firstly, 
the seeming reigniting of the Latino threat narrative with Trump’s campaign 
represents a return to the prejudicial narratives that were explanatory factors behind 
the Chicano generation’s rejection of the US system in favour of a vocal ethnic 
nationalism in the 1960s and 70s, as well as the decision by Latino generation elites 
to emphasise their political loyalties to the US and its political system in the late 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
Secondly, the Trump administration’s policies concerning Cuba as well as Central 
America echo the political stance and policy positions that had been adopted by the 
Reagan government during the period of the Exile generation in the 1980s. For 
example, the Trump administration decided to abandon the ‘Cuba thaw’ initiative 
that had been a cornerstone of Barack Obama’s foreign policy and that had resulted 
in the first meaningful warming of relations between the two states and the easing 
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of travel and business restrictions.431 After initially supporting the improvement of 
bilateral relations between the two countries on the campaign trail, Trump adopted 
a policy of fierce opposition to easing relations in the latter half of 2016, following 
several campaign visits with Cuban exile groups in Florida.432 On Central America, the 
president has moved to end the ‘temporary protected status’ of refugees from El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, which had seen renewals in this status under the Clinton, 
Bush and Obama administrations.433  
 
Hispanic American elite responses to these policies have also reflected elements of 
foreign policy engagement that incorporate tactics and approaches from across all 
three political generations. Firstly, the rise in anti-Hispanic rhetoric has seen a 
burgeoning re-emergence of, and interest in, the Chicano movement and Chicano-
inspired protest movements across the southwest.434 These reflect a desire to 
promote a sense of national ethnic pride in Mexican-American and pan-ethnic 
Hispanic status, whilst echoing the critical challenge to the legitimacy of the model 
of immigration political incorporation that had characterised the original Chicano 
movement.  
 
Secondly, the administration’s policy of escalating deportation of undocumented 
immigrants, coupled with the ending of TPS status for hundreds of thousands of 
Central American refugees, has resulted in the re-emergence of tactics deployed 
during the Exile generation’s opposition to Reagan’s Central America policy in the 
1980s. The post-2016 era has witnessed the emergence of a new sanctuary 
movement, with Hispanic organisations and religious institutions providing shelter to 
undocumented Latin American immigrants and attempting to shielding them from 
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deportation.435 In addition, Trump’s move to return to a hard-line stance on Cuba 
and tighten business and travel restrictions to the island, has seen the emergence of 
vocal Cuban-American support for Trump from amongst the remaining Exile 
generation organisations.436 
 
Some Latino organisations have adopted an approach reminiscent of the retreat 
from critical foreign policy engagement made by the Mexican-American elites in the 
1980s, as they sought to distance themselves from the oppositional stance of the 
Chicano movement. In a similar vein, some contemporary organisations have sought 
to shed their remaining ties to the Chicano era in the hope of avoiding controversy. 
For example, in 2017 the National Council of La Raza formally changed its name to 
UnidosUS (which translates as ‘United US’), following a campaign of online criticism 
in 2016 from Trump supporters of the organisation’s inclusion of ‘La Raza’ in its 
name.437 The name was a legacy of its origins as a Chicano movement-inspired 
organisation, but had come under scrutiny following Trump’s suggestion that a 
Mexican-American federal judge had shown bias against him in a trial as the judge 
had been a member of a legal association that also contained the name ‘La Raza’, 
which Trump suggested indicated a support for Mexican ethnic nationalism.438 In 
changing their name out of concern for the implications of a presentation of ethnic 
nationalism following 2016, the NCLR cast off their link to the Chicano movement. 
 
Given this apparent re-emergence of numerous different types of US foreign policy 
engagement by the Hispanic American community since 2016, this suggests that the 
unprecedented hostile rhetoric and policies seen by the Trump administration could 
result in the emergence of a new political generation of Hispanic American elites that 
engage with US foreign policy in different ways to the Latino advocacy organisations 
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that have dominated Hispanic political representation in Washington since the 
1990s. Alternatively, it could result in the incorporation of methods of foreign policy 
engagement seen in previous generations in the agendas and political tactics of the 




Whilst the challenges and opportunities posed by the election of Donald Trump 
warrant close scrutiny of the ways in which Hispanic elites will react and respond to 
a hostile administration, the findings of this thesis also offer an important insight into 
the potential long-term outlook for Hispanic elite engagement with foreign policy. 
 
The Hispanic American demographic is growing, and despite reports that their 
ascendancy as a voting bloc was stalled following the 2016 election, it is nevertheless 
likely that they are going to become a political force within US politics in the 21st 
century, to the extent that they will be in a position to influence US foreign policy, as 
a result of their size as an electoral bloc. As was outlined in the Introduction chapter 
of this thesis, this assumption is shared by several important foreign states with 
which the US maintains a significant relationship, and is reflected in their escalation 
of outreach efforts to Hispanic American elites since 2012.439 As a result, Hispanic 
Americans are framed within a narrative of political ascendancy, in which Hispanic 
American elites are destined to enjoy positions of political influence. As a result, 
there has been a growing audience for Hispanic American policy perspectives in 
recent years, in an attempt to identify areas of difference or similarity compared to 
the mainstream population within the US. 
 
As the analysis of the dynamics of the current Latino generation advocacy 
organisations in chapter 5 has shown, any foreign policy engagement by Latino elites 
requires an ability to contextualise this engagement to the domestic, socio-economic 
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concerns that are considered priorities for the Hispanic population. As a result, 
assuming that Latino generation elites continue to enjoy their position as the 
recognised and legitimate ambassadors of the Hispanic population within wider US 
society, any foreign policy engagement will reconcile their domestic priorities with 
international concerns. Therefore, as was suggested in Chapter 5, future foreign 
policy engagement is likely to focus on intermestic issues such as immigration, as well 
as the environment and climate change. With particular reference to climate change, 
not only is this a relatively recent issue that has come to be associated with Hispanic 
elites and one that has not previously been considered by the relevant existing 
literature, but is also a topic on which Hispanic elites are actively being courted. As 
was discussed in the thesis Introduction, both the Canadian and British governments 
have sought to develop a working relationship with NALEO and other LAOs by 
communicating their governments’ strong positions on tackling climate change and 
environmental concerns, and making this a core platform of their Hispanic outreach 
efforts. This step suggests that, as the Hispanic population grows, increased 
engagement with foreign policy matters is something that is driven by 
encouragement from outside actors, rather than by a demand for Hispanic elite 
action on these issues within the population.  
 
Avenues for further research 
 
Whilst this research project represents an original contribution to knowledge and 
reveals several important conclusions of interest and use to the existing literature, 
the findings also suggest a number of areas in which there exists avenues for 
potential research in the future.  
 
The first avenue of potential further research would be to interrogate possible 
deeper meaning behind the findings related to the changing behaviour of Hispanic 
elites over time, from a position of outside radicalism to reconfiguring themselves 
into organisations designed to succeed within the established mechanism of the US 
political and economic system. Whilst this thesis has attempted to outline the 
consequences that this has had on Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy, 
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it has not addressed the question of what this change itself reveals about the nature 
of the US political system or the networks of power that influence US foreign policy. 
Parmar and Ledwidge have proposed that the US foreign policy establishment itself 
contains an ‘unacknowledged racial dimension’ that has evolved over time away 
from being a biological category towards a cultural, White Anglo Saxon Protestant 
mindset.440 As the authors contend, this mindset is one that a limited number of non-
white ethnic minorities have indeed been allowed to adopt in exchange for access to 
elite-status within the foreign policy establishment, thus reinforcing the privileged 
status of Waspish-ness as a necessary condition of entrance to positions of influence 
within the foreign policy for ethnic minority elites.441 The imminence of a ‘majority-
minority’ US population has therefore provided an impetus for the foreign policy 
establishment and the US political elite to extend their membership to an increasing 
percentage of ethnic minority elites willing to adopt this mindset, in order to 
maintain the hegemonic position of Anglo Saxon heritage within foreign policy 
planning. 
 
The findings of this research could therefore be further extended to explore the 
extent to which the case study of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy, 
and the transition away from critical positioning on US foreign policy matters by LAOs 
in the contemporary period, offers empirical evidence to support Parmar and 
Ledwidge’s framework. In addition, it offers the opportunity to contextualise the 
complex ways that Hispanic elite individuals choose to racially identify themselves 
against a racialised political structure.  
 
More widely, the findings presented in this thesis offer interesting implications for 
the debate over the role of power within the American state. Specifically, the 
contrast between the active assimilationist Latino Generation elites and their 
resistant, oppositional Chicano Generation counterparts, suggests that Hispanic 
elites have configured their image to best fit a pluralistic model of power and political 
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influence. However, the nature of this engagement and the reluctance to offer a 
critique of US foreign policy by Latino elites from the 1990s onwards, suggests that 
in fact, power remains as racialised and Anglo-privileging as Chicano elites were 
claiming two generations earlier. Further research that explores the empirical 
findings of this research within the context of competing models of the American 
state and its power structure, could provide fruitful new insight for this debate. 
 
The second area for potential further academic inquiry concerns the discussion in 
Chapter 5 of the emergence of ‘the environment and climate change’ as a topic area 
of likely future engagement as a foreign policy issue for Hispanic American elites. As 
suggested in the chapter, the possibility of a Hispanic environmental foreign policy 
agenda had not previously been considered by the existing literature, and therefore 
this finding offers opportunities for further research. In particular, the underlying 
explanation behind the apparent difference in policy preference on the environment 
and climate change by Hispanic survey respondents, compared to the mainstream 
population, is worthy of further study: As outlined in Chapter 5, interviews with 
recently-established Latino environmental lobbies indicates that Hispanic elites 
present both ethno-cultural and socio-economic explanations to account for the 
unusually strong Hispanic interests in the environment. Further academic research 
could attempt to establish the validity of these claims, and discern the extent to 
which a Hispanic concern for the environment and climate change is driven by 
Hispanic Americans’ Latin American heritage, their disproportionately high chances 
of living in an environmentally-degraded location within the US, a combination of 
these, or something else entirely. Furthermore, additional research could offer 
insight into how a potential Hispanic environmental foreign policy agenda would 
impact their overall political influence in the United States – whether adopting a 
distinct, Latino agenda on the environment would have an effect on Hispanic elites’ 
relationships with conservative and business lobbies both within the Hispanic 
American population, as well as within the wider US political system. Finally, further 
research could determine which configuration of Hispanic elites is likely to engage 
most prominently with an environmental foreign policy agenda, whether that be 
national or local elected officials, existing national Latino advocacy organisations, 
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small-scale Latino advocacy organisations with a specific environmental remit such 
as GreenLatinos, or existing mainstream US environmental and climate change 
lobbies that could claim to represent the environmental foreign policy concerns of 
the Hispanic American population.  
Given the apparent emerging focus since 2014 on the environment and climate 
change by Hispanic American elites as well as interest in Hispanic policy preferences 
on climate change policy by foreign governments, this topic offers a logical and 
potentially insightful area for future research. 
 
The third area for potential future research concerns the growing interest in the 
Hispanic American community by foreign governments, as outlined in the thesis 
Introduction. As this chapter outlined, four states with important bilateral 
relationships to the US were found to have conducted significant outreach to 
Hispanic Americans since 2012, with a focus on elected officials and high-profile LAOS 
such as NALEO and HACU. In the case of Israel, the United Kingdom and Canada, 
these overtures reflected a desire to make inroads with a demographic to which they 
generally lacked any historical, cultural or ethnic ties. Diplomatic officials from all 
three of these states, in addition to Mexico, indicated that these outreach efforts 
reflected an assumption of future Hispanic American influence in US foreign policy 
discourse. Therefore, a potential area of future enquiry concerns how far this level 
of outreach by these four states is indicative of a wider interest from US allies, 
partners and adversaries in the growth of the Hispanic American demographic. 
Further research could determine whether the case studies examined here, chosen 
due to their supposed status of each possessing a ‘special relationship’ with the US, 
is an outlier in terms of Hispanic outreach, or reflective of a growing interest in 
Latinos amongst foreign governments. In addition, further research could help to 
illuminate the type of outreach tactics likely to be used by foreign governments to 
establish a dialogue with Hispanic Americans: All four governments deployed their 
extensive consular networks to lead localised outreach efforts, with Israel doing so 
in conjunction with Jewish-American organisations within the US. Equally, Israel and 
Mexico conducted outreach in part to improve what they perceived to be negative 
Hispanic perceptions of these states (or negative perceptions of US aid in the case of 
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Israel), whereas officials from both the UK and Canada reported wanting to establish 
relationships where none had existing in a meaningful way before. Therefore, 
additional research could help to establish how far there is a homogeneity or 
heterogeneity in the tactics of, and strategic incentives for, Hispanic engagement by 
foreign governments more generally. 
 
Related to this theme, the fourth area of potential future research concerns the state 
of current and future outreach by Latin American governments towards their 
diaspora communities within the US, to the populations with an ancestral heritage in 
their country, and towards the Hispanic American demographic as a whole. As the 
examination of Mexico’s outreach efforts in the introduction section illustrated, 
Mexico has increased its outreach efforts towards the Mexican and Mexican-
American children of emigrants within the US, out of a concern that these individuals 
will have inherited a hostile attitude towards Mexico from parents that experienced 
violence, crime and government corruption before leaving the country. As a result, 
Mexico displays a concern that these individuals, once they rise to positions of 
influence within the US, will threaten US-Mexico relations with their prejudices 
against the Mexican government. To combat this, Mexico has provided considerable 
consular assistance to DACA-eligible undocumented immigrants, as well as partially 
re-framing their outreach within a ‘Hispanic’ rather than ‘Mexican’ context, to 
accommodate a perceived changing identity of Mexican Americans. Therefore, 
further research is needed to determine how far other Latin American governments 
with substantial diaspora and national-origin populations living with the US have 
adopted similar levels of outreach in recent years, and if they have, how far their 
rationale for engagement reflects similar sentiments and concerns. In particular, 
further research on the outreach attempts by the governments of El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic offer the potential of valuable 
empirical data to contribute to the existing literature of Latin American-Latino 
relations.  
 
The fifth area of potential future research concerns the findings in Chapter 6 that 
examined the nature of US foreign policy engagement by Hispanic Americans 
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working within the Department of State and USAID. This chapter found that Latinos 
working within foreign policy related careers within these agencies promoted a 
sophisticated set of arguments to justify the promotion and advancement of Hispanic 
Americans as foreign policy practitioners, with these narratives being reinforced and 
rearticulated by the foreign policy agencies themselves. This finding was important 
as it indicated a significant entrenchment of a pan-ethnic status within these 
institutions since the mid-2000s, as well as highlighting a coordinated effort to 
emphasise the ethnic, cultural advantages that Hispanic Americans can bring to bear 
on foreign policy, something that had not previously been examined by the existing 
literature. Given these findings, further research needs to be conducted to determine 
how far the experiences of these foreign policy agencies are reflected in the 
government more widely. For example, interviews could be conducted with Hispanic 
Americans working in the US military and federal intelligence agencies as well as in 
foreign policy roles in both state and local governments. This would help to provide 
further insight into how far the dynamics of the Department of State and USAID are 
reflective of Hispanic foreign policy engagement in the US government more widely, 
or if these represent something of an exception. 
 
Finally, a sixth area of potential further research concerns the possibility that the 
manner and form of contemporary foreign policy engagement examined in Chapters 
5 and 6 may change in the future as a new biological generation of Hispanic 
Americans replaces older elites. In 2014, 47% of US-born Hispanics were under the 
age of 18, with 74% being under the age of 33.442 As a result, the majority of US-born 
Hispanics were not alive during the period of the Chicano Generation, and most will 
have been no older than a child during the period of the Exile Generation in the 
1980s. Therefore, the Hispanic American population is characterised by its relative 
youthfulness: given the sheer size of the Hispanic population under the age of 18, 
there is a need to research this group to determine whether their policy preferences, 
having being formed without any lived experience of preceding political generations, 
                                                     




may be different from those of the current Latino generation elites. Were this cohort 
to indicate different foreign policy positions to older Hispanic Americans, it leaves 
open the possibility that the findings of this research will have less relevance as and 
when this new biological generation of Hispanic Americans takeover elite positions 
in the coming decades. 
 
This research was constructed with the principal aim of offering a contribution to the 
existing literature on ethnic interest group engagement and participation in US 
foreign policy. As a result, choices and decisions about which intellectual avenues to 
pursue and which to leave were driven by an awareness of a need to adhere to a 
relevance to the discussions within this literature, in order for the thesis to make a 
meaningful, significant contribution. Accordingly, this meant that there were 
moments throughout the research where the possibility of further intellectual 
analysis was available but left unexplored in order to adhere to the remit of the 
central research question. As a result, some of the findings from this study may offer 
the potential to be useful to research in academic fields related to the study of 
Hispanic Americans within the United States, but were not explored here. Areas of 
most likely usefulness concern both the empirical findings of the research, in addition 
to the analytical framework of the thesis.  
 
Firstly, the finding that Latino advocacy organisations and Latino foreign policy 
practitioners were willing to articulate and present the discussion of a pan-ethnic 
‘Latino’ label in notably different ways, may be of interest to scholars within both 
Latino Studies and Ethnic studies. In particular, the consistent choice by LAOs to 
frame ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ in the context of shared domestic interests compared 
to the narratives deployed by Hispanic FPPs that emphasised the ethno-cultural basis 
for a common ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ identity, reveal interesting observations on the 
differences between how Hispanic American elites chose to deploy ethnic 
terminology in different settings and different areas of public discourse.  
 
Secondly, this thesis presents the experiences of both Cuban exiles and Central 
American refugees during the 1980s as a single and cohesive ‘Exile generation’. This 
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combination is appropriate as it reflects the similarity of interests, tactics and 
circumstances between the two communities, and presenting them as a distinct 
political generation allows their behaviour and foreign policy engagement to be 
better understood in the context of the preceding and succeeding generations. The 
use of this generation, original to this thesis, offers a potential analytical tool for 
historians of Hispanic politics during the 1980s, as well as offering a contextualising 
insight for research into the emergence of the ‘culture wars’ during the 1990s.   
 
Finally, the use and adaptation of García’s generational approach to understanding 
Hispanic elite behaviour offers a potential use to researchers of politics beyond US 
foreign policy. Indeed, the use of the three case study generations explored in this 
thesis, that of the Chicano, Exile and Latino generations, offers a possible framework 
with which to address different political questions, using the same approach. In 
particular, this framework would be of use to scholars wishing exploring Hispanic 
elite engagement with political thought and ideology, as this would allow a 
comparison of the similarities and differences between the generations across the 
cold war into the present day, and recognise the role that the underlying 
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“Latinos Are Shaping the Future of the United States: How the United States and 




Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs: ‘Director’s Diversity in 
Leadership Study: Overcoming Barriers to Advancement’, 17th April, 2015. 
[https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/dls-report.pdf] 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs: ‘Diversity & Inclusion at the 
CIA’, July 2014. [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/diversity-
inclusion-at-the-cia/Diversity_And_Inclusion.pdf] 
 
E. Chávez, “¡Mi Raza Primero!" (My People First!): Nationalism, Identity, and 
Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 1966-1978 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2002) 
 
L. R. Chavez, The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation, 
2nd ed. (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013) 
 
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Latinos and the Future of US Foreign 




“Chicanos and the War”, La Raza, Vol 1. No. 3, Special Issue, 1970 
 
D. N. Cohen, “Seeing the Future, Israel and U.S. Jews Court America’s Hispanics”, 
Haaretz, 20th March, 2017 [https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-seeing-
the-future-israel-and-u-s-jews-court-americas-hispanics-1.5451213] 
 
S. L. Colby, J. M. Ortman, “Projections of the Size and Composition of the U.S. 




K. J. Cooper, “Hispanic Caucus Shows Its New-Found Clout”, The Washington Post, 





A. Corchado, “Why Israel wants to create an alliance with U.S. Hispanics”, The 




D. Correia, “‘Rousers of the Rabble’ in the New Mexico Land Grant War: La Alianza 
Federal de Mercedes and the Violence of the State,” Antipode Vol. 40, No. 4, 2008. 
 
J. Cortina, R. O. de la Garza, S. Bejarano and A. Wainer, The Economic Impact of the 
Mexico-California Relationship, (Los Angeles, CA: The Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, 
2005) 
 
“Cuba: A General Overview”, La Raza, Vol. 1, No. 7, 1972 
 
M. C. Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American politics, 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1994) 
 
C. Davenport, “Climate is a Big Issue for Hispanics, and Personal”, The New York 




R. O. de la Garza and M. Hazan, Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Mexican 
Organizations in the U.S. as Agents of Incorporation and Dissociation, (Claremont, 
CA: The Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, 2003) 
 
R. O de la Garza, “Chicanos and U. S. Foreign Policy: The Future of Chicano-Mexican 
Relations,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1980 
 
 254 
R. O. de la Garza, “Introduction,” in R. O. de la Garza and H. P. Pachon (eds.) Latinos 
and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the “Homeland”?, (Walnut Creek, CA, United 
States: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2000) 
 
R. O. de la Garza, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Mexican-American Political Agenda.”, 
in M. E. Ahrari (ed.), Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Greenwood, 
1987) 
 
R. G. del Castillo, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992) 
 
M. de los Angeles Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United 
States (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2001) 
 
Deport Racism, “Latinos Vs. Trump’s Racist Rednecks”, 21st September, 2016. 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kw9TOPnXFw&frags=pl%2Cwn] 
 
L. DeSipio, and R. O. de la Garza, U.S. Immigrant and Immigration Policies in the 
Twenty-First Century: Making Americans, Remaking America (United States: 
Westview Press, 2015) 
 
J. I. Dominguez, “Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs, No. 6, 2005 
 
S. E. Eckstein, The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and 
their Homeland, (New York & London: Routledge, 2009) 
 
E. Elinson, UFW Memoir: The UFW Grape Boycott in Europe (1968-1969 1974-1976), 
(UC San Diego Library: Farmworker Movement Documentation Project, n.d.)  
 
P. Elliott and A. Altman, “The Republican 2016 Field Takes a Hard Right on 
Immigration”, Time, 20th August, 2015. [http://time.com/4005245/republican-
president-immigration/] 
 
“El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán”, (n.p., 1969), 
[http://clubs.arizona.edu/~mecha/pages/PDFs/ElPlanDeAtzlan.pdf.] 
 
Ethnifacts, “The Hispanic Century Is Here: Results and Implications of the 2010 




D. J. Fernández, “From Little Havana to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and 
U.S. Foreign Policy”, in M. E. Ahrari (ed.), Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) 
 
 255 
L. Ferdinando, “National Guard Troops Deploy to Southern U.S. Border”, press 




M. Freund, “FUNDAMENTALLY FREUND: TIME FOR HISPANIC ‘HASBARA’”, The 




M. R. García-Acevedo, “Return to Aztlán: Mexico’s Policies Toward Chicanas/os,” in 
D. R. Maciel and I. D. Ortiz (eds.) Chicanas/Chicanos at the crossroads: Social, 
economic, and political change, (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1996) 
 
L. García Bedolla, Introduction to Latino Politics in the U.S (Oxford: Wiley, John & 
Sons, 2009) 
 
I. M. García, Chicanismo: The Forging of a Militant Ethos Among Mexican Americans 
(Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1997) 
 
M. Garcia, From the Jaws of Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of Cesar Chavez and 
the Farm Worker Movement (Berkeley, CA, United States: University of California 
Press, 2014) 
 
M. C. García, “Hardliners v. "Dialogueros": Cuban Exile Political Groups and United 
States-Cuba Policy”, Journal of American Ethnic History, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1998. PP. 3-
28 
 
M. C. García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 
1959-1994 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997) 
 
M. T. García, “Introduction: The Chicano Movement and Chicano Historiography,” 
in M. T. García (ed.), The Chicano movement: Perspectives from the twenty-first 
century (London: Routledge, 2014) 
 
M. T. García, Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity, 1930-1960 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 
 
M. T. García, The Chicano Generation: Testimonios of the Movement (Oakland, CA: 
University of California Press, 2015) 
 
M. T. García, The Latino Generation: Voices of the New America (Chapel Hill, NC: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2014) 
 
J. A. García, Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011) 
 
 256 
J. A. García, “The Chicano Movement: Its Legacy for Politics and Policy,” D. R. Maciel 
and I. D. Ortiz (eds.) Chicanas/Chicanos at the crossroads: Social, economic, and 
political change, (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1996) 
 
K. Geron, Latino Political Power, (Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2005) 
 
S. A. Gershon and A. D. Pantoja, “Latino Immigrant Transnational Ties: Who Has 
Them, and Why Do They Matter?,” in T. Affigne, E. Hu-DeHart, and M. Orr (eds.), 
Latino politics en Ciencia Politica: The search for Latino identity and racial 
consciousness (New York: New York University Press, 2014) 
 
O. Giuntella, “The Hispanic Health Paradox: New Evidence from longitudinal data on 
second and third-generation birth outcomes” SSM – Population Health, No. 2, 2016 
 
T. Golden, “Hispanic Group calls on Reagan to drop ‘contra’ support”, 25th October, 




L. E. Gómez, “The Birth of the “Hispanic” Generation: Attitudes of Mexican-
American Political Elites toward the Hispanic Label.”, Latin American Perspectives, 
Vol. 19, No. 4, October 1992 
 
A. Gomez, “Trump cracks down on U.S. business and travel to Cuba. Here’s what’s 




J. Gómez-Quiñones and I. Vásquez, Making Aztlán: Ideology and Culture of the 
Chicana and Chicano Movement, 1966-1977 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2014) 
 
R. Gonzales, in Antonio Esquibel (ed.) Message to Aztlan: Selected Writings of 
Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales (Houston, TX: Arte Público Press, 2001) 
 
A. Goodall, “El Salvador” in R. van Dijk, W. G. Gray, S. Savranskaya, J. Suri & Q. Zhai 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of the Cold war (Oxford: Routledge, 2008) 
 
“Guatemala: Social Revolution”, La Raza, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1970. 
 
A. Gumbel, “Pentagon targets Latinos and Mexicans to man the front lines in war 





J. A. Gutiérrez, “Mexicanos need to be in control of their own destinies”, Excerpt of 
Speech from May 4th. La Raza, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1970 
 
N. Guttman, “U.S. Jews and Latinos Form Unlikely Bond Over Immigration Policy”, 
Haaretz, 31st January, 2010. [https://www.haaretz.com/1.5093752] 
 
Y. Habib, “The CIA is Looking For You”, AL DÍA News, 4th October, 2017. 
[http://aldianews.com/articles/politics/cia-looking-you/50144] 
 
P. Hakim and C. A. Rosales, “The Latino Foreign Policy Lobby,” in R. O. de la Garza 
and H. P. Pachon (eds.), Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the 
“Homeland”?, (Walnut Creek, CA, United States: The Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishing Group, 2000) 
 
E. T. Hall, Beyond culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1976) 
 
E. T. Hall and M. R. Hall, Understanding Cultural Differences: Germans, French and 
Americans (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1990) 
 
G. Hartley, “I Am Joaquín: Rodolfo ‘Corky’ Gonzales and the Retroactive 
Construction of Chicanismo,” in R. Delgado and J. Stefancic (eds.), The Latino/a 
condition: A critical reader(New York: New York University Press, 1998) 
 
U. Hoffmann-Lange, “Methods of Elite Identification”, In H. Best and J. Higley (eds.), 
The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018) 
 
V. Huddleston, “Trump Is Returning Cuba Policy to the Cold war”, The New York 
Times, 21st November, 2017. 
[https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/opinion/trump-cuba.html] 
 
J. D. Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 
1991) 
 
S. P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 
76, No. 5, 1997 
 
S. P. Huntington, ‘The Hispanic Challenge’, Foreign Policy, October 28th, 1999. 
[http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/the-hispanic-challenge/] 
 
S. P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) 
 
R. Janik, “Over 50% of Americans Will Be Nonwhite Within 30 Years”, Time, 3rd 
March, 2015. [http://time.com/3730385/census-projections-diversity/] 
 
 258 
M. Jones-Correa, “Latinos and Latin America: A Unified Agenda?”, in T. Ambrosio 
(ed.), Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (United States: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2002) 
 
M. Jones-Correa, “Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and Its 
Consequences for Naturalization in the United States,” International Migration 
Review Vol. 35, No. 4, 2001 
 
E. Kamisher, “US LATINO LEADERS OBSERVE COMPLEXITIES OF ARAB-ISRAELI 




K. Karson, “DHS Secretary Nielsen casts immigration crisis as 'a national security 
issue'”, ABC News, 21st June, 2018. [https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dhs-secretary-
nielsen-casts-immigration-crisis-national-security/story?id=56057714] 
 
P. Kasperowicz, ‘Dems demand more diversity at the State Department’, 




K. M. Kaufmann, “Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino 
and African-American Political Coalitions”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 
2, 2003 
 
J. Kerry, Careers.State.gov, ‘Secretary’s Statement on Diversity and Equal 
Employment Opportunity’ n.d. [http://careers.state.gov/learn/diversity-inclusion] 
 




J. M. Krogstad, R. Stepler & M. H. Lopez, “English proficiency on the Rise Among 




J. Lara-Braud, “What is La Raza?”, La Raza, Yearbook, 1968 
 




L. Leal, “In Search Of Aztlán,” in R. A. Anaya and F. A. Lomeli, Aztlán: Essays on the 




R. S. Leiken, The Melting Border: Mexico and Mexican Communities in the United 
States, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Equal Opportunity, 2000) 
 
A. Leiserowitz, M. Cutler and S. Rosenthal, Climate Change in the Latino Mind: 
“Report Summary”, Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, (New Haven, 
CT, 2017) 
 
S. Levitz, “Federal government expands communications outreach to Hispanics in 
U.S. to curb asylum surge”, CBC, 6th September, 2017. 
[https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/pablo-spanish-asylum-los-angeles-1.4277333] 
 




J. M. Lindsay, “Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America’s 
Foreign Policy Style?,” in E. J. Wilson (ed.), Diversity and U.S. Foreign policy: A 
reader (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004) 
 
M. R López, Chicano Timespace: The Poetry and Politics of Ricardo Sánchez (College 
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2001) 
 
R. Lovato, “The War for Latinos”, The Nation, 15th September, 2005. 
[https://www.thenation.com/article/war-latinos/] 
 
J. Ludden, “Hundreds of Thousands March for Immigrant Rights”, NPR, 10TH April, 
2006 [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5333768] 
 
T. Luecke, Generations in World Politics: Cycles in U.S. Foreign Policy, the 
Construction of the “West,”, and International Systems Change 1900-2008. PhD 
dissertation: The Ohio State University, 2013. 
 
LULAC, “Special LULAC report: Fact Finding Mission to Cuba”, Winter 1984/1985, 
Chicano Resource Center, East Los Angeles Library, LULAC collection, Folder 1. 
 
K. Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations”, in Essays on the Sociology of 
Knowledge (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1928/1952) 
 
G. Mariscal, Brown-Eyed Children of the Sun: Lessons from the Chicano Movement: 
1965-1975 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2005) 
 
J. Mariscal, “Foreword: The Chicano Movement,” in M. T. García (ed.) The Chicano 
movement: Perspectives from the twenty-first century (London: Routledge, 2014) 
 
 260 
A. K. Marks, K. Ejesi & C. G. Coll, “Understanding the U.S. Immigrant Paradox in 
Childhood Adolescence”, Childhood Development Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 
2014 
 
N. Masuoka, “Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of Panethnic 
Group Consciousness Among Asian-Americans and Latinos”, Social Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 5, December 2006, 
 
J. M. McCormick: “Interest Groups and the Media in Post-Cold war U.S. Foreign 
Policy” in J. M. Scott (ed.), After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold 
war World (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1998), PP. 170-198. 
 
“Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labour of the Committee on Labour and Public 
Welfare”, Senate, 91st Cong., (1969), Testimony of Delores Huerta. 
 
H. Miller, “Latino Cultures Have a “Green” Legacy, Says Festival Founder”, 
TriplePundit, 4th December, 2014. [https://www.triplepundit.com/2014/12/latino-
cultures-inherently-environmentalist-says-festival-founder-irene-vilar/] 
 
J. L. Monforti, “Identity Revisisted: Latinos(as) and Panethnicity”, in T. Affigne, E. 
Hu-Dehart & M. Orr (eds.), Latino Politics en Ciencia Politica: The Search for Latino 
Identity and Racial Consciousness, (New York: New York University Press, 2014) pp. 
51-73 
 
W. Moquin and C. Rivera, (eds.), A Documentary History of the Mexican Americans 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971) 
 
G. C. Mora, “Hispanic Panethnicity”, Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, 
(Fall, 2011) [http://clas.berkeley.edu/research/research-hispanic-panethnicity] 
 





C. Moreno, “NCLR, Country's Largest Latino Advocacy Group, Rebrands As 




R. Morin, “Crime rises among second-generation immigrants as the assimilate”, 





A. Morris, A Practical Introduction to In-depth Interviewing (London: SAGE 
Publications ltd, 2015) 
 
C. Muñoz, Jr., Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano Movement (New York: Verso 
Books, 2007) 
 
D. Nakamura, “Obama thanks Mexico for ‘absorbing’ Central American refugees. 






National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, ‘2008 Hispanic Public Policy Agenda’, 2008. 
[https://www.maldef.org/resources/publications/nhlapublicpolicyagenda.pdf]. 
 




National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, “Latino Leaders United in Condemning 
Decision to End DACA and Call on Congress to Act Immediately”. Press statement. 




National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, “Re: NHLA Opposition to H.R. 6136, Border 




National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, “Statement of the National Hispanic 
Leadership Agenda Condemning Arizona Governor Brewer on Enacting Anti-Latino, 
Un-American and Un-Constitutional Law”, Washington, DC. 26th April, 2010 
[http://unitearizona.org/media/pdf/NHLA_Release_4-26-10.pdf] 
 
National Resources Defense Council, “NRDC Report: Latinos Are Especially Hard-hit 
by Climate Change”, 13th October, 2016. 
[https://www.nrdc.org/media/2016/161013] 
 
A. Navarro, La Raza Unida Party: A Chicano Challenge to the U. S. Two-Party 
Dictatorship (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000) 
 
A. Navarro, Mexicano Political Experience in Occupied Aztlan: Struggles and Change 
(New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 
 
 262 
B. J. Newman, S. Shah & L. Collingwood, “Race, Place, and Building a Base: Latino 
Population Growth and the Nascent Trump Campaign for President”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2018, PP. 122–134. 
 
The New York Times, Stanford University and Resources for the Future, “Global 




F. P. Noe & R. Snow, “Hispanic Cultural Influence on Environmental Concern”, The 
Journal of Environmental Education, Vol. 21, No. 2, PP. 27-34. 
 
J. Nordheimer, “Cuban-American Leader Builds a Foundation of Power Beyond 




Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, “Attorney General Announces Zero-




B. J. Olson, S. Parayitam, & Y. Bao, ‘Strategic decision making: The effects of 
cognitive diversity, conflict, and trust on decision outcomes’, Journal of 
Management, Vo. 33, No. 2, 2007, PP. 196-22 
 
L. Oropeza, ¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Viet 
Nam War Era (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005) 
 
S. Orozco, “‘The View of Chicanos in Mexico,’” Onda Latina: the Mexican American 
experience program collection of the KUT longhorn radio network, 1976-1982, (n.p.: 
Longhorn Network, n.d.), 
[http://www.laits.utexas.edu/onda_latina/program?sernum=000534549&term=.] 
 
U. Özek & D. N. Figlio, “Cross-Generational Differences in Educational Outcomes in 
the Second Great Wave of Immigration”, NBER Working Paper, No. 22262, May 
2016 
 
F. M. Padilla, Latino ethnic consciousness: the case of Mexican Americans and 
Puerto Ricans in Chicago, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985) 
 
H. P. Pachon, R. O. de la Garza, and A. D. Pantoja, “Foreign Policy Perspectives of 
Hispanic Elites,” in R. O. de la Garza and H. P. Pachon (eds.), Latinos and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Representing the “homeland”? (Walnut Creek, CA, United States: 
The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2000) 
 
 263 
S. E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, 
Schools, and Societies (2nd edition) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 
 
A. D. Pantoja, “Combating Climate Change Is a Distinct and Top Foreign Policy Issue 




A. D. Pantoja, “Transnational Ties and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The Case 
of Dominicans in Washington Heights, New York,” International Migration Vo. 43, 
No. 4, 2005 
 
I. Parmar “Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the 
Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations”, 
International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1., PP. 53-75 
 
I. Parmar and M. Ledwidge, “… ‘A foundation-hatched black': Obama, the US 
establishment, and foreign policy”, International Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3, PP. 373-388 
 
E. Patten, “The Nation’s Latino Population Is Defined by Its Youth”, Pew Research 




M. Pawel, The Crusades of Cesar Chavez: A Biography (New York: Bloomsbury 
Publishing USA, 2014) 
 
R. Peace, “The Anti-Contra-War Campaign: Organizational Dynamics of a 
Decentralised Movement, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
2008 
 
Michael Pena, “The Archaic, Historical and Mythicised Dimensions of Aztlán,” in R. 
A. Anaya and F. A. Lomeli (eds.), Aztlán: Essays on the Chicano 
homeland,(Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1991) 
 
M. Pengelly, “Donald Trump backlash: 'I love Mexico' but promises border wall if 
elected”, The Guardian, 28th June, 2015. [https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/jun/28/donald-trump-mexico-immigration-presidential-campaign] 
 
J. Perez, “Standing Up for Environmental Justice in the Latino Community” LULAC 
blog, Medium, 16th March, 2017. [https://medium.com/@LULAC/standing-up-for-
environmental-justice-in-the-latino-community-f51919df0cb6] 
 
H. Perla, “Central American counterpublic mobilization: Transnational social 
movement opposition to Reagan’s foreign policy toward Central America”, Latino 
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2013 
 
 264 
H. Perla, Jr., “Heirs of Sandino: The Nicaraguan Revolution and the U.S.-Nicaraguan 
Solidarity Movement”, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 36, No. 6, 2009 
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